THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA
IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

by

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ABSTRACT

This work studies the use made of the mass media by the British colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia to put across educational, cultural and political propaganda to the African population. The initial step was taken after an enquiry into a strike by African miners on the Copperbelt in 1935 publicised the fact that the widespread circulation of 'subversive' Watch Tower literature was being facilitated by the lack of secular reading material in simple English and the local languages. Government responded by starting its own newspaper, "Utende", and by sponsoring a committee to produce 'wholesome literature. War hastened the development of government propaganda services. An information office was established in 1939 which used press, radio and film to disseminate war propaganda. Africans did co-operate in the war effort but some propaganda had an unsettling effect: talk about Nazi oppression provoked some Africans to reflect on their own lack of freedom.

After the war the range of government propaganda broadened with special emphasis being placed on public relations and community development. The period was dominated by the white settlers' campaign for closer union with Southern Rhodesia. Before the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established in 1953 broadcasting and some film and literature production had already been organized on a regional basis. At first the Information Department was unsympathetic to the settlers' political ambitions, but once the
British government had agreed to the Federation proposals. The department began to put out pro-Federal propaganda in an attempt to overcome African hostility to the plan. Government propaganda services had assisted in the creation of an informed African opinion but Africans could not be persuaded to accept a federation which was considered inimical to their interests. In the long term, the administration's educational and cultural propaganda contributed to the socialisation of Northern Rhodesian Africans into a western technological society - with a British bias.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACEC</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSNA</td>
<td>Acting Chief Secretary for Native Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEKE</td>
<td>Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment</td>
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<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
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<td>CABS</td>
<td>Central African Broadcasting Station</td>
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<td>CAC</td>
<td>Central African Council</td>
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<td>CAFU</td>
<td>Central African Film Unit</td>
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<td>CBMS</td>
<td>Conference of British Missionary Societies</td>
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<td>CFU</td>
<td>Colonial Film Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cmd.</td>
<td>Command Paper</td>
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<td>C.O.</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office papers, PRO</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Central Office of Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>D.O.</td>
<td>District Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCLA</td>
<td>International Committee on Christian Literature for Africa</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Missionary Council</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Ministry of Information papers, PRO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leg. Co.</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>Nyasaland African Congress</td>
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<td>NAZ</td>
<td>National Archives of Zambia</td>
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<td>NRMU</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACS</td>
<td>Principal Assistant Chief Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.C.</td>
<td>Provincial Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office, London</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Secretary for Native Affairs</td>
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<td>S/S</td>
<td>Secretary of State for Colonies</td>
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INTRODUCTION

1. Definition of Terms

This thesis traces the development of government propaganda in Northern Rhodesia up to 1953. It is a study of the way in which a British colonial government used the new technology of mass communications as a means of social control.

Propaganda is nothing new. The word itself originates from the seventeenth century when the Catholic Church organized an association to spread the Catholic doctrine, to propagate the faith. Propaganda has therefore been associated from birth with proselytising, the converting of people to a particular belief or practice. The activity described by the word is, of course, older than the seventeenth century. Deliberate missionary attempts to propagate a belief can be found in the Bible and in Herodotus. But propaganda in the twentieth century has taken on a new meaning as it has come to be used by governments as an indispensable means of mass persuasion.

Propaganda - twentieth century style - is the product of the nation state, the technological society and the application of advertising techniques to government. Perhaps the greatest contributory factor to the ubiquitousness and importance of propaganda in the twentieth century is the mass communications revolution which enables visual and auditory messages to be mechanically multiplied by print and the electronic media.
and transmitted to anonymous audiences of thousands or millions. In this thesis, propaganda is used in the sense of a deliberate attempt by a government through the mass media - the printed word, film and radio - to influence, mould, control and sometimes to change the attitudes and behaviour of its citizens. The word propaganda is sometimes used to describe the activity or technique and sometimes the message itself, the content.

A certain odium has become attached to the word propaganda in the course of the twentieth century. This has come about partly because of the exaggerated and often false atrocity propaganda employed by both sides in World War I (e.g. British propaganda tales about Germans bayoneting babies and raping Belgian nuns); and partly because of the blatant totalitarian-style propaganda employed by Goebbels on behalf of Nazi Germany. As a result the term propaganda is often used pejoratively to refer to publicity put out by the other side: propaganda is lies told by the other side. But we shall see that governments display no qualms about the use of the word when they are discussing mass education and community development programmes when such terms as agricultural propaganda, health propaganda and propaganda for better living are used freely. Governments, however, as a rule, prefer not to describe a department as a propaganda department and will prefer to use less emotive titles such as public relations department, information department or publicity department.

The way in which a government uses the mass media as a means of social control varies according to the type of nation-state in which a government functions. In a totalitarian state such as the Soviet Union government has complete control over the media and only facts, images and opinions acceptable to government are permitted to be transmitted. Rigid censorship seeks to prevent any 'subversive' views from getting a hearing; this is carried to the extent of jamming foreign short-wave stations. In a liberal democracy of the British type government uses the various media to put across its own viewpoint but government does not own all the channels of communication and contrary opinions are allowed to be heard.

In the open market place of ideas a government has to persuade people to accept its policies and plans; therefore in a liberal democracy a government places great emphasis on the role of public relations. The term 'public relations' is of American origin and was coined shortly after World War I by a publicity agent, Ivy Lee, who had been hired by the millionaire, J. D. Rockefeller, to improve the image of Standard Oil. The public relations style of propaganda is more indirect and subtle than the frontal assault technique of a totalitarian government; its aim is to influence

public opinion. Hans Speier has defined public opinion as:

opinions on matters of concern to the nation freely and publicly expressed by men outside the government who claim a right that their opinions should influence or determine the actions, personnel, or structure of their government.

In a liberal democracy where the doctrine of popular sovereignty is deeply embedded in the popular mythology, government is seen to rest on the consent of the governed; this makes public opinion a potent force with which a government must reckon.

A British colony was neither a totalitarian state nor a liberal democracy. Government was more of a benevolent autocracy, authoritarian and paternal, though attempts were made to introduce a slight element of democracy through elected legislative councils which had some influence in local matters; but the composition of such councils was elitist as there was no universal suffrage. Government did not have complete control over the media so that contrary opinions could be expressed; to compensate, censorship tended to be stricter than in Britain itself. Government was not, in the last resort, responsible to the colonial peoples but to the British Parliament so that a colonial government did not display the same concern about the 'engineering of consent' as


did the government in Britain. This placed a government information department in a British colony in rather a tenuous position; it was a mouthpiece for an autocratic local government which acted on behalf of a liberal democratic government in Britain.

Colonial governments sought to adapt the local people to western technological society in general and, in particular, to socialise them into the British Empire and later into the Commonwealth. As early as 1938 R. S. Lambert noted the considerable role being played by propaganda in this process:

Indeed, our Empire to-day provides... hundreds of examples of the successful use of the subtler forms of propaganda, particularly in the governing and training of native peoples, e.g. in Africa, Christian Missions - on the face of it a form of religious propaganda - have an indirect political and economic effect which is often decidedly propagandist. So do educational and cultural influences, including popular forms of entertainment like the film and wireless, as transplanted from Europe and America.1

This thesis is concerned only incidentally with the role of missions or schools in the socialisation of colonial peoples; the emphasis will be on the way in which one colonial government used the mass media to convey and reinforce the norms of a particular social and political context. In 1936 one of the two themes selected for the conference of the International Colonial Institute was 'the means of spreading thought and ideas in the colonies

more particularly by the Press, Broadcasting and the Cinema'. The Secretary of State for Colonies announced that:

What railways and steamships were in their far-reaching effects to the nineteenth century world, cinema, wireless and the cheapening of the daily press are to the twentieth century.

'The new media', he went on to say, were 'capable of being used for really valuable visual, intellectual and oral education, but equally capable of grave misuse'. This thesis sets out to analyse the attempt of the colonial government in Northern Rhodesia to use the new media as a 'Means of Spreading Thought Among Natives'.

2. Mode of Analysis

The study of the development of government propaganda in Northern Rhodesia will be based on Lasswell's simple

1. The International Colonial Institute was founded in Brussels in 1894 to discuss problems of mutual interest to colonial powers. The conferences were usually biennial and attended by colonial experts from Western Europe. The 1936 conference was the twenty-third; it was held in London and presided over by Lord Lugard. Some of the other British colonial experts who attended were Lord Hailey, W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, Hanns Vischer, T. Drummond Shiels and Prof. W. M. Macmillan. See Institut Colonial International, Record of the XXIIIrd Meeting held in London on the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th October 1936 (Brussels, 1937).


3. CO 323/1400/7004, title of paper delivered to conference by Charles Dundas, Chief Sec. of Northern Rhodesia. Paper dated 15 July 1936.
communications model:

Who
Says What
In Which Channel
To Whom
With What Results

Of fundamental importance will be the political, cultural and economic setting in which this model is worked out, as each element and the interaction between each element will be coloured by local circumstances.

Propaganda is the tool of policy. Under the 'Who' of the paradigm we will be looking at the formation of propaganda policy and at the communicators - the people who guide and initiate propaganda. In the colonial situation in Northern Rhodesia it will be of particular significance that the communicators, Colonial Office officials, both in Britain and Northern Rhodesia, were different in educational background, political experience, culture and economic circumstances from the majority of their audience. Most of the African population were illiterate and had had no formal education in the western sense. Government had cast itself in the role of guardian.

'Says What' relates to content and style. Here we will be looking to see what are the major propaganda themes, what are the myths and symbols, images and ideas, and world view, that the government is seeking to promote through the mass media. An acquaintance with the history and theory of mass communications suggests one fundamental

problem. In order to propagandise people successfully they must have a certain level of information. Illiterate peasants, as Lenin found, are notoriously impervious to propaganda. Studies of mass communications in developing countries have shown that 'propaganda begins to "bite" among peasants at the exact moment when information is promulgated there...'\(^1\). Jacques Ellul describes this foundation layer as 'sub-propaganda'.\(^2\) It follows that when we come to look at the content of government propaganda in the Northern Rhodesian context - where the majority of the population were illiterate and ill-informed - a mass education drive could be looked at in one sense as sub-propaganda. It would have significance not only for the contribution it might make to social and economic development but also to political education in that by raising the level of information of the people they are being rendered more amenable to government propaganda. Therefore, they can more easily be adjusted to western technological society.

In talking about 'In What Channels' we will be largely concerned with the mass communications media - print, radio and film - but where propaganda is transmitted at the personal level as for example through the District Officer (D.O.) this will also be taken into account. Indeed, some propaganda and mass communications theorists argue that propaganda is most effective when it is transmitted via both mass and

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2. Ibid., 32, fn. 5.
personal channels. Of relevance here are the primary group, interpersonal relationships and opinion leaders of the Two Step Flow theory developed by Merton (1949) and Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955).¹ According to the Two Step flow theory, mass communications do not act directly on the individual; there is no hypodermic effect; people do not tend to act immediately on suggestions relayed through the media. What really happens is that people are influenced by the opinion leaders in their own primary groups. These leaders are people who are respected because of their greater knowledge and wisdom. Whether or not media messages evoke a response depends on the reaction of the opinion leaders. This American theory originally arose out of a study of the voting habits of Americans² but has been found to have Third World relevance in, for example, Neurath's experiments with rural radio forums in India.³

The next step in the model is the audience, the 'To Whom'. Here the political setting in Northern Rhodesia surfaces once again. At the broadest level there was not one audience but two. In Northern Rhodesia there were two nations: the European minority who had a background of western education and culture and the African population


most of whom did not. Obviously government is not in such circumstances able to use the same imagery, myths and symbols, or the same content, in dealing with these disparate groups. Equally obviously, if different types of propaganda are being disseminated to different groups in a plural society this must have some effect on the efficacy of the propaganda and ultimately on the stability of the society.

Some would argue that to talk of a mass media, meaning that it must by definition reach a mass audience, is a misnomer even in the Africa of today. The African audience for the mass media is limited by Africa's continuing and formidable communications barriers: geographical isolation perpetuated by poor communications and transport facilities, illiteracy, poverty, and the 'babel of tongues'. In Zambia just after Independence there were 2.8 radio receivers, 0.9 daily newspaper copies and 0.4 cinema seats per 100 people.\(^1\) Before Zambia became independent in 1964 these figures were even smaller. In the 1930s when illiteracy was estimated at 90 per cent, very few Africans ever heard a radio or saw a film. Vernacular literature was usually concerned only with religion.

In this situation we will be trying to find out both the approximate number of people being reached by the various channels and - what is perhaps politically more significant - the type of person being reached. We

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certainly will not be expecting the media to be reaching directly the masses - in the sense of the majority of the African population. But we will be interested in the impact of government propaganda on the small educated African minority, the new opinion leaders, who in a transitional society base their claims to leadership not on inherited status but on acquired education. The old isolated life of village and tribe was being broken down by the intrusion of western technological society of which colonial rule was the vanguard. In the small pre-industrial societies communications were at the primary, face-to-face level; in the absence of writing thought systems were closed, limited to the immediate and past experiences of the particular society. McLuhan describes the liberating effect of print thus:

"The giving to man of an eye for an ear by phonetic literacy is, socially and politically, probably the most radical explosion that can occur in any social structure. This explosion of the eye, frequently repeated in 'backward areas,' we call Westernization."

The literature records that this explosion of literacy produces a new type of man - Lerner calls him a 'mobile personality' who is now able to comprehend a reality beyond immediate experience. Literacy inducts him into the world view and the mores of western society, his

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horizons are enlarged and as a result he undergoes a 'characterological revolution' which Riesman sees as a concomitant of the industrial revolution.¹ Literacy enables the marginal man to break away from the tradition-directed primary group - he now becomes 'inner-directed' rather than 'other-directed'.² It is these men who take on the role of interpreters and relay and explain the new technological world which is breaking in on the old, to the rest of the population who have little or no western education.

Finally we come to consider 'With What Results'. This is already known. The impact of colonial rule of which the communications system was an integral part - the nervous system - led to the growth of African nationalism and the eventual independence of Northern Rhodesia in 1964 under the new name of Zambia. This thesis will isolate this one variable, the mass communications system, and see what specific contribution government propaganda was making to the awakening of African political consciousness and the formation of an African public opinion. This is the first step in the direction of a growth of national consciousness. First people have to have information to give them the data from which to form opinions. They must also have platforms from which to express these opinions,

so as to make them public: they need publicity. Associated with this publicising of views on matters which are considered to be important is the growing awareness of people that their opinions should be taken into account by government: government should be influenced by public opinion. Here we have the dawning in new soil of the notion of popular sovereignty.

3. **Summary of the chronological development of Northern Rhodesia's government propaganda agencies.**

   In Northern Rhodesia the administration took its first steps towards using the media as an instrument of policy by introducing a government-sponsored newspaper, *Mutende*, in 1936, the African Literature Committee in 1937, and the Native Film Censorship Board in 1937.

   In Britain the beginning of the war saw the setting up of government machinery to dispense war propaganda. The direction of colonial war propaganda was divided between the Ministry of Information (MOI) and the Colonial Office (C.O.). In Northern Rhodesia an Information Office was established in September 1939 as a result of a C.O. directive. In 1940 the new Information Office started in Lusaka and took over the running of *Mutende*.

   After the war, with the rise of African nationalism the C.O. placed special emphasis on the role of colonial information departments in countering nationalist propaganda and enlisting local support for government policies. The C.O. also sponsored a mass education drive financed in many instances by the Colonial Development
and Welfare Fund in order to accelerate the process of community development. A feature of the post-war period in Northern Rhodesia was the increasing regional co-operation in media services, in that the Central African Broadcasting Station (CABS) and the Central African Film Unit (CAFU) which both came under the auspices of the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council and were partially financed by Colonial Development and Welfare funds, pooled resources and provided services for the African populations of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Broadcasting was divided along racial lines. African broadcasting came under the direction of the Northern Rhodesian Information Department and operated from Lusaka whilst European broadcasting was organized from Salisbury by the Southern Rhodesian Department of Posts and Telegraphs. Northern Rhodesia's African Literature Committee and the Nyasaland Department of Education, which had both been publishing and encouraging literature for the African populations of their respective territories joined forces in 1948 to form the Publications Bureau of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
1. Linguistic, Cultural and Political Background

In the aftermath of the 'Scramble for Africa' touched off by the Congress of Berlin in 1884-1885, that broad stretch of Central Africa north of the Zambezi and south of Lake Tanganyika, which comprises modern Zambia, came under British colonial rule. The population of Iron Age farmers over which a colonial administrative superstructure came to be placed was not homogeneous; it consisted of a number of discrete cultural groups which can most easily be distinguished by language differences.

The language picture that confronted the colonial administrator was complex and fragmentary. All the languages belonged to the Bantu language family but there were many variations. Recent linguistic research has identified nine major language groups which have probably been evolving towards their distinctive modern character since the Iron Age farmers first began moving into Central Africa, mainly from Zaire, since the beginning of the second millennium. The exception is Lozi, a language that was introduced by Kololo invaders from South Africa in the nineteenth century. ¹

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The historical summary in the following pages is based on Roberts, Zambia, and on L. H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia (London, 1964).
Five of the language groups are found in the northwest region: Kaonde, Luyana, Nkoya, Wiko and N.W. Lunda. The Chewa and Tumbuka language groups are found in the east; Nyanja, the 'principal modern language' of the Chewa group is one of the four most widely-spoken languages in Zambia today. The three other most widely-spoken languages are: Lozi, Bemba and Tonga. (These four languages were also predominant in the colonial period.) In the northeast Bemba is the 'principal modern language' but there are eleven other languages which are all related to Bemba to the extent that the twelve are mutually intelligible. A similar situation occurs in the south where Tonga is the 'principal modern language' but there are eight related languages which are mutually intelligible. Also in the northeast is the Corridor language group of which the 'principal modern languages' are: Mambwe and Inamwanga. 1

Amongst these Bantu-speaking peoples there were certain similarities in culture and political organization: they all believed in a supreme being who was to be approached through the ancestors, and were grouped according to clans; most were ruled over by chiefs. Behind the similarities there was considerable diversity: some clans were matrilineal, others patrilineal; religious practices differed from area to area; some people kept cattle, others were shifting cultivators, and so on. Some people were part of highly organised and centralised chieftainships which dominated weaker neighbours like the Lozi who dominated the western region, the Bemba who dominated the north east and the Ngoni (recently arrived

1. Roberts, Zambia, 60
immigrants from South Africa) who were powerful in the eastern region. By contrast, in the south, the Tonga who were numerically the largest group, were not organised in one highly centralised chieftainship but had a very loose political organization based on the clan with the headman being the dominant political figure.

Groups in the various regions had been brought into contact with each other chiefly by means of raiding and trade. Some interaction had been effected through regional trading networks based on such commodities as salt, iron and copper. These contacts were extended in the nineteenth century with the arrival of long-distance slave and ivory traders from both the east and west coasts and later through the arrival of European explorers, traders and missionaries. But these external influences did not impose any unity on this part of Central Africa as different regions established different channels of communication with the outside world. The Bemba, for example, had contacts through the Arabs and Swahili with the East African coast; the Lozi established contact with the West African coast through Mambari traders from Angola, and with the south through white missionaries and traders; the east was penetrated by the Chikunda, Portuguese-speaking Africans who were linked with the Portuguese in Mozambique. A fundamental problem for the new colonial rulers, then, would be one of communication; their new subjects were divided by language and by recent political, cultural and economic experience.
The British government initially ruled Northern Rhodesia indirectly through the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which based its claim to the area on treaties that had been obtained from a number of chiefs. From 1899 till 1911 Northern Rhodesia was administered as two separate territories - North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia. These were combined in 1911 and the BSAC continued to rule till 1924. The inspiration of the BSAC was the imperial vision of its founder, Cecil Rhodes. Rhodes was an enthusiastic empire builder not only because of the profit motive but also because of his expansive belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race which he wished to see colonise as much of Africa as possible. The first white settlers who began to trickle into Northern Rhodesia in the early years of the century were engaged in farming along the line of rail from Livingstone to Ndola (the line from Bulawayo reached Katanga in 1910) and around Fort Jameson (Chipata) in the east and Abercorn (Mbala) in the north; in lead and zinc mining at Broken Hill (Kabwe) and in small businesses in all the areas of settlement. Africans provided cheap labour for these 'pioneers' and in larger numbers for the mines of Southern Rhodesia and Katanga in which the BSAC had an interest. In order to get Africans out to work and to get revenue a hut tax was imposed. The initial impact of western technological society was to turn the future Zambia into a labour reservoir.

The settlers disliked the rule of the BSAC and felt that their best hope of achieving eventual self-government
would be through direct C.O. rule, through becoming a crown colony with a legislative council. This ambition was achieved in 1924 and soon afterwards the colony was opened up to exploitation by the South African based Anglo-American Corporation and the American based Rhodesian Selection Trust. The copper mining area, adjacent to Katanga in the Belgian Congo, came to be called the Copperbelt and a number of towns grew up near the mines. The mining boom brought an influx of white settlers, many of whom were Afrikaners from South Africa. The impact on the African way of life was to increase the migrant labour trend as many Africans, particularly Bemba whose homeland was nearby, came to the Copperbelt to work as unskilled labourers. However, despite this urban growth the colonial government like other colonial governments in southern Africa, did not encourage the stabilisation of the African population in the towns. There was the fear of settlements of Africans in towns threatening white security and there was also the financial fear that if Africans cut off all ties with their villages then government would be obliged to spend money on social security benefits for the unemployed, the sick and the old.\footnote{For reasons of security and finance 'detribalisation' was not to be encouraged.} There were never as many Europeans in Northern Rhodesia as there were in Southern Rhodesia which from the start was

\footnote{1. Roberts, \textit{Zambia}, 188-189.}
considered a white man's country. According to the official figures there were 3,634 Europeans in Northern Rhodesia in 1921; this leapt to 13,846 during the mine construction boom but fell during the depression so that in 1932 the European population was given as 10,553. This comparatively handful of settlers was far outnumbered by the African population which in 1936 was estimated at 1.3 million. But though small in number these settlers had grandiose political ambitions. They sought both to increase their power at the centre in the local legislature, and to obtain closer union with Southern Rhodesia through first amalgamation and when this proved unacceptable to the C.O. - through federation.

Northern Rhodesia had a constitution characteristic of crown colonies. The British Parliament legislated for the country; major policy changes were effected through Orders-in-Council. Routine matters were dealt with locally. Executive power was in the hands of the Governor representing the Crown and responsible to the Colonial Secretary. He was assisted by an Executive Council which was originally composed entirely of officials who included the Chief Secretary, Attorney General, Financial Secretary and the Secretary for Native Affairs. At first the Legislative Council (Leg. Co.) had nine official and five unofficial members; the latter were drawn from the white settlers who had the franchise which was denied to the African population. Africans were governed from 1930

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through a system of local government called indirect rule, by which the Provincial Administration ruled through local chiefs. This system placed Northern Rhodesia's African population outside the mainstream of Northern Rhodesia's politics which were conducted in the Leg. Co.

It was the ambition of the settlers to get an unofficial majority on the Leg. Co. where they constituted themselves as an unofficial opposition to the policies of the C.O. They made steady gains and by the outbreak of World War II had obtained representation on the Executive Council and the Finance Committee and had increased the number of unofficials in Leg. Co. though they had not gained a majority. Two outstanding politicians emerged in the second half of the 1930s to give the settler cause talented and determined leadership. In 1935 Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, a retired army colonel and gentleman farmer, was elected to Leg. Co. In 1938, when Gore-Browne became the member nominated to represent African interests (a new post) his seat at Broken Hill was taken over by Roy Welensky, an engine driver and railway union official, who had grown up in Southern Rhodesia.

The settlers sought closer union with Southern Rhodesia because they feared that Northern Rhodesia might eventually be given African majority rule. The end of the 1920s saw the C.O. placing increasing emphasis on trusteeship and African interests. Such sentiments were greeted with suspicion in colonies like Kenya and Northern Rhodesia where white settlers hoped to win the political kingdom. A shattering blow to European political
expectations came in 1929 with the publication of the "memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa," drawn up by the Colonial Secretary in the new Labour government, Sidney Webb (now Lord Passfield), which restated the principle of the paramountcy of African interests in multi-racial territories. The Memorandum reiterated the doctrine of the Devonshire Declaration of 1923 made with reference to Kenya, that 'the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail'.

The doctrine of paramountcy caused uproar amongst Europeans in Africa from Lord Delamere in Kenya to General Hertzog in South Africa. In Northern Rhodesia, the newspaper-owner and politician, Leopold Moore, fulminated:

If the Territory is to be developed by white men so that in twenty years or so natives may dominate our Councils and control our affairs, we are simply not going on with it.

To pacify white settlers the C.O. soon backed down and the doctrine became a dead letter. The principles of the Memorandum were reinterpreted by the pro settler Northern Rhodesian Governor, Hubert Young, to mean 'no less than that the interests of the non-native minority must not be subordinated to those of the native majority'.

Despite the retraction the spectre of potential African paramountcy continued to haunt Northern Rhodesia's white settlers. The Memorandum was a turning point in white politics in Northern Rhodesia. Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia had been under discussion for many years but opinion had been very divided and even those who were in favour did not feel there was any urgency. Before the Memorandum, and with the great economic future that copper seemed to promise, the majority of Europeans either hoped for self-government for Northern Rhodesia alone or to amalgamate with the south when the north was more prosperous and better terms could be obtained. But, as a result of the Memorandum and the economic slump of 1931-1934, the majority of the settlers became strongly pro amalgamationist and embarked on a determined campaign to achieve closer union with Southern Rhodesia.

It is against this background of white settler political activities and ambitions that we now look at the development of government propaganda services in Northern Rhodesia. The first communications channel to be discussed will be the press.

2. The Press

(a) Mutende

The development of the press in Northern Rhodesia was essentially a European activity. The earliest commercial newspapers catered for white settlers. Of these newspapers the most resilient was the Livingstone Mail founded in 1906 by a Livingstone chemist, Leopold Moore. The paper reflected the political views of editor
Noore as he championed the cause of the settlers first against the BSAC and later against the C.O. Paradoxically Moore saw himself both as a socialist and as a champion of the small businessman against the large scale capitalist, as he frequently printed pieces from the New Statesman and Nation throughout the 1930s. The Livingstone Mail, a weekly, contained local news from South Africa and Britain. A summary of news was telegraphed by Reuters, Cape Town. Two regular features were parliamentary reports from South Africa and 'the London Diary of Events'.

Until 1935 the Mail was the only paper published in Northern Rhodesia. Then it was joined by Copperbelt Times and the Northern Rhodesia Advertiser. Both these papers carried local news of interest to white settlers and had small circulations. For more serious reading Europeans and a small minority of educated Africans turned to Southern Rhodesian papers of which the Bulawayo Chronicle was the most popular. The Chronicle and the Rhodesia Herald were both owned by the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company, a subsidiary of the powerful South African newspaper combine, the Argus Group dominated by the Chamber of Mines in South Africa.

Africans were largely ignored in these papers except when an item concerning Africans was thought to be of interest to Europeans. The papers mirrored a white

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colonial world reflecting the hopes, interests and life-styles of the white settlers who saw themselves as pioneers of a young country as Australians and New Zealanders had before them in other parts of the Empire. For the minority of literate Africans these papers provided a window on the European world. And this, predicted R. C. Trowell at the International Colonial Institute Conference in 1936, would ultimately have disturbing effects in the colonies. Basing his observations on his Kenyan experience Trowell pointed out that European demands for democratic self-government for Europeans voiced in European newspapers would fire Africans to make similar demands which would 'render impossible the restriction of democratic self-government to Europeans'. He further pointed out that 'At present the majority of Africans live in a world where the white man is surrounded somewhat delightfully by what he is pleased to call his prestige'. African contacts with Europeans were confined to those with benevolent missionaries, paternal D.C.s and settlers who paid their wages. Africans thus had an unreal view of the European world. Access to European newspapers would soon disabuse them of any illusion about the omniscience of the white man. They would read about wars, Christians fighting Christians, industrial problems, unemployment and crime. The European press would provide Africans with their first real lessons in political education.

Four types of newspapers were produced for Africans in the colonial era in Africa. These were: the mission newsletter, the commercial European-owned paper, the government-sponsored paper and the independent African-run paper. The earliest mission newsletter in Northern Rhodesia was *Mafube a Bo-Rotse* (The Dawn), a monthly Lozi journal started by Francois Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Mission at Sefula in 1904. A European firm published newspapers for Africans in South and Central Africa; this was the Bantu Press founded in South Africa in 1931 by the Paver brothers in order to counteract the influence of radical African-run newspapers highly critical of government and the mines. The Bantu Press aimed at having one of its papers in every province from Cape to Congo; it took over some previously independent papers and started new ones so that by 1946 of thirteen newspapers published for Africans in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the Bantu Press controlled eleven and ran three monthlies as well.\(^1\) In Southern Rhodesia the *Native Mirror*, founded in 1931, was taken over by the Bantu Press in 1936 and renamed the *Bantu Mirror*. The *Bantu Mirror* and the later Paver paper in Southern Rhodesia, the *African Weekly* started in 1944, are of particular interest here because they carried Northern Rhodesian news and letters and were circulated in Northern Rhodesia.\(^2\)

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2. They were then printed in the following languages: *Bantu Mirror*: English, Ndebele and Lozi; and the *African Weekly*: English, Shona, Nyanja and, from 1948, Bemba.
The third genre of African newspaper, the government-sponsored newspaper, was represented by Mutende started in 1936. This makes Northern Rhodesia the last country in East or Central Africa to have a secular newspaper for its African population. In Kenya in the late 1920s the government financed Habari, a newspaper for Africans, which was later closed down during the depression. In 1935 the Tanganyika government's monthly Swahili journal, Mamba Leo, was already thirteen years old. Zoona, sponsored by the Nyasaland government, had been started in 1930. Since the 1920s both missionaries and educated Africans had discussed the idea of government starting a newspaper for Africans but their proposals had been rejected on financial grounds. In 1930, for example, when the then Secretary for Native Affairs, J. Moffat Thomson, discovered that Mamba Leo despite a circulation of 9,000, was run at a loss he immediately dismissed the idea, explaining that an African newspaper came low on the list of priorities behind native dispensaries and schools and hospitals.

One type of newspaper conspicuously absent from Northern Rhodesia before the Federation was the independent African-owned paper found in many other British colonies where there existed a tradition of radical, polemic African journalism. Elsewhere in Africa these papers have

2. NAZ/SEC 2/1226, Moffat Thomson to P. C. Lusaka, 7 June 1930.
been credited with playing a major part in spreading the gospel of African nationalism. In West Africa the first newspapers published by and for Africans appeared in the British colonies of Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria and the Gambia. By 1900 thirty-four newspapers had appeared in Sierra Leone, nineteen in Gold Coast, nine in Nigeria and one in the Gambia. In East Africa the earliest African newspapers appeared in Uganda owing to the early spread of mission education there: Sekanyolya, a Luganda monthly, was first published in December 1920. The first African-owned paper in Kenya was Mwigwithania which was first published in 1928 and edited by Jomo Kenyatta.

One reason for the lack of African initiative in Northern Rhodesia in the newspaper field was the educational backwardness of the colony. At Independence in 1964 only 0.5 per cent of the then 3½ million population had even a full primary education, with the result that Zambia had relatively fewer highly educated


Africans than any other former British dependency. The educational pyramid was very broadly based but absurdly narrow at the top: in 1939 there were 78,361 pupils in Sub-Standard A and fifteen students in Form I. The educational backwardness of the African population owed not a little to white settler pressure in the Leg. Co. where European-elected members concentrated on seeing that European children were getting favourable educational opportunities. They resisted, for example, the idea of a unified education department for both Europeans and Africans. For the most part they considered that education made Africans 'cheeky' and inculcated a dislike for manual labour. In his maiden speech in the Leg. Co. in 1935 Core-Browne said there were 'two cardinal principles' which should guide technical education policy. The first was that nothing should be done 'to take a white man's job from him...The second is that we should not train a native for any job which does not exist'. In 1936 the Secretary of State for Colonies, J. H. Thomas, became exasperated with the slow progress of technical education for Africans in Northern Rhodesia and wrote a highly  

3. Ibid. 
4. P. D. Snelson, Educational Development in Northern Rhodesia 1883-1945 (Lusaka, 1974), 229. 
critical letter to the Governor, Sir Hubert Young, in which he demanded some positive action.\footnote{Quoted in Snelson, \textit{Educational Development}, 231.} In 1938 the Northern Rhodesian government provided bursaries for five Africans to go to secondary schools in South Africa, Uganda and Tanganyika and finally in 1939 the first secondary school opened in the colony with a handful of Form I pupils.

This backwardness in African education in Northern Rhodesia helps to explain the Nyasaland brain drain. As a result of the work of Scottish missionaries, particularly at Livingstonia, many Nyasalanders were comparatively well educated. Nyasaland only provided limited job opportunities so Nyasalanders were available to take up some white collar jobs in Northern Rhodesia before there were sufficient numbers of local educated Africans. Such political activity as there was before World War II was confined to Welfare Societies and Native Associations in which Nyasalanders were very much in evidence.

There is perhaps a connection between the more advanced state of political awareness in Kenya and the earlier appearance of African-run newspapers there. \textit{Mwigwithania} was the mouthpiece of a political organization, the Kikuyu Central Association, and financed by it. In Northern Rhodesia the first African political party was not founded till 1948 and the first news sheet put out by a political party, \textit{Congress News},
did not appear till October 1953. But the interconnection between educational backwardness, the slow growth of African political awareness and the lack of independent African journalism in Northern Rhodesia in the pre Federal era cannot explain the whole story; Kenyatta and many of the early Kenyan African journalists only had a primary school education!

Two other contributory causes of the lack of independent African newspaper activity in Northern Rhodesia were labour migration and the extremely diffuse nature of settlement in the colony. Until 1935 Livingstone at the extreme southern border was the capital whilst the industrial centre was 550 kilometres to the north on the Copperbelt where there were a number of mining towns. In 1935 the capital was moved to Lusaka which though more central was still approximately 350 kilometres away from the Copperbelt. Communications became even more difficult when one left the line-of-rail to reach such far flung outposts as Fort Jameson in the east and Abercorn in the north. Northern Rhodesia in the 1930s did not have African entrepreneurs capable of providing the capital to pay for the printing and distribution of a newspaper. Most Africans were not engaged in business, rather they were wage-earners: teachers, ministers of religion, capitaos and clerks. There were not, as in Kenya, Indian businessmen who were willing to help finance African newspapers.

1. It was a paper of the African National Congress, edited by Kenneth Kaunda.
If the intellectual energy was not concentrated in one area, nor were those in employment. The Copperbelt was the largest single employer of labour in Northern Rhodesia but it employed less than 20 per cent of all Northern Rhodesian wage earners; and as late as the mid 1950s possibly one third of Northern Rhodesia's workforce was employed outside the country. More Northern Rhodesians were employed in Southern Rhodesia alone than on the Copperbelt until the late 1950s. A combination of these factors: lack of capital, the diffuse pattern of settlement, the backwardness of education and the comparatively late emergence of African political awareness, seems to account for the absence in Northern Rhodesia of a vigorous tradition of protest journalism conducted in independent African newspapers. It was the white politicians like Moore and later Welensky who as newspaper owners engaged in protest journalism in order to attack C.C. rule and further their own political careers.  

It was a strike by African mine workers on the Copperbelt in 1935 which caused the Northern Rhodesian administration to begin the publication of a newspaper for Africans. The copper industry was just beginning to


2. Welensky took over the Copperbelt Times which became the Northern News in 1944 and owned this paper until he was bought out by the Argus Group in 1950. He used it in the prosecution of his closer union campaign.
recover from the slump of the early 1930s when an inadequately publicised change in the tax law provoked a strike amongst workers at Mufulira, Nkana and Luanshya. Six Africans were killed at Roan Antelope mine when troops opened fire on the strikers. This was the first outbreak of urban violence in Northern Rhodesia's history. It had far reaching consequences. The Europeans, shocked and frightened, adopted laager politics and banded together in the Leg. Co. to protect European interests. Highly significant for the future of the mass media in Northern Rhodesia was the finding of the Commission of Enquiry into the Copperbelt Disturbances that the Watch Tower movement was 'an important predisposing cause'. The teachings of this 'dangerously subversive movement' had brought 'civil and spiritual authority, especially native authority, into contempt'. The spread of Watch Tower, a religion of the book, was proof of the influence of literature. The Commission considered that the spread of the movement had been greatly helped by the fact that there was no other literature available 'in convenient and cheap form' for Africans to read. It was, therefore, recommended that 'cheap and suitable literature' should be provided to counteract the pernicious influence of Watch Tower publications.¹

The African Watch Tower is an offshoot of the American Jehovah's Witness sect. It was introduced into Nyasaland in 1908 by Elliot Kamwana, an ex-Livingstonia man. As it

¹. Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia, October 1935, Cmd. 5009 (1935), 51.
developed in African conditions it became something of a socio-religious movement amongst labour migrants. Sholto Cross sees in Watch Tower the beginnings of a 'proletarian consciousness', a primitive labour movement, in fact. It spread in the three big mining areas in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Katanga. Watch Tower purported to explain to the bewildered labour migrant in millenarian and apocalyptic terms, the new technological world dominated by the white man. Watch Tower predicted the collapse of white authority and the establishment of a new society in which the black man would triumph. At the core it was anti-authority and anti-government and so was opposed also to traditional chiefs. The pamphlet Favoured People taught that 'All earthly rulers were turned away from God by the wicked influence of Satan'. Before the strike the mining compounds were saturated with cheap literature abounding in such sentiments.

Mutende was the first government newspaper to be published in Northern Rhodesia; a specimen issue appeared in January 1936, but it was not the first government news sheet to be circulated. It was preceded by the 'Serenje


Boma News Sheet' which appeared monthly for a brief period from June 1935 until it was superseded by Mutende. The News Sheet, which consisted of no more than two or three pages, was produced by the Serenje District Commissioner (D.C.) and typed out by the clerk; it included government notices, district news and several short paragraphs relating legends and animal stories.¹ Like Mutende the 'Serenje Boma News Sheet' was largely a response to the Copperbelt strike. It was intended to keep Native Authorities and headmen informed of what was happening in the district, particularly by making them aware of government notices, and to provide an alternative to Watch Tower literature which was 'in extensive circulation' in the Serenje district.²

The title of the newspaper, 'Mutende' was the choice of a majority of the provincial officials. 'Mutende' means peace in Bemba and greetings in Lala and is recognised as a form of greeting throughout the country. Basically Mutende was to be 'a form of insurance against another rising in the Copperbelt';³ it was to keep people informed of what government was doing and so prevent wild rumours and false reports which might precipitate a disturbance.

¹ Copies of the June and July issues are to be found in NAZ/SEC 2/1126.
The Secretariat canvassed amongst the provincial officials for further ideas about what the paper's objectives should be. K. Bradley who was in 1939 appointed Northern Rhodesia's first Information Officer was then D.C. at Mumbwa; he thought the paper offered an excellent opportunity for government 'propaganda' to let the African know what was being done for him as the local press took no notice of African affairs. Mutende could offer 'constructive ideas to counteract the persistently destructive attitude of the European local press towards every activity of Government'.

The Chief Secretary, Charles Dundas, considered the printed word had 'magic' and was the best 'Means of Spreading Thought Among Natives'. But a government newspaper for Africans would also give the administration an opportunity to find out what the African was thinking as he told the conference of the International Colonial Institute in 1936; it would provide an insight into 'the African mind which some claim to get behind but few ever do'. Colonial administrators were:

- too much obsessed with our thoughts, our teaching, our plans. It is high time that we heard a little from the other side. We are constantly reminded that the native is not vocal, cannot make himself heard and is thus incapable of representing his views and desires.

He was well aware that the starting of such a newspaper could have a politicising effect but he worked on the theory that it would be a political awakening over which

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the administration could exercise a measure of control.
It was better that government should start a newspaper for Africans before they started one themselves:

the best way to counter that danger will be for ourselves to inaugurate a native Press, rather than procrastinate until we are forced to produce native newspapers in order to compete with an independent Press of undesirable character.¹

The specimen issue of Mutende was criticised for its language choice; it had been printed in English, Bemba, Lozi, Nyanja and Ila. C. Opper, the Acting Director of Native Education, took exception to the choice of Ila rather than Tonga which was more widely spoken in the south.² When Mutende began to appear regularly as a monthly from March 1936 Ila was replaced by Tonga which meant that the paper was then printed in the four most widely spoken African languages in the colony.

The editor of Mutende was always a seconded D.C. in the pre-war years. (The 'last thing' that J. A. Cottrell, the Superintendent of Native Education, had wanted to see 'in this country at the present stage, is a newspaper with native editorship'. His experience in South Africa of such a phenomenon had been 'distasteful'.³) The first editor, chosen for his good command of African languages, was C. Stevens, then a D.O. at Livingstone. In July 1936 S. R. Denny took over from

1. CO 323/1400/7004.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1127, Opper to Chief Sec., 19 March 1936.
Stevens and continued till June 1938. For a brief period in 1938 H. Franklin, who later succeeded Bradley as Information Officer, became editor; at that time he was Resident Magistrate at Broken Hill. In November 1938 G. Phillips, who had previously served as a D.O. at Petauke and Fort Jameson, became editor and retained the post till 1941. By Denny's time the position of editor was classified as a part-time job, the editor being attached to the D.C.'s Office at Lusaka for extra duties.

The editor of Mutende was responsible to the Secretary for Native Affairs under whose overall supervision the paper was produced. Some matters were referred upwards to the Chief Secretary and the Governor and every month copies of the paper were forwarded to the Secretary of State. Denny later recalled:

"All the proofs had to be submitted to the Secretariat lest I print something likely to provoke a revolution or to commit Government to some action which it ought to but would not do."

The editor contributed articles, explanations of new laws and editorial comment. He was assisted by two African clerks, the number being later increased as the paper expanded and became fortnightly during the war. Material that was to be printed in the local languages was given to the African clerks to translate. They also wrote articles in the local languages and translated letters and other African contributions into English so that they

could be vetted. Edward Mbuyisa was responsible for Tonga and Lozi translations and Edwin Mongoti for Bemba and Nyanja. In filling these positions the editor had found some difficulty as it was not easy to find Africans who were literate in more than one local language.1

Mutende contained world news, local news and articles, English lessons and letters from Africans, a woman's page which later gave way to a health page because the former proved unpopular, a children's page, competitions, job advertisements and commercial advertisements which were often of the mail order variety. Sport was a prominent feature with pictures, articles and results appearing regularly. The paper was always notable for its pictures which were plentiful and featured both local and overseas subjects. Mutende was not only engaged in short-term political propaganda, it was also assisting at the personal level in the 'characterological revolution'; it was acting as a long-term agent of change, inducting its readers into the social norms of western society.

In November 1936 R. S. Hudson, the Assistant Chief Secretary for Native Affairs, pronounced himself well satisfied with the way Mutende was shaping:

> It has now evolved into the sort of paper we wanted I believe and is largely an expression of Native views on matters of interest to Natives, combined with explanations of difficulties which are apparent from correspondence received.

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2. NAZ/SEC 2/1128, minute, 1 Nov. 1936.
Hudson omitted one major objective, the spreading of right thinking. Indirect rule was one topic on which Mutende sought to guide African thought. Mutende sought to build up the prestige of chiefs and Native Authorities whilst attempting to check the political pretensions of the marginal men, the educated Africans, whose role as defined by Mutende was to assist the traditional rulers in modernising their councils. In May 1937 Mutende published a speech by Lord Lugard in which he had expressed the hope that educated Africans would no longer despise Native Councils because of the councillors' lack of education but would instead participate in their development.¹

'The chief is the leader of his people' explained Mutende in July 1937 and, like God, 'He always has been and always will be. The coming of the white man has made no real difference in this'. Since the Native Treasuries had been started the chief was 'more than ever' the leader, for now he could 'really govern and improve his country' with the advice of his councillors.²

However eternal the chief might be he was not omnipotent. In May 1938 Mutende said:

>We cannot sufficiently emphasise that the District Officer is in his district to help the Natives there. His work is to look after them, to help them in all sorts of ways, to point the road by which they may become more civilised. But to do this he must have the confidence of his people. He must be trusted by them. And the best sign of trust is for them to come to him with their troubles so that he may put them right.³

1. Mutende No. 15, 5.
3. Mutende No. 27, 2.
In the late 1930s some Africans already had their politics in focus and were well aware that chiefs and Native Authorities were irrelevant to the real decision-making in the colony which took place in theLeg. Co. Then Sir Stewart Gore-Browne was appointed to represent Africans there in 1938 some Africans were critical of their interests being represented by a European. In April 1939 Mutende agreed with Thomson Konkolo Road of Kashinjia Mission who had written in to criticise 'the many Africans who say that Africans should be members of Legislative Council'. Mutende said:

Most of Northern Rhodesia was a dark land of ignorance only thirty years ago. How can anyone say that in that short time he has developed enough to join in a Council which is run on lines which have taken the English people six hundred years to develop?1

Mutende did provide its readers with some news of the progress of the amalgamation question. In January 1936 a conference was held at Victoria Falls attended by the seven unofficial members of the Leg. Co. and by representatives of the three parties in the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly. The conference resolved unanimously on the early amalgamation of the two countries. The question was troubling the African population and so in September 1936 Mutende explained the position by reporting what the Chief Secretary had said

1. Mutende No. 38, 18.
in the Leg. Co. the previous December:

He told the Council that the King's Government in England thought that Northern Rhodesia must go forward more before any big change was made.

The British government was still undecided:

... the King's Government does not say that the joining of the two Governments of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia is a good thing or that it is a bad thing, but only that the time has not yet come to decide on what shall be done.¹

The white settlers drive to amalgamation was taken one step further in 1938 with the appointment of a Royal Commission under Viscount Bledisloe to see whether a closer association between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was 'desirable and feasible'.²

Mutende gave Africans the opportunity to express their dissent in print. It published a report of a public meeting which had been held on the amalgamation issue by the Broken Hill African Welfare Association on 5 June 1938. Mutende readers learnt that Africans at the meeting had said that many Europeans in Southern Rhodesia wanted amalgamation so that they could transfer the Southern Rhodesian Africans to Northern Rhodesia; and that the Northern Rhodesian settlers wanted the union because they objected to Africans 'being employed as clerks, interpreters, sub-postmasters in Government service, and other posts such as bricklayers, carpenters etc.

¹ Mutende No. 7, 12.
and that they or their children should fill up these positions." Some of the speakers who had experienced Southern Rhodesian conditions compared the reserves to locations because 'chiefs in those areas had no authority over their people and the Natives had nothing they could call their own'. The editor commented:

> It should be noted that some of the statements made in the report above are not true. We print the report, however, since it gives an account of the opinion of Africans on a most important matter."

The actual findings of the Bledisloe Report were not dealt with so frankly by Mutende in its issue of April 1939:

> They say that they do not think that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia have developed far enough to be ready to join with Southern Rhodesia at the moment, but they advise that as soon as certain questions can be settled, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should join together under a single Government.²

Mutende neglected to mention that the stumbling block was the Southern Rhodesian native policy which was more overtly discriminatory than that in the north.

A cornerstone of British propaganda was the monarch and the royal family, the cardinal symbols of Empire. Hardly an issue went by without some publicity about the King and his family. The paper ran a poetry competition to celebrate the coronation of George VI, there were numerous background articles and lengthy coverage of the

1. Mutende No. 29, July 1938, 6.
ceremonies. The visit to England of the Paramount Chief of Barotseland was fully reported, both in Mutende and in a booklet written by Godwin Lewanika who accompanied Yeta on the trip.¹

After so much energy had been devoted to building up the mystique of the monarchy the abdication of Edward VIII placed the administration in something of a quandary. Hudson thought that the 'natives will not understand any reference to Mrs. Simpson...Therefore the less Mutende says about it all without evading it altogether the better'.² Follows, an Assistant Secretary, minuted 'the native mind cannot be expected to understand the ethics of divorce'.³ Sir Stewart Gore-Browne later remarked in the Leg. Co. that Mutende probably made journalistic history by being the only newspaper in the world to carry the abdication story without any reference to Mrs. Simpson.⁴ It was later reported that Mutende's handling of the abdication story adversely affected sales in Mufulira: 'The accounts given in other papers were more circumstantial and interesting and so were bought'.⁵ Despite the abdication, royal propaganda seems to have been as successful in Northern Rhodesia as elsewhere in the Empire. The Bledisloe Commission were told that

1. Godwin Lewanika was originally known as Godwin Mkbikusita. In the 1940s he changed his name to Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika and he was sometimes referred to thereafter as Godwin Lewanika. See S. E. Wilmer, 'Northern Rhodesian African Opposition to Federation 1950-1953', B. Litt. thesis, Oxford, 1973, 35, fn. 2.


3. Ibid.


5. NAZ/SEC 2/1128, Denny, report on visit to the Copperbelt, 11 March 1937.
Africans 'look upon the "throne" as they continually express it, as the father and mother of the people'.

The opinion columns were of political importance to both government and the African population. For the government they were a window on the African mind indicating where to aim propaganda. Denny felt that Africans expressed themselves much more freely with pen and paper than in the constrained atmosphere of a government office. 'Speaking for myself, I can say that I have learnt more about the Native in the last eighteen months than I did in the previous 7 years'. Denny consciously fostered the opinion pages in order to encourage Africans to think for themselves as he considered that in the past they had been too much dependent on Europeans.

To stimulate argument Phillips introduced a debating column, 'Nsaka', in which he threw out a topic and initiated letters on subjects such as 'Which is best, Cattle in the Kraal, or Cash in the Bank?'

In 1939 the editor reported that he was receiving between three hundred and five hundred letters a month. About 50 per cent of these were 'well written and easily understood' at a time when circulation was about five thousand. Very few letters were received from the Tonga and Lozi speaking peoples; Bemba and Nyanja speakers accounted for about 80 per cent of the letters in local

1. Extract from: Record of Oral Evidence Submitted to the Bledisloe Rhodesia-Nyasaland Commission (1938). Mabel Shaw to Fitzgerald CXVII.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1129 Denny to Acting Chief Sec. for Native Affairs, 24 June 1938.
languages. English was the language most favoured by writers who preferred to write in unintelligible English rather than in a local language.¹

For the African a new channel of communication had been opened; a platform was now available by means of which articulate Africans could identify common problems and talk to each other across the country. Denny thought the 'letters which we printed showed great common sense and a desire in the writers to help their country. The feeling of local patriotism is definitely growing'.²

From the opinion pages we can get some idea of what topics were of concern to literate Africans in the second half of the 1930s. The most popular topics were: education, chiefs and their failure to write to Mutende, beer drinking, the bad behaviour of women, and the 'machona' or lost ones.³

Writers explored many aspects of the education question: the need for education on the Copperbelt and for secondary schools, the need to send girls to school, complaints against parents who neglected to send their children to school, the need for more schools and for a teachers' association and the importance of education for progress and civilization. Until 1939 Northern Rhodesia had no secondary school. Trevor Coombe has noted six occasions in Mutende up to July 1938 when Africans asked

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
for local secondary education.\textsuperscript{1} In July 1938 Ackson Mwale of Fort Jameson appealed in \textit{Mutende} for:

one big school where all the ambitious boys and girls from all the corners of our country will go for higher education. Because with this meagre education which some of us carry in our heads at present...what we really want is a secondary school which we will proudly call our University.\textsuperscript{2}

All the talk about education for girls exasperated one reader who wrote to \textit{Mutende} in June 1938 pointing out that:

your publishing will never build a school for women. I like to mention to you that education costs money in Europe, thousands and thousands of pounds have been voted in England and other parts of Europe for education of both races, and how can your women be educated if you have no vote for their education.\textsuperscript{3}

In 1938 Dauti Yamba,\textsuperscript{4} who was then a teacher in Salisbury, suggested that a teachers' association should be formed with branches at district level and an annual general meeting to which the Director of Native Education and other Europeans would be invited.

In accordance with the paternalist character of the paper editors gave guidance liberally. They were particularly keen to stress that Africans had a misconception about education. They talked 'Progress and Civilization' but what they meant was 'a job as a

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Coombe, 'The Origins of Secondary Education', 195.
\item[2.] \textit{Mutende} No. 29, 17.
\item[3.] A. G. D. T. Nkashi, \textit{Mutende} No. 28, 17.
\item[4.] In 1941 Yamba became headmaster of Luanshya primary school and in 1946 presided over the Federation of African Welfare Societies which was transformed in 1948 into Northern Rhodesia's first political party.
\end{itemize}
clerk, wearing European clothes and living in town'.

The educated were urged not to be ashamed to work with their hands ('Few of the Head Messengers have had proper educations [sic], and yet many of them have been honoured by our King'); they should go back to the villages and help raise the standards of their people, or go in for other jobs like policemen. Nelson Nalumango (who later in 1948 was one of the first two Africans to become a member of the Leg. Co.) wrote in to Mutende in June 1939 to explain why Africans preferred white collar jobs such as clerks, interpreters and medical orderlies; people in such positions 'are usually treated better than other people...'. It was a question of status. In another exchange of views with the editor, J. M. Lubinda reported in Mutende in May 1938 that going back to the village to assist the less educated was not always a rewarding experience: the prophet was not always honoured by his own people:

We all very well know the customs of our people in the village, that they cannot comply with any suggestion hinted at by any young educationist but what they want always is, 'Leave off the imitation of the whites they cheat you or want to coax you only.' So a young educated Native is disappointed and gives up those noble civilised manners of our white fathers.

In June 1938 Mutende ran a competition asking readers to write a letter applying for a job as a clerk or a cook.

4. Mutende No. 27, 5.
The editor was surprised that no one wanted to be a cook after they left school:

But why not? While there are Europeans in Africa there will be cooks wanted, someone will have to hand round the plates at table. And for one who has passed Standard VI and can speak English, such work should be attractive...

We should like to see classes for bread making, cooking chickens, and advanced cookery held at larger schools. We should wish that lady missionaries at schools would give lessons in washing clothes and ironing...¹

On one level this may have been a realistic appraisal of job opportunities open to Africans who had reached the highest standard of education then available in Northern Rhodesia but from a psychological perspective it is also an example of the inculcation (however inadvertent!) of the 'colonial mentality'. The African is being presented with the image of himself as a servant of the European; the superior/inferior relationship inherent in the colonial situation is being reinforced.

Another subject on which Mutende offered guidance was the 1935 Maize Control Ordinance. The Ordinance was designed to protect European farmers against African competition in the wake of the depression by the allocation of three quarters of the internal market to European growers. One reason was that otherwise Africans would extend their acreage under cultivation which would lead to soil erosion. A Monze farmer, Khaki Mwene, complained

¹ Mutende No. 28, 2.
This year in Northern Rhodesia God has blessed us more than other countries with mealies, but there is a great murmuring in Northern Rhodesia for the mealies this year. Africans there are trying their best to break the land, but the Government has discouraged them from doing so.

Mutende included an explanation for the low price. But it was not propaganda that stopped the murmuring but the fact that in practice the Ordinance was found to work in favour of the African farmer.

In 1939 the editor found that the chief complaint that Africans made against Mutende was that they felt it did not allow them full freedom of expression; they were not free to criticize chiefs, Europeans and the government; yet editor Phillips claimed in a memorandum in July 1939 that 'very few of this sort ever reached the Editor'.

The files during this period do not contain any evidence of suppressed letters on sensitive issues although later files do. Some of the letters cited above show that political opinion was not completely emasculated but for a more full-blooded expression of African political opinion one has to turn to the Bantu Mirror. As it was a commercial paper it allowed greater freedom of expression.

In two successive issues of the Bantu Mirror in February 1939 there is a cri-de-coeur from Ackson Mwale,

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1. Mutende No. 7, 2.


3. NAZ/SEC 2/1129, Phillips, 'Memorandum on the Publication'.

4. See pp. 186-188.
a clerk at Fort Jameson Boma, and also a Mutende correspondent,\(^1\) for 'a larger chance'—greater opportunities for Northern Rhodesian Africans.\(^2\) The letter is something of a milestone in the history of the awakening of a political consciousness amongst Africans in Northern Rhodesia. His first complaint is about the paucity of educational opportunities which he blames (not without reason) on the white settlers; European farmers were opposed to educating Africans because they feared a diminution of their labour supply whilst other Europeans feared the competition of educated Africans in the job market:

> When educated enough he'll chafe to be under the restraint of the white man and will likely compete with him. Leave him where he is. The no-good European will always tell you this.\(^3\)

Mwale's second point was that the lack of both educational and property qualifications prevented the African from having his own representatives in the Leg. Co.: 'to him the door is barricaded'. If an African found 'a flaw in the laws of the country and in his government, and by this is stirred to make his own voice heard by those concerned' he was blocked because he did not have the right to vote. A European nominated to represent African interests was an unsatisfactory arrangement because 'A European does

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not know his ins and outs'. Mwale went on to express his resentment about the 'unfair treatment' of the African in labour and business, because of his black skin; and about bad wages, housing conditions and exorbitant taxation, concluding:

we wonder whether we shall come to the time when the African will be able to represent his own interests in the high courts of parliaments and enjoy the franchise; open up farms and businesses, and be employer instead of employee; be able to tackle his own problems... He is sick of being ever a hewer of wood and drawer of water! He desires something real and decent out of life..."  

Harry Nkumbula, a founder member of Northern Rhodesia's first African political party and a future leader in the African fight against closer union with Southern Rhodesia, contributed his views on amalgamation to the Bantu Mirror in July 1939 when he was working for the Native Education Department at Mazabuka. The letter is interesting because Nkumbula at this stage was in favour of amalgamation and had a vague vision of a pan Bantuism:

If the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland were to be amalgamated how much better it would be: because then we would be under one Government. We would have the same privileges and there would be a closer relationship between us. In my opinion I would wish the whole of Africa to be under one rule because then we could more speedily build up the BANTU NATION.  

In the preceding pages Mutende has been analysed for its political propaganda content, and as a source of

2. Bantu Mirror, 8 July 1939, 1 and 12.
information about what issues were of particular concern to educated Africans in the pre-war period. But what impact was the paper having? Who was reading Mutende?

One impressionistic answer was given in 1939 by the Provincial Commissioner (P.C.) at Kasama:

Two widely divergent types of native read Mutende. The first, the bulk of the subscribers, are literate, sometimes of foreign origin, who have travelled, and are attempting to reach a higher culture, which includes better housing, food and a subscription to Mutende. It may be added that this type enjoys almost a monopoly of intelligent reading and is the usual contributor of letters and articles.

These people were usually clerks or store capitaos. The other type were 'the aspiring local school boys and young men with a smattering of education'. Some of the illiterate had Mutende read to them by itinerant teachers but this practice was more widespread during the war.

According to Ivor Graham, Mutende was designed for an African population of 1,366,000 with 10 per cent literacy. The first issue was expected to sell three thousand. Mutende No. 1 which came out in March 1936 was a twelve page monthly selling at 1d per copy. Instead of three thousand the first issue sold 5,742 and the second, 6,503. (Readership would be larger than circulation;

3. NAZ/SEC 2/1129, Phillips, annexure to 'Memorandum on the Publication'.
it was estimated in 1937 that one newspaper would be read by about ten people.\(^1\) Owing to the large demand and the fact that production costs ran to more than 1d per copy, the Chief Secretary decided that the third issue should be enlarged to sixteen pages and the price raised to 2d, the same price as the Bantu Mirror.

Stevens was against the change which he thought might 'cause considerable trouble amongst the native public' but he was overruled by Dundas, the Chief Secretary.\(^2\)

As a result of the price rise there was a dramatic slump in sales: the May issue dropped to 4,372, the June to 3,783 and sales did not pass the four thousand mark till October 1938 and only approximated those of the first issue in mid 1939.\(^3\) As Mutende was intended to do battle against Watch Tower literature the poor sales were a cause for concern at the Secretariat. Considerable research was done into the dramatic fall.\(^4\) Sales graphs were made and analysed and pressure put on provincial officials to boost sales.

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2. NAZ/SEC 2/1127, Stevens to ACSNA, 17 April 1936.
3. NAZ/SEC 2/1129, Phillips, annexure to 'Memorandum on the Publication'.
4. An article on 'The African Press' in The Times of 20 July 1951 considered that in Africa 'a circulation of 6,000 is an exceptional achievement'. In 'The Bantu Press and Race Relations', in Race Relations 2, 1 (1935), 129, it was reported that in South Africa the combined circulation of the seven native weeklies probably did not amount to much more than 25,000.
The overall position in August 1936 is shown by this sales analysis for each station shown as a percentage of the adult male population:

- Livingstone: \(\frac{6}{10}\%\)
- Luanshya: \(\frac{5}{10}\%\)
- Mfulira: \(\frac{4}{10}\%\)
- Lusaka: \(\frac{3}{10}\%\)
- Namwala, Nkana: \(\frac{2}{10}\%\)
- Ndola, Sesheke: \(\frac{1}{10}\%\)
- Abercorn, Mazabuka, Solwezi: \(\frac{1}{10}\%\)
- Broken Hill, Kasama, Mumbwa, Serenje: \(\frac{1}{10}\%\)
- Chinsali, Fort Jameson, Isoka, Kalabo, Kazempa, Lundazi, Mpika, Mwinilunga, Senanga: \(\frac{1}{10}\%\)
- Fort Rosebery, Kalomo, Kawambwa, Luwingu, Mkushi, Mongu, Mporokoso: \(\frac{1}{10}\%\)
- Baloyale, Mankoya, Petauke: \(\frac{1}{10}\%\)

The poor sales on the Copperbelt were particularly worrying to the administration and both Stevens and Denny were sent to the Copperbelt to investigate. Stevens found that the first two issues had been welcomed because of the 'novelty' but readers had been antagonised by the rise in price, which was the prime reason for the sales slump. He found a variety of secondary causes which included: opposition by Watch Tower leaders and by discontented loafers who are being prosecuted; European papers being more 'outspoken and more frequent'; the belief that 'evolve' was 'a Government trap to get more of their money and to get free thinkers into trouble...'; and the idea that the paper would not last.\(^2\)

Copperbelt sales did not improve and in March 1937 Denny, the new editor, was despatched to the Copperbelt to investigate. He attributed the poor sales to two principal causes: the inadequacy of distribution and

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1. NAZ/SEC 2/1128, Stevens to ACSNA, 14 Aug. 1936.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1128, Stevens to ACSNA, 12 Aug. 1936.
the lack of interest of the paper to the educated. Denny emphasised that on the Copperbelt Mutende had to compete with the Bulawayo Chronicle and the Johannesburg papers:

It may be said that there are relatively few Natives who buy these journals. That is as it may be. Most of those I spoke to do so regularly. But their influence is very great. A word from a clerk to the effect that Mutende is no good and that better value is given by the Chronicle for 6d than Mutende for 2d passes from mouth to mouth in the compounds. The hearers may not wish to buy the Chronicle, nor be able to read it, but they will not in the alternative, buy Mutende.

According to the sales analysis in August 1936 the worst sales in the country were in Eastern Province. The Secretariat demanded an explanation. The P.C. for the region received a strongly worded note from E. A. T. Dutton in which he pointed out "...the great necessity for providing our natives with readable literature so as to make them less anxious to acquire literature which may be undesirable politically'. He continued:

His Excellency wishes me to say that he hopes that you will tell your officers that the wide circulation of Mutende is considered to be a matter of importance, and that it is the policy of Government that its officers should use every endeavour to increase it.2

After an inquest in Eastern Province the D.C. reported that the paper was 'unsuitable and unpopular'.3

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1128, Denny to ACSNA, 11 March 1937.
3. NAZ/SEC 2/1128, Russell to Chief Sec., 28 April 1937.
This was partly because of low Nyanja content and partly because the paper was over the heads of the readers. When Mutende first started there had been some objection to the use of Nyanja on the grounds that it was a foreign tongue¹ and for the first three years of the paper's existence more space was devoted to Bemba than the other three languages. In October 1938 the language distribution was:

- English: 2 3/4 pages
- Bemba: 4 pages
- Nyanja: 2 pages
- Lozi: 1 1/3 pages
- Tonga: 1 1/4 pages²

The D.C. reported that it was the feeling of the officials in his area that the paper should strive to appeal to the majority of Africans and not to a small educated minority. Articles in Mutende were too long and some words were beyond the comprehension of readers and should not be used without explanation. The 'average native' said Russell, found ten or twenty lines sufficient for an evening's reading.³ Denny strongly disagreed about who should be Mutende's target audience, 'the best policy for Mutende to pursue is working downwards, rather than upwards. It is the educated Native who guides African opinion'.⁴ One of the Eastern Province D.O.s, Phillips, later took over as editor and he consciously aimed the

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¹ NAZ/SEC 2/1127, A. M. Jones, Warden, St. Mark's College Mapanza, to Chief Sec., 30 April 1936.
³ NAZ/SEC 2/1128, Russell to Chief Sec., 28 April 1937.
⁴ NAZ/SEC 2/1128, Denny to ACSNA, 10 May 1937.
paper at the less educated. He doubted the desirability of including European news at all; it was 'a dangerous feature' because the educated, who were highly critical of the 'Government news' in Mutende and accused the paper of 'lying when the details provided are not so lurid as those in other papers', might turn their less educated brethren off the paper.\textsuperscript{1} Phillips, however, was overtook by events, the Second World War, and it was no longer possible for him to confine the paper's overseas coverage to about a column in English.

The Secretariat decided that D.O.s must do all they could to boost sales and a district circular was sent out to this effect on 5 November 1937. The circular also announced that Native Authorities were to be invited to become agents with a commission of 1d per copy. An Eastern Province suggestion that contributors should be paid for their efforts was incorporated in the circular which announced that the senior clerk at each station was to become an official correspondent and would be paid at the rate of 5/- a column,\textsuperscript{2} for any material that was printed; other contributors would be paid at the same rate. The appointment of official local correspondents did not work but more free-lance contributions were received as a result of the payment.

In December 1938 Mutende sales reached 4,106 a slight

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} NAZ/SEC 2/1129, Phillips, 'Memorandum on the Publication'.
\item \textsuperscript{2} NAZ/SEC 2/1128, Dutton, 5 Nov. 1937.
\end{itemize}
increase over December 1936 when they had been 3,072. The increase was largely accounted for by the increase in the Nyanja readership which now outnumbered all others. This was partly because the Eastern Province administration had made a determined effort to increase local sales after the Secretariat reprimand and partly because the Nyanja content of Mutende increased and became comparable to that of Bemba when Phillips became editor.¹

Lozi readership was poor. The Native Affairs Annual Report for 1936 spoke of a 'most discouraging apathy'. Sales were not low because people could not afford the paper, but because the Lozi had 'not acquired the newspaper habit'.² The Native Affairs Annual Report for 1937 noted that educated Lozis living in the province were most reluctant to contribute to the paper, and that the members of the central kuta (council) did not buy more than one or two copies. Sales were not good in Southern Province either. The Ila were resentful because their language was not included and generally poor sales were attributed to the lower standard of general education in the province compared to the north and east.³

In summing up the impact of Mutende before World War II the first point to be emphasised is that the

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² Northern Rhodesia Native Affairs Annual Report, 1936, 81.
³ Ibid., 28.
effect of this government paper was influenced by the availability of alternative sources of information. Mutende was an instrument of the colonial government reflecting its authoritarian, autocratic character but Africans also had access to European commercially-owned papers which reflected the democratic nature of domestic British government with its tradition of freedom of the press. Educated Africans could, and did, compare the carefully edited accounts of events in Mutende with reports in commercial newspapers. The Rev. A. J. Cross reported to the Bledisloe Commission that he had been told by an African that the European papers were preferred to Mutende because 'we prefer to read what the white man says about us in his own paper'.

Mutende was contributing to the formation of an African public opinion. For public opinion to be formed people need a certain level of information and some forum where opinions can be expressed, where dialogue can take place, and issues be identified. Africans were not permitted to write to European newspapers; Mutende did give them some opportunity for public discourse. It provided, in the words of the Native Affairs Report for 1937, a vehicle for 'the ventilation of the views of the more advanced natives'.

1. Record of Oral Evidence to the Bledisloe Commission 1938, CXXVII. para. 31; A. B. Kazunga told the Bledisloe Commission at Broken Hill that there was little reading of Mutende (Evidence, c. para. 63).

this process, urging Africans to have opinions and
publicly express them but once it was started the
administration tried to establish controls, to channel
thought and limit freedom of expression to non controversial
issues. Africans, however, had before them the example
of the European free press where white settlers trenchantly
criticised C.O. rule and wrote of Africans in racist and
derogatory terms; Africans did not see why they should
not also be allowed full freedom of expression. The
government was caught in the contradiction of its own
system.

Mutende was also making a contribution to the breaking
down of the mental isolation of the African and making
him conscious of a new territorial identity as a Northern
Rhodesian African in addition to his primary ethnic identity -
the first stage in the awakening of a national consciousness.
Moses Mubitana wrote in to Mutende in February 1941 to say
that he thought:

the printing of news of what is
happening all over the country in
each edition, so that all can read it,
is most important of all. By doing
this Mutende will do good work in
making people interested in each other
and teaching them that they are all
brothers working to the same goal.

Whilst this was not the foremost objective of the
administration it was not absent from the mind of all

1. Mutende No. 82, 27 Feb. 1941, 8.
administrators. In 1936 Denny wrote:

I regard Mutende not only as a journal for the Northern Rhodesian Native, but as a potential force in the welding together of the African race, and such welding must necessarily be the goal of all Native administration.¹

But Mutende appeared in five languages! McLuhan writing of Europe considered that 'print created individualism and nationalism in the sixteenth century'² and that 'political unification of populations by means of vernacular and language groupings was unthinkable before printing turned each vernacular into an extensive mass medium'.³ On the one hand in Mutende English was providing a common medium of expression and giving Africans a concept of themselves as Northern Rhodesian Africans - Ali Mazrui writes of the 'detribalising effect of the English language'.⁴ But on the other hand if we follow through McLuhan's argument the four vernacular languages in which Mutende was published may at the same time have been reinforcing ethnic particularism. (The Publication Bureau, for example, found that one of the most popular subjects that Africans wished to read and write about was tribal history.⁵)

It was English, nevertheless, which was the language of politics; and it was those Africans who were proficient

3. Ibid., 177.
5. See pp. 308-309.
in English and could interpret the colonial situation to other Africans who were emerging as the new leaders as Denny found on his visit to the Copperbelt. Mutende was providing a platform for these new opinion leaders to demonstrate their language and polemical skills. Again the administration was caught in its own net. Whilst preaching through the pages of Mutende the importance of traditional authority Mutende was giving an opportunity to those who did not have traditional claims to power to establish their leadership credentials in a literate society. Inevitably Mutende contributed to the failure of indirect rule.

(b) The African Literature Committee

Like Mutende the African Literature Committee was set up by the Northern Rhodesian administration after the Commission of Enquiry into the 1935 Copperbelt strike had found that the spread of what they considered subversive Watch Tower literature had been facilitated by the fact that there was practically no cheap secular literature available for Africans either in their own local languages or in simple English. The African Literature Committee was a product of both government and missionary initiative. The C.O. had referred the literature problem to its Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies which referred it to the Text Book sub-committee. Further discussions were held with J. Merle Davis of the International Missionary Council, the International
Committee on Christian Literature for Africa (ICCLA), a sub-committee of the International Missionary Council, and the United Society for Christian Literature.

Before the Copperbelt strike missionaries had demonstrated a concern both about the effects of rapid industrialisation on African society on the Copperbelt and the dearth of simple reading material for newly literate Africans. In 1932 Merle Davis had been chairman of a commission of enquiry under the auspices of the International Missionary Council which had investigated the effect of Northern Rhodesia's copper mines on African society and the work of the Christian missions and had urged that missions should pay more attention to adult education and welfare work.

Since the 1920s missionaries had been discussing the need for literature for Africans. The subject was discussed at the Le Zoute Conference in 1926 when 231 missionaries and officials from fourteen countries discussed educational work in Africa. As a follow up the ICCLA was established in 1929; Margaret Wrong, a Canadian became Secretary and held the post till 1948. The ICCLA was financed by grants from American, British and European missionary societies, religious publishing houses and some bookshops in Africa. Organizations including the Phelps-Stokes Foundation and the Carnegie

1. In 1926 she assisted in a survey in Africa under the Phelps-Stokes Foundation on education in Africa.
Corporation also contributed substantially. The ICCLA acted as a clearing house for information on literature plans and publications for different parts of Africa; this was done chiefly through Books for Africa a quarterly bulletin edited by Margaret Wrong which first appeared in 1931. In 1932 she started a simple periodical for village people and school children called Listen which sold at 1d, was subsidised by an American mission organization and contained simple material on health, African history and world events; this periodical found its way into Northern Rhodesian schools.

At the General Missionary Conference in Northern Rhodesia in 1927 missionaries lamented the lack of suitable reading material for Africans. They made an unsuccessful approach to the government to start an African newspaper and urged that both missionaries and African authors should be encouraged to write educational as well as religious books. But by 1937 little contribution had been made towards the provision of non religious reading material. In 1937 a survey revealed that there was very little in the way of general reading material in the local languages: Bemba, Ila and

Lozi each had one general work, there were two in Tonga and by contrast Tumbuka had six and Nyanja eighteen.¹ (The latter two languages were both spoken in Nyasaland where missionaries were more active in literary work.)

In March 1936 the Secretary of State for Colonies wrote to Hubert Young, the Northern Rhodesian Governor, to inform him of the progress of discussions he had been having with missionary groups concerning plans for providing simple literature for the mining areas of Northern Rhodesia. He thought it likely that a committee would be set up for general missionary work by the missions with the co-operation of the mining authorities and that the provision of cheap literature could be included as one of its objectives.² The Northern Rhodesian administration intimated that any financial contribution from that source would depend on the proposed committee being more broadly based and less obviously missionary in character.³ It also felt that literature work should not be confined to the Copperbelt but should include the rest of Northern Rhodesia.⁴

A more broadly representative committee was established in 1937; it was originally called the


2. NAZ/SEC 2/1138, J. H. Thomas to Young, 16 March 1936.

3. NAZ/SEC 2/1138, Dundas to Thomas, 15 May 1936.

Native Literature Committee but later in 1937 'Native' was altered to 'African'; the members included:

- The Senior Provincial Commissioner, Chairman (alternate A. T. Williams, D.C. Kitwe)
- Rev. A. J. Cross (General Missionary Council)
- David Greig (Copperbelt United Mission)
- An African to be nominated by the Chairman
- Superintendent of Native Education, Ndola, Secretary.

Merle Davis had recommended that the protestant missions should combine their resources in order to carry out more effectively welfare, educational and evangelical work on the Copperbelt. The 1935 strike hastened the setting up of the United Missions in the Copperbelt in 1936. The group included representatives of the London Missionary Society, the Church of Scotland, the U.M.C.A., the Methodists, the South African Baptists and the United Society for Christian Literature. The United Society established its headquarters at Mindolo in Kitwe and took on the task of providing Christian literature for the Copperbelt, and of producing and distributing educational text books for the whole country. Moreover its representative, David Greig, played a prominent part in the work of the African Literature Committee. At the insistence, then, of the Northern Rhodesian administration the production of religious literature was kept distinct from the work of the African Literature Committee.

The Committee were determined that African opinion should be consulted and deliberately chose an African

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1. Universities' Mission to Central Africa.
who was not employed by either government or the missions in an effort to get an independent viewpoint. Clement Kandeke worked in the compound office at Nkana mine but he was not able to retain his appointment because his employer refused to give him time off. Later in 1937 two more Africans joined the Committee in place of Kandeke. The Western Province P.C., T. F. Sandford, felt that it would be better to have two African members so that they could have discussions between themselves before meetings and thus be able to give a more thorough representation of African opinion. The new members were both government employees. Ernest Muwamba, a Nyasalander and the senior-ranking African in the civil service, was a clerk in Sandford's office. Sandford described him as:

an extremely intelligent native who is in contact with many different classes of Africans, and was at one time a leader of the Native Church at Ndola. He is quite able to express an opinion of his own.

The other new member, Lisimba Sunduma, was a teacher at Ndola government school and a member of the Library Committee at Ndola.

The African Literature Committee in drawing up its objectives, was strongly influenced by suggestions both from Margaret Wrong and from Northern Rhodesia's Chief Secretary, Charles Dundas, who was Acting Governor at the time the Committee was established. Dundas

2. NAZ/SEC 2/1138, Sandford to Chief Sec., 10 Dec. 1937. Muwamba became an acting D.C. at Broken Hill in World War II.
emphasised the 'importance of getting a variety of literature' and 'of avoiding being too materialistic and utilitarian' and of catering to the needs of the African woman. 1 In 1936 Wrong toured South and Central Africa on behalf of the ICCLA; at the request of the C.C. she extended the tour to include Northern Rhodesia because of the Copperbelt disturbances; the enlarged itinerary was financed by the Carnegie Corporation. 2 Wrong insisted on the need to encourage general literature in the local languages because it would be 'many years before the rank and file of the population will be able to read English'. 3 On another occasion she argued that because the African dwelt 'in two worlds' he needed more than one language; 4 Dundas agreed, he cited the case of the West Indies, commenting that 'the loss of a people's natural tongue is little short of a disaster'. 5 Wrong further advocated that African authors should be encouraged to produce both English and vernacular works which was apparently considered an 'outlandish' suggestion at the time according to G. H. Wilson later

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1141, Draft Minutes of the Native Literature Committee, 23 April 1937.

2. Edinburgh House Archives, Margaret Wrong, ICCLA, Box 10, 'Memorandum With Regard To A Grant From The Carnegie Corporation', 4 Dec. 1935.


5. 'Means of Spreading Thought'. Dundas had served in the Bahamas from 1929 to 1934.
Secretary of the Literature Committee and Director of its successor, the Public Relations Bureau of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland:

Government policy here and academic and educational policy put out from London was all based on ideas of aborigines' protection, indirect rule through Native institutions, and the preservation of African cultures, alongside the supply to the mines of a labour force which was to remain migrant based on villages, not urbanised, and not Europeanised, not taught to talk in English, or think in English, or read in English or write in English. 1

Finally Wrong made the point with which Dundas strongly concurred that African opinion was vital at every stage of the production process. 2

Wrong herself began the process of consulting African opinion during her tour of Northern Rhodesia in 1936 as a result of which she prepared a memorandum indicating what she found to be the current taste in literature amongst Africans. 'Simple people', she reported, were more interested in fables and short stories from real life than novels, only the more 'sophisticated' were interested in fiction. 'Accounts of brave deeds and short biographies of Africans, of Europeans who have served Africa and of American negroes' were popular. (The life of Aggrey was cited as an example of a popular book both in the English and Nyanja version.) People had asked for books about


George V and George VI with illustrations and books on nature study, health, hygiene and tribal history. 'Men in responsible positions in Native Authorities' had requested a 'book explaining British Administration and giving information about government in Great Britain'. Many people wanted books explaining the Bible: 'This will help you to understand your Bible' appeared to be the 'most telling recommendation for Watch Tower literature'. Her final word was that the majority of Northern Rhodesian Africans had not yet acquired the reading habit and that reading for recreation was rare.\(^1\)

On the organizational side Wrong suggested that the proposed committee should liaise closely with Nyasaland because Nyanja was widely spoken in both colonies. She recommended a yearly grant of £200 to cover such items as fees for translators, authors and artists, and publication expenses; a centralised distribution agency and in the country districts organised sales, and an extension of libraries in both rural and urban areas. Finally she recommended that Mutende should have a book column to keep the public informed of the work of the committee.

Most of the suggestions of Dundas and Wrong were followed up by the African Literature Committee. It kept in close touch with Nyasaland and arranged for the circulation in Northern Rhodesia of some Nyanja works which originated there; at a later stage literature work

\(^1\) NAZ/SEC 2/1138, Wrong, 'Memorandum On General Literature Needs'.
in both colonies was merged with the formation of the joint Publications Bureau of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1948. In the first year of operation £100 was made available from government funds and in the second £365 out of the Native Development Fund. The balance of the 1938 grant, £319, was spent in 1939 as it was not spent in 1938. The United Society for Christian Literature's Mindolo Book Depot became the central distributing agency; through the Depot books were sold and distributed throughout the country. The Committee decided that the Pollak bequest should be used for providing termite-proof library cupboards in all the provinces - 42 in all, and persuaded the government to introduce a law which reduced licenses payable by booksellers and book-hawkers from £5 and £2 to 10s and 5s. These measures were taken to promote the distribution of books throughout the country.

The Committee was concerned to promote the production and distribution of literature in both simple English and the local languages. The question of what local languages to use was referred to the Governor who urged that the Committee follow the Mutende path and use the

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1. 'The Native Development Board: A Useful Institution in Northern Rhodesia' by a District Officer, Journal of the Royal African Society, 156 (1940), 244-247.

2. Major Pollak left the sum of £2,500 'for such charitable, educational research and National Institutions of Northern Rhodesia as the President of the British South Africa Company might think fit'. It was £200 from this fund that was to be used for library cupboards. C. Dundas to J. H. Thomas S/S, 15 May 1936, NAZ/SEC 2/1141.

3. Northern Rhodesia Native Education Annual Report 1938, 27.
four official local languages as well as English. The Governor wished that the use of the local languages should be thus restricted in the hope of developing a lingua franca. One task the Committee set itself was to recommend simple works in English to local libraries and bookshops; its recommendations included books on health and hygiene, on mothercraft, animal stories, fairy tales and fables and some British adventure yarns like *The Prisoner of Zenda* and *Martin Rattler*. Another task was to arrange for works to be translated into the local languages: *Up From Slavery*, *Aggrey the African*, *Lives of Eminent Africans* and *Kulera Mwana* (Bringing Up a Child) were translated into Tonga, Bemba and Lozi. In 1939 to encourage African authors the Committee conducted with the assistance of Mutende a literary competition and entries were solicited in three classes: biographies or original stories, tribal histories and collections of folk stories. Thirteen manuscripts were received. The running of a competition had been first suggested in 1937 at a meeting where Clement Kandeke had told the Committee that it was not African custom to write new works of fiction; instead they often added new touches to an old story. It had then been suggested that Mutende ought to run a competition for a new story.

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1141, Hudson to PACS, 16 Aug. 1937.
3. Written in Nyanja by M. Begg and C. Peat.
Another facet of the African Literature Committee's work was to commission books on specific topics. When Africans had been asked what sort of books they wanted the first request had been for a history of Northern Rhodesia. Kenneth Bradley was asked to write such a book suitable both for general reading and for schools and to seek guidance from Professor Coupland, Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford who was chairman of a committee that had recently been appointed to advise authors intending to write history books for African schools.¹

The Literature Committee also gave advice on the projected work. Muwamba and Sunduma thought that the history should mention the role played by Africans 'in the discovery and early development of the Copper Mines' giving as an example, 'help and information given to prospectors'. What was of more general concern was the treatment in the history of the Mwanalesa movement,² Jehovah's Witnesses and the 1935 strike. It was decided that it was necessary to give a specific account of the Mwanalesa episode but:

it was unnecessary and undesirable that the subsequent history of the Watch Tower movement and the emergence of Jehovah's Witnesses should receive more than the minimum of attention. African members emphasised the need for a true account of the 'Mwanalesa' affair but deprecated any further discussion of subsequent developments.


². Mwana Lesa (son of God) was the name taken by the notorious Tomo Nyirenda who, influenced by Watch Tower, conducted a witch hunt in the Lala area of Central Province in the 1920s killing many people by means of an ordeal by drowning.
On the subject of the strike the African Literature Committee thought:

it should be made clear that whatever fighting occurred was not due to any general hostility between Europeans and Africans but because Africans attempted to take the law into their own hands and thus sought redress by wrong methods. It should be made clear that if the law is challenged, no matter in what circumstances, it must be enforced, even at the cost of physical violence.¹

Another work commissioned by the Committee was Ignorance Is No Defence written by Harry Franklin to assist Africans coming to town for the first time by explaining town regulations.

When we come to look at what books were actually published as a result of the Committee's efforts in this pre-war period we find the answer is - very few.

Neither of the two commissioned works mentioned above, for example, were published before the war.² In 1938 the Committee arranged for the publication of four books in a category described as 'Customs, Manners, Morals, European interpretation'; and in 1939 there were published three western historical works and three tribal and traditional historical works.³ The small number of

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publications is partially accounted for by the normal delay that occurs between the decision to publish and the actual publication. Economic and professional reasons were also advanced: the Committee did not think it economically sound to commence an extensive publications programme until 'literacy, the reading habit and spending power' had become more developed. Expansion was held back, too, by the voluntary nature of the Committee. It was the desire of the Director of Native Education and the African Literature Committee that a professional publications bureau with a full-time officer in charge, and supported by clerical and translating staff be set up with the Committee continuing to function in an advisory capacity. War delayed these plans.

It is not possible to estimate the impact of the work of the African Literature Committee in any depth during this early period. The work of the Committee had only just begun; unlike Mutende the African Literature Committee was not engaged in both short-and long-term propaganda but only the latter. Mutende was concerned with the cut and thrust of everyday propaganda which aimed at popularising particular plans and policies as well as more long-term propaganda promoting a particular way of life, a certain mental set, thought wholesome by church and state. The African Literature Committee was only concerned with the

latter, with the characterological revolution. One would not expect immediate results, particularly as the publications were so few.

There is some evidence of African reading tastes contained in a 'Memorandum on Books Popular with African Readers' compiled by Greig of the Mindolo Book Depot in 1939, and based on sales; particularly popular were brief biographies of famous Africans and Europeans 'who have given service to Africa'.\(^1\) In the promoting of the characterological revolution the book *Aggrey the African* is of some significance as it shows an African succeeding in a white world in a way approved of by whites and his career is held up for emulation. Riesman's comment on the vocational guidance role of the story of Booker T. Washington could also apply to the account of Aggrey's career:

> Booker T. Washington's whole career could be described as an effort to turn the Negro away from dependence on tradition-direction towards dependence on inner-direction.\(^2\)

The role of the colonial government in shaping Bradley's history, the first history of Northern Rhodesia, written for both general and school use, illustrates the way in which education and propaganda are often intertwined. Some facts are played down and others omitted in order to present an interpretation of the past which best suits the purposes of the present government.

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1. CO 795/110/45137, Memorandum sent by W. M. Logan, Deputy to Gov. of Northern Rhodesia, to Malcolm Macdonald, 24 June 1939.
2. Riesman, 'The Socializing Functions of Print', 420.
Government's attempts to control the reading habits of Northern Rhodesian Africans in the interests of good government can also be seen in its censorship activities where the concern was with secular subversive literature of the 'black consciousness' variety. In the 1920s copies of the Workers' Herald, the official paper of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa edited by Clements Kadalie, and the Negro World, produced by the Universal Negro Improvement Association led by Marcus Garvey were seized at the Post Office. But government seems to have been little troubled by this type of polemical literature between the wars. In 1933 the Secretary of State for Colonies had supplied a long list of subversive publications whose importation into Northern Rhodesia was to be prevented, but none of the publications were found to be circulating in the territory. In 1936 there was some concern about a verse on the cover of The Black Man edited by Garvey which contained the lines:

Another day has just begun,
For white and black alike
The white man greets it with his gun:
Will Negroes ever strike?

Twenty-six copies had been sent in a package to a Lozi employed at a Copperbelt hotel. The administration decided not to impound the journal but to keep a watch on the activities of the recipient. It was not, as we have seen

1. NAZ/SEC 1/1777, From Superintendent of the Criminal Investigation Branch to the Commissioner of Police, 15 May 1934.

the subversive influence of black consciousness literature but rather of Watch Tower pamphlets that troubled the Northern Rhodesian administration in the 1930s which is perhaps a commentary on the slow dawning of African political consciousness in Northern Rhodesia.

After the strike the policy adopted by the Northern Rhodesian administration, towards the Watch Tower, under the guidance of the C.O., was 'one of unobtrusive vigilance' rather than 'active repression'.¹ In September 1935 the C.O. agreed to the suggestion of the Governor, Hubert Young, that he should 'at his discretion' prohibit the importation of Watch Tower publications into the country.² In February 1936, however, the Secretary of State advised that the ban should not be enforced too rigorously, 'only those publications which were definitely seditious should be prohibited'.³ J. A. Calder of the C.O. commented:

It is clear that a Society whose chief doctrine is that Satan rules the world and that all existing officials in states and churches are his agents must find it difficult to propagate its doctrines without verging on sedition. But there is general agreement that it is preferable to supervise its activities rather than to prohibit them.⁴

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¹ CO 323/1611/71371/1, E. Boyd, minute, 22 July 1938, quoting a confidential despatch to the Gov. of Northern Rhodesia dated 11 Feb. 1936.

² CO 323/1824/2607, C. E. Lambert, minute, 8 March 1941.

³ Ibid.

⁴ CO 323/1611/71371/1, J. Howard, minute, 19 July 1938.
Governor Young invited the Society to send a representative to Northern Rhodesia to supervise the activities of its followers. The South African headquarters were asked to withdraw one of their representatives, Peter Johannes de Jaeger, for 'conducting a strong campaign of propaganda'. The administration were, initially, more satisfied with the work of the other representative, Lewellyn Phillips, who established a depot in Lusaka in 1936. All Watch Tower literature had to be imported through Phillips who then had to submit it to the administration before distribution for censorship. In August 1937 Governor Young reported to the C.O. that Phillips appeared to be succeeding in checking 'the subversive and otherwise undesirable tendencies of some of the followers'. This policy of 'unobtrusive vigilance', however, was to change to one of 'active oppression' under the pressure of war and another strike on the Copperbelt.

3. The Electronic Media
(a) Broadcasting

From the second half of the 1920s the C.O. began to explore the implications, for the colonies, and for the colonial power, of the electronic media: broadcasting and film. A discussion of the development of the British government's policy on colonial broadcasting before World War II has two areas; the BBC's Empire Service and local colonial broadcasting. The objectives of

1. Ibid.
2. CO 323/1824/2607, Lambert, minute, 8 March 1941.
colonial broadcasting as they emerged in the period were: the Projection-of-Britain in the international competition for the ears of the global village; the strengthening of the imperial link primarily with the kith and kin beyond the seas; and the use of broadcasting in the colonies as an instrument of administration, education and entertainment.

It was the BBC and its Director-General John Reith who more than any other group pushed the cause of colonial broadcasting. Reith was interested in seeing the establishment of both an Empire service for the BBC and autonomous local broadcasting stations.¹ Short wave internationalised broadcasting, made it a world issue. By 1929 the parochial BBC had become somewhat alarmed at the growing number of foreign short wave stations beaming their messages across national boundaries and devoted to 'the world-wide presentation of the national viewpoint in terms of national culture'. The BBC felt 'the boundary between cultural and tendentious propaganda is, in practice, very indefinite'² and counter-propaganda might become necessary. The BBC also intimated its concern about the power of the American broadcasting interest.

(This paralleled contemporary British concern about the

2. Memorandum by C. F. Atkinson (Foreign Director) and Noel Ashbridge (Chief Engineer) Nov. 1929, quoted in Briggs, History of Broadcasting Vol. II, 374-375.
domination of the world cinema market by the American movie.¹ British commercial and political interests seemed to call for an Empire short-wave service.

There was also a call from the C.O. for an Empire service. The C.O. felt 'that broadcasting was a service of very great Imperial value...from the point of view of sentiment, general Imperial patriotism, finance, commerce...'.² Interest was expressed at the C.O. Conferences of 1927 and 1930. Two schemes prepared by the BBC were rejected by the British government for financial reasons. Finally in 1931, with Britain in the depths of a financial depression, the BBC realised that the only way to get anything done would be for the BBC itself to pay the whole cost of an Empire service. Money was allotted for this purpose out of the home listeners' license fees and the first regular Empire broadcasts began on 19 December 1932.³ BBC historian Asa Briggs commented:

The decision was an important one, and it is a comment on the cautious and unimaginative political attitudes of the inter-war years that the BBC had been forced to take it unilaterally and on its own responsibility.⁴

W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, former Parliamentary Under Secretary

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² CO 323/1338/5302/1, memo on 'Empire Broadcasting' E. Bowyer, 22 May 1935.

³ J. H. Whitley, 'Empire Broadcasting and the New Service', United Empire, 24 (1933), 86.

of State for Colonies (1924-1929) and future Secretary of State for Colonies (1936-1938), applauded the decision. Empire broadcasting was a matter 'of the utmost political as well as commercial importance to this country' and 'long overdue'.

The launching of the Empire Service was a stimulant to colonial broadcasting activities. Successive Secretaries of State emphasised the great importance they placed on the reception in the colonies of the Empire Service. An associated development was that recognition was soon given to the importance of the development of local colonial broadcasting.

Secretary of State for Colonies Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister (1931-1935) addressed governors on the subject in a number of circular despatches, the most comprehensive of which was that of 8 May 1935. In it Cunliffe-Lister discussed both the purposes of colonial broadcasting and the question of reception facilities. He was particularly concerned to see that programmes of British origin should be received in the colonies. By 1935 this question had assumed greater importance than when the Empire Service was first mooted because of the increasingly hostile propaganda that was being put out over short-wave by Germany and Italy. That 'boundary between cultural and tendentious propaganda had definitely been overstepped'.

One way of projecting Britain, Cunliffe-Lister pointed out, was through the broadcast of royal and ceremonial occasions.

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which gave people 'a more vivid realisation of their connection with the Empire'. This was proved with the outstanding success of the first royal Christmas broadcast when George V spoke to both home and overseas audiences in 1932. The BBC had acquired a new role, high priest in the rites of the imperial tribe.

The Empire Service was designed for white populations under the British flag and those of the native intelligentsia who had the educational background to appreciate the broadcasts which were 'representative of British tradition and sentiment'. Who in Africa was listening in? Of all the continents Africa was the last to experience a broadcasting take-off. The main reasons were technological backwardness and the poverty of the people.

Broadcasting on the African continent was first developed for the benefit of Europeans living in the more technologically advanced areas. Johannesburg went on the air in 1924, Kenya in 1928 and Southern Rhodesia in 1932. In Kenya broadcasting was organised by arrangement with a commercial company; at first it was the British East African Broadcasting Company but this was later taken over by Cable & Wireless Limited. In other African colonies there was an audience for the Empire Service amongst those who could afford expensive short-wave sets to listen direct to Daventry.

1. CO 323/1338/5302/1, Cunliffe-Lister, 8 May 1935.

Following on the establishment of the Empire Service some relay stations were established in West Africa as a result of local enthusiasm and ingenuity. Sir Arnold Hodson, when he was Governor of the Falkland Islands, established rediffusion there in 1929 to send the Empire Service out over telephone wires. He also introduced rediffusion to Sierra Leone in 1934 and Gold Coast in 1935 during subsequent postings to these colonies. A rediffusion station was opened in Lagos in 1935 replacing an experimental government station in Ibadan in 1939. These relay services seem to have had the effect of stimulating thought on the part of the colonial authorities and the BBC on the subject of broadcasting to the colonial people generally.

In the exploratory despatch of 8 May Cunliffe-Lister enclosed a BBC memorandum 'dealing with recent developments in the Empire Broadcasting Service and the methods of reception which may be employed' for the Daventry Service.\(^1\) The first was directly through short-wave receivers; the second through sets tuned into local transmitting stations as in Kenya. The third method was by rediffusion; Daventry would be received at a central station and from there relayed over a line network as in West Africa. The Secretary of State particularly commended rediffusion for those territories which could not see their way to establishing a broadcasting station. Cunliffe-Lister also raised the subject of educational broadcasting which

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\(^1\) CO 323/1338/5302/1, Cunliffe-Lister, 8 May 1935.
was becoming increasingly important in Britain. Colonies which had local broadcasting should pay careful attention to its use for educational and administrative purposes. The Secretary of State professed himself anxious to hear progress reports.

Shortly after this despatch was sent the C.O. had a new Secretary of State. There now followed a rapid turnover of incumbents: 7 June 1935 Malcolm MacDonald, 27 November J. H. Thomas and 29 May W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore. All followed up the interest in colonial broadcasting.

In September 1935 a discussion on the subject was held at the C.O. convened by Malcolm MacDonald and attended by Sir John Kaffey, R. Vernon, E. Bowyer (the C.O.'s liaison officer with the BBC) and Sir Arnold Hodson (then Governor of the Gold Coast). MacDonald announced that 'The Empire stood for ideas and principles of Government which were being subjected to attack from many sides'. He named Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan and urged that:

the fullest use ought to be made of this most powerful instrument - broadcasting - to uphold in the Colonies, British principles, ideas and culture, so that the peoples of the Colonies should appreciate more and more the privilege they enjoyed in membership of the Empire. In the final resort it would be such appreciation by the people of the Empire and not armed force - that would hold the Empire together.¹

MacDonald then suggested that a committee be set up to

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¹ CO 323/1338/5301/23, record of discussion on 4 Sept. 1935.
make a comprehensive investigation of colonial broadcasting. His successor J. H. Thomas acted on this suggestion and his first step was to have the BBC prepare a preliminary memorandum which was circulated to colonial governors.

The BBC memorandum was a call to action:

The time has come for consideration to be given to definite comprehensive action throughout the Colonial Empire to the end that the Daventry service should cover the Empire satisfactorily in both the technical and programme sense...1

The BBC, pushing the product, urged the 'institutionalisation' of broadcasting which should be treated as an 'organic interest' in the C.O. and in all the colonies. It should be given departmental status for 'the potentialities of broadcasting are comparable with the demands of the major social services and of defence'.2

In February 1936 J. H. Thomas appointed a committee under the chairmanship of the Earl of Plymouth to undertake a thorough study of colonial broadcasting. Other C.O. representatives on the committee included Vernon and Bowyer with J. Megson as Secretary. There were also representatives from the General Post Office (G.P.O.), the BBC, the Crown Agents and the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies. The terms of reference were:

to consider and recommend what steps could usefully be taken to accelerate the provision of broadcasting services in the Colonial Empire, to co-ordinate such services with the work of the British Broadcasting Corporation, and to make them a more effective instrument for promoting local and imperial interests.

1. CO 323/1338/5301/23, 'The British Broadcasting Corporation Introductory Memorandum'.

2. Ibid.
Their report, popularly known as the Plymouth Report, was published in 1937. The purpose of the Plymouth Report was to encourage the reception of Daventry in the colonies, primarily in the imperial interest, and to promote the development of local broadcasting services 'as part of the machinery of civilization and administration in Africa'. Special mention was given to the unique value of the Empire Service for cementing the ties of Empire. This function ranged from the great occasion broadcasts like that of 'His late Majesty King George V at Christmas and of the Jubilee celebrations' to 'the repeated projection on the minds of the listeners overseas of British culture and ideas...'.

In commending the Plymouth Report to colonial governors the new Secretary of State, Ormsby-Gore, drew special attention to paragraph 14 which described colonial broadcasting as an 'instrument of advanced administration' to be used particularly:

for the enlightenment and education of the more backward sections of the population and for their instruction in public health, agriculture, etc.

This often quoted principle which is in keeping with the tradition of broadcasting as a public service established


4. Ibid., 5.
by Reith, was the cornerstone of the Report whilst the Report itself came to be the definitive text on colonial broadcasting for many years to follow.¹

The Plymouth Report expressed the hope that colonial governments would see fit to spend at least some money on investigating the possibilities of local broadcasting for Africans.² What was wanted was an experiment in the effectiveness of educational broadcasting in adult education comparable to the Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment (BEKE)³ which was then under way. Adult education was a popular topic in the 1930s, partly because of the success of workers' education programmes in Britain and partly because of the reputed success of crash mass education programmes in Russia which had a large illiterate population. Both films and broadcasting were seen as a way of jumping the stage of illiteracy - telescoping the educational ladder.

In order to encourage positive action, the Plymouth Report suggested that a questionnaire should be sent out to colonial governments asking for 'definite proposals for the development of local broadcasting' and whether technical experts might be required to give advice in the colonies or alternatively their advice should be sought in Britain.⁴ Ormsby-Gore in taking up this suggestion

¹ COI, R.2644, 'The Development of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom Dependencies', 31 July 1953.
² Plymouth Report, 3.
³ See pp. 111-117.
⁴ Plymouth Report, 10.
informed Governors of the great importance he placed on the committee's proposals and went on to suggest that adjacent colonial territories might think about the possibilities of regional broadcasting. ¹

The first steps towards local broadcasting for Africans were taken in West Africa. In the Gold Coast broadcasting was at first confined to rediffusion of the Empire Service but gradually local programmes were added: a local news service, a Children's Hour, musical programmes and vernacular news because only a literate minority could understand English. These developments were on an extremely small scale before the war. ²

The experimental spirit was not as fruitful in East Africa. The Governor of Uganda, Philip Mitchell, decided in 1938 to arrange for an experiment to be conducted into the possibilities of broadcasting in Uganda. He arranged for an assistant D.C., E. F. Twining, to undergo instruction at the BBC. Twining then returned to Uganda to conduct the experiment, assisted by W. K. Brasher, who had taken part in a recent experiment in Palestine, and C. A. L. Richards from the Ugandan administration. ³

The Twining Report published in 1939 contained proposals for developing a broadcasting service and details of a rediffusion experiment conducted with the aid of loud-

². See 'Development of Vernacular Broadcasting in the Gold Coast', Oversea Education, 15, 4 (1941), 177-178.
speakers in the neighbourhood of Kampala from 23 January
to 4 March 1939. The C.O. decided that the proposals
contained in the Twining Report would have been too
costly to implement. They were based on the idea that
eventually broadcasting in East Africa would be inter-
territorial envisaging a capital expenditure of £65,000
and annual recurrent costs of about £12,000.¹

As Kenya already had a commercial broadcasting
station which catered for Europeans the Plymouth Committee
had felt the colony would be an ideal place for a
broadcasting experiment for Africans. In 1936 Kenyan
officials investigated the idea of a broadcasting
experiment. The area suggested was the Kiambu Native
Reserve, a particularly progressive area near Nairobi.
It was thought that loudspeakers could be installed and
talks given by various veterinary, medical and
agricultural officials; the cost was estimated at
£2,500.² ('The only difficulty' foreseen by Sir Cecil
Bottomley of the C.O., was that 'Mr. Kenyatta would
certainly want to have his turn at the microphone'.³)
Parallels were drawn with the BEKE then being conducted
in East Africa⁴ and application was made to the Carnegie
Corporation for £2,500 to finance the Kikuyu experiment.

¹ CO 323/1650/5301/32, Mitchell to Cosmo Parkinson,
20 May 1939.
² CO 323/1390/5301/17, 'Memorandum on Broadcasting for
Africans in Kenya' sent to Ormsby-Gore, S/S,
31 Oct. 1936.
³ CO 323/1390/5301/17, minute, 1 May 1936.
⁴ CO 323/1390/5301/17, J. E. W. Flood to A. de V. Wade,
4 May 1936.
Carnegie agreed to pay only half the sum requested, £1,250, as the Kenya government was informed in January 1918. The Kenyan government then lost interest in the experiment and by August had decided not to proceed with it. Instead when war broke out in 1939 the government thought of utilising the funds for a different purpose, for the dissemination of war propaganda. Kenya suggested that the Carnegie grant might be used to contribute towards the cost of receiving sets and public address equipment. Sir John Shuckburgh, then Deputy Under Secretary of State for Colonies, reminded Sir Henry Moore, the Governor of Kenya, that the Carnegie grant was intended for research into educational broadcasting. What the Kenya government was now suggesting was tantamount to an invitation to them to contribute towards our war propaganda activities in Africa... The Carnegie grant was subsequently withdrawn and the funds were diverted to Makerere College Library.

Nyasaland informed the Secretary of State that they could not afford a broadcasting service but suggested that in the future they might join forces with Northern Rhodesia because Nyanja was spoken by large numbers of people in both territories.

Northern Rhodesian's Governor Hubert Young informed

1. CO 323/1584/5301/17, R. Brooke-Popham to W. Ormsby-Gore, 3 March 1938.
2. CO 875/2/5301/17, Shuckburgh to Moore, 27 May 1941.
the Secretary of State Ormsby-Gore, in 1937 'that the
time is not yet ripe in this territory for the
establishment of a local broadcasting service'. However
he went on to say that consideration was then being given
to equipping all government stations with receiving sets
and when this happened he intended 'to inaugurate
experiments in the local broadcasting of messages,
utilising one of the transmitters at the Broken Hill
Wireless Station...'.

A Native Development Board had been set up in 1938
with the Chief Secretary as chairman. One of its functions
was to advise on schemes to assist African development and,
in particular, on the use of £30,000 from the Central
Treasury Fund. In 1938 the newly constituted Board
asked the Postmaster General (P.M.G.) to produce a
broadcasting scheme to be financed with a grant of £500
from the Fund. The Board went on to accept the P.M.G.'s
proposal for a number of small, provincial broadcasting
stations using low power transmitters, with an initial
experiment to be conducted by the Provincial Administration
at Broken Hill.

The P.M.G.'s plan included the stipulation that
receiving sets listened to by Africans should only be able
to tune into broadcasts on one or two wave lengths. This

1. CO 323/1494/5301/40, Young to Ormsby-Gore, 10 Aug. 1937.
3. NAZ/SEC 2/425, Acting Chief Sec. to P.M.G. Livingstone,
   1 July 1938.
would not only save batteries but had the added advantage of 'avoiding the risk of foreign hostile territories' interfering with 'native politics in Northern Rhodesia'.¹ This belief that in the interests of security radios listened to by Africans should be pre-set to the local government station, persisted in official thinking in Northern Rhodesia until after the Second World War.²

C. J. Tyndale-Biscoe, Director of Native Education and a Member of the Native Development Board, forwarded to the Chief Secretary, W. M. Logan, some recommendations for programme content which included: gramophone records, lessons in English, BBC relays (especially of royal functions), concerts and tribal dances, readings and dialogues in different vernaculars, local news and sport, recordings of public functions and speeches, lectures, and church services arranged by larger missions.³

From the suggestions put forward by Tyndale-Biscoe it is clear that the proposed broadcasting experiment was very much in keeping with the spirit of the Plymouth Report, that broadcasting in the colonies should be concerned with the 'enlightenment and education of the more backward sections of the population'. The relaying of BBC


2. The fear of Africans listening to hostile German and Italian propaganda was later replaced by the fear of their listening to Moscow. See Peter Fraenkel, Nyanalshi (London, 1959), 18.

programmes, particularly the royal occasions, fits in with the original idea of Empire broadcasting - that it should reinforce the sentimental and patriotic ties of Empire. But the P.M.G.'s plan was not to be implemented. Young's successor Governor Maybin was not keen. He had been irritated by rediffusion in Nigeria and pronounced himself very 'sceptical' about a Northern Rhodesian experiment.1 With this lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Governor it is not clear whether the plan would have been proceeded with if war had not broken out and other broadcasting arrangements made.2

Local broadcasting in Northern Rhodesia actually began in Mongu, capital of the remote Barotse Province on the borders of the Kalahari, in September 1938. At a D.C.s' conference in Mongu in May 1938 it was recommended that "a Broadcasting Service should be started in the Barotse Province, with transmissions from Mongu, and that receiving sets should be supplied to outstations".3 The primary objective appears to have been administrative, to keep outlying stations informed and in close touch with headquarters. For example, before broadcasting the only

1. NAZ/SEC 2/425, Maybin, minute, 6 March 1939.
2. War-time broadcasting arrangements included broadcasting to Europeans which could not have been financed by the Central Treasury Fund. See NAZ/SEC 2/425, K. C. Johnson for Chief Sec., March 1940 to P.M.G. Livingstone.
3. NAZ/SEC 2/183, Minutes of District Commissioners' Conference held at Mongu 9 May to 13 May 1938.
way to send a message to Balovale was by runner and it took three or four days.

Apart from being an 'instrument of advanced administration' the Mongu station on at least two occasions served a specific political purpose. In 1938 a commission of enquiry had been appointed to adjudicate the Balovale dispute. The Lunda and Luvale people had resented being placed under a Lozi Native Authority as part of the system of indirect rule operative in Northern Rhodesia. There was considerable friction in Balovale between the Lozi officials and the Lunda and Luvale people and this had occasioned the sending of the commission. During the visit on 18 November 1938 the Lozi Paramount Chief, Yeta III, broadcast from his capital in Mongu to his Ngambela (Prime Minister) and Indunas (advisers) at Balovale. The Bantu Mirror reported that Yeta sent greetings to the commission and 'urged his people in Balovale to behave well, and said he hoped the blessing of God would be on the Royal Commission'. Approximately 150 Lozis in Livingstone also listened in to the broadcast at the home of the Director of Publicity.

Permission for Yeta's historic radio debut, probably the first time an African chief had broadcast from his capital to his people, had been obtained from the Chief Secretary who had warned that Yeta was to avoid any

2. Ibid.
3. NAZ/SEC 2/425, Director of Livingstone Publicity and Travel Bureau to D.C. Mongu, 18 Nov. 1938.
mention of politics, particularly the Balovale dispute. 1 Nevertheless from the report in the Bantu Mirror it would seem that the broadcast was politically motivated, designed to act as a calming influence on Lozi officials in Balovale during the visit of the commission. 2

Another broadcast of political import was made on 8 February 1939. After Yeta had suffered a stroke which left him partially paralysed, rumours were rife that he was dead. The administration, therefore, arranged for Yeta's interpreter, Suu, to speak over the radio to the Lozi telling them that as Yeta was ill the Northern Rhodesian government and the Lozi kuta (council) had decided that the Ngambela should be 'given temporary powers to transact the Chief's business...'. 3

This system of broadcasting messages continued into the Second World War. The D.C.s were well satisfied with the service which was run by Postmaster Bailey at Mongu 4

1. NAZ/SEC 2/425, telegram from Chief Sec. to D.C. Mongu, 15 Nov. 1938.

2. There is an interesting precedent for the use of mechanical means to broadcast political messages from the Paramount Chief to the outlying areas of his territory described by Colin Harding in, In Remotest Barotseland (London, 1905), 83, 93, 114, 123, 187, 245. Harding who was then Acting Administrator of North-West Rhodesia, used a phonograph to relay messages from Lewanika whilst he was on tour.

3. Mutende No, 37, March 1939, 1. And see pp. 185-186.

4. NAZ/SEC 2/183, Minutes of D.C.s' Conference held at Mongu 20, 21, 22 and 23 June 1939.
and P. C. Read was keen to see the proposed Broken Hill experiment given a trial. 1 The Posts and Telegraphs Department in their Annual Report for 1938 reported that:

This experiment has demonstrated that broadcasting, not only for the benefit of the Administration but for the African populace can be introduced at no very great cost. 2

Interest in broadcasting to Africans was also expressed on the Copperbelt in 1938. In that year the Copperbelt P.C., Harold Cartmel-Robinson was making enquiries about wireless equipment which could be utilised in the time of an industrial disturbance to relay urgent messages, to provide musical entertainment and to calm large numbers of Africans. 3 This enquiry would have been partly stimulated by Ormsby-Gore's despatch of 21 March 1938 which spoke of:

the potential advantages of the installation of loud speaker apparatus in mining camps and other similar compact communities in the Colonial dependencies so that in case of local emergency the Administrative Officer, or other responsible official who might be available, would be in a position to address the community in question in its own language. 4

The D.C. at Kitwe recommended to Cartmel-Robinson a

3. NAZ/SEC 3/89, D.C. Kitwe to P.C. Western Province Ndola, 1 Sept. 1938.
transmitter set with a built-in gramophone unit:

Congreve has told us of the power of music to soothe the savage breast. I am told some twelve hundred breasts can be soothed with a 2-speaker equipment...

Cartmel-Robinson's interest in broadcasting had not gone beyond the enquiry stage when war broke out in 1939 but with the outbreak of war he encouraged some European amateur radio hams to broadcast war news to Africans on the Copperbelt to prevent the mining population from being disturbed by wild rumours. Out of this experiment developed the Northern Rhodesian government broadcasting station.

The Plymouth Committee had envisaged a rapid growth of broadcasting throughout Africa and other colonial territories. This did not happen. By the time the war came all that had emerged, with a few minor exceptions, was an accumulation of principles, most important of which was that colonial broadcasting should be developed as a public service primarily for the administration and enlightenment of colonial peoples. What the BBC was to say in 1947 could also have been said in 1939: 'Little or no progress had been made towards applying these emphatic declarations of principle'.

1. NAZ/SEC 3/89, D.C. Kitwe to P.C. Western Province Ndola, 1 Sept. 1938.


(b) Films

By the mid 1920s there was growing concern in British government circles about the influence of the cinema in the Empire.¹ The propaganda power of the cinema was believed to be enormous. The question was - how to harness this power in the imperial interest? In the African colonies the concern of the C.O. was centered on:
(a) how the cinema affected the economic and political interests of the imperial power; and (b) how the imperial power might use the cinema to promote what it determined to be the economic, social and moral welfare of colonial peoples.

Britain felt both her economic and political interests in Africa were threatened by the stranglehold the American film had on the commercial cinema circuit. It was believed not only that 'trade follows the film',² but also that the unsavoury image of the white race being projected in the Hollywood movie was a political threat as it endangered the prestige of the white race. Attempts to break the American stranglehold failed mainly because many colonies had prior contractual obligations with South Africa from where they obtained their commercial films.³


2. R. Donald, 'Films and the Empire', Nineteenth Century, 100, 596 (1926), 497.

As most Africans were illiterate, both the cinema and the radio were thought to offer bright possibilities as a medium of instruction for adults. In 1927 Hanns Vischer, Secretary to the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, recommended to the C.O. Conference that films be used to help spread general knowledge about 'health and economic development'. Governors were sent this memorandum along with a confidential circular of 1 October 1927. W. Ormsby-Gore on behalf of Amery, the Colonial Secretary, asked if colonial governments would 'in principle' be interested in contributing financially to any scheme 'for the production and distribution' of educational or other films, and whether they thought it would be useful to exhibit instructional films in their territories?

In his reply to the Secretary of State the Governor of Northern Rhodesia J. C. Maxwell, expressed his strong belief in the educational value of the cinema for Africans:

> since visual instruction impresses itself upon the mind, particularly as regards juveniles and natives, more effectually than verbal instruction.

The Governor was particularly interested in scientific and medical films on such subjects as malaria, first-aid and the fly danger that had been mentioned in the despatch. However, he regretted that European schools were few and

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scattered, as 'Native Education in the Territory is at a very low stage of development' and as few viewing facilities were available, Northern Rhodesia was not yet in a position to benefit from the educational use of the cinema. Acting on the advice of his Director of Native Education, G. C. Latham, Maxwell thought that if some experiment in producing educational films for Africans were undertaken his government could offer 'a small sum' of perhaps £50.¹

The positive response of Northern Rhodesia to the idea of making a financial contribution to the promotion of the educational film was exceptional. Kenya agreed 'in principle' but thought that Kenya would not be able to contribute financially in the immediate future.²

One reason for the early interest of the Northern Rhodesian administration in the instructional film was the enthusiasm of Latham who in the 1930s was to become a pioneer in the production of films for Africans. In 1928 he wrote:

> It is surprising what an intelligent interest even comparatively raw natives take in a motion picture suited to their understanding and full advantage should undoubtedly be taken of this method of educating them and enlarging their horizons.

Despite C.O. interest it was seven years before a


2. CO 323/1045/60583, E. Grigg (Gov. of Kenya) to Lord Passfield, 7 Oct. 1929.

full scale experiment in the production and distribution of educational films was launched. In the meantime some local initiative was displayed. W. Sellers, who worked for the Nigerian Medical Health Service, had been using the magic lantern and health propaganda films from England. Then in 1931 he obtained equipment for producing and projecting 16 mm films through the Colonial Development Fund and proceeded to make a series of health films.¹ When Julian Huxley went to East Africa in 1929 on behalf of the Colonial Advisory Committee on Native Education to test African reactions to instructional films he found that Dr. A. Paterson of the Kenya Department of Medical and Sanitary Service had produced one of the first educational films for use in Africa, Harley Street in the Bush, as part of a campaign against hookworm on the Kenya coast. Huxley conducted his experiment with schoolchildren and reported confidently that films could be used to advantage both in schools and for adult education. 'For the latter purpose they will in the present state of tropical Africa be much the most powerful weapon of propaganda which we have at command.'² Meanwhile in England plans were discussed for an experiment by the Commission on Educational and Cultural Films on which the C.O. was represented and which produced the influential report, The Film in National Life (1932), and by the Dominions, India and Colonies Panel of the British Film


². CO 323/1252/30125/1, J. S. Huxley, 'Report on the Use of Films for Educational Purposes in East Africa'
Institute. But finance could not be found.

Financial assistance for an experiment in the production and distribution of educational films for Africans was finally forthcoming from the Carnegie Corporation which earlier had financed the publication of The Film in National Life. The experiment which the Carnegie Corporation chose to finance was sponsored by the International Missionary Council. In 1932 J. Merle Davis, Director of the Department of Social and Industrial Research of the International Missionary Council, had gone to Northern Rhodesia's Copperbelt to lead an enquiry into the effect of industrialization on African society. The investigation was financed by the Carnegie Corporation and the results were published in Modern Industry and the African (1933). Merle Davis and his team found that the mines of the Copperbelt had profoundly altered the pre-industrial society of Central Africa. Davis recommended the use of the cinema to help the illiterate African to adjust to the coming of western capitalist society with its alien social and economic standards. As a follow-up to his Copperbelt study Merle Davis drew up a plan for a film experiment on behalf of the International Missionary Council. The experiment would study the use of the cinema as an instrument for 'educational and cultural adjustment'.

Two notable hopes for the experiment were that it would

1. CO 323/1253/30141, J. E. W. Flood, minute, 8 Nov. 1934.
help to bridge the knowledge divide between the young educated African and his illiterate elders; and that it would produce films which might become a substitute for older forms of recreation which were disappearing.

The BEKE was conducted in East and Central Africa between March 1935 and May 1937. The films were produced and processed locally, and then taken on tour to test audience reactions. The production side of the experiment began at Vugiri in Tanganyika; later films were sometimes made on location. African advice was solicited during filming on matters of content and effectiveness and Africans were trained in all aspects of production and exhibition. Ideas for scenarios, however, were mainly invited from the ruling class: colonial officials, the plantocracy and missionaries. The first batch of films included some that were strictly instructional, e.g. Hides on correct methods of tanning, and Tea, explaining how tea is grown and prepared; and some that disguised the message in a story, e.g. Tax and Post Office Savings Bank. The latter is one of the earliest uses of the Mr. Wise and Mr. Foolish format. The foolish man puts his money in the ground and has it stolen; the wise man puts his in the savings bank.

The films were 16 mm and silent, but the experiment used a special technique, sound-on-disk. The disks could


be made locally which reduced costs. It also meant that recorded sound could be provided in the languages of many of the areas visited. Where an area's language was not on disk, a narrator was used. The first twelve films, with disks in seven languages, were taken on a lorry tour of nine thousand miles through Tanganyika, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Uganda by the BEKE's Educational Director, G. C. Latham who had formerly been Director of Education in Northern Rhodesia. The places visited in Northern Rhodesia were: Abercorn (Mbala), Chikuni, Choma, Fort Jameson and district (Chipata), Kasama, Kasenga, Lubwa, Lusaka, Malole, Mapanza, Mazabuka, Mwenzo, Ndola, Rusenga, Senga Hill, Serenje and the Roan Antelope, Nkana and Mufulira mines. The only places where films had previously been shown to Africans had been the Copperbelt and a few mission stations. Films had been shown to African miners since 1928 for the purposes of attracting labour and providing recreation. In 1931 the open-air native compound cinema at Luanshya had an average weekly attendance of two thousand and the open-air cinema at Nchanga, one thousand two hundred.  

BEKE films had sound commentaries in Bemba and Nyanja only. Outside these linguistic areas interpreters were used. There is some evidence of the reactions of Northern Rhodesian Africans to these films from the Copperbelt, Kasama, Abercorn and Mwenzo. Latham feared that the inferior technical quality of the films might affect their

1. CO 323/1122/80160/2, enclosure in Maxwell to Cunliffe-Lister, 20 Nov. 1931.
popularity with Copperbelt Africans who were used to the more professional commercial films. He found otherwise:

The subject-matter and African background of the pictures had an appeal for the 'Native which is lacking in western-made films which they are accustomed to see.\textsuperscript{1}

The Kasama Native Welfare Association reported that 'the natives generally were interested'.\textsuperscript{2} In contrast to the general finding of the experiment that Africans responded best to films whose backgrounds were familiar, the D.C. at Abercorn expressed his personal opinion 'that the Native was bored with the reproduction of familiar scenes and most keenly interested in pictures dealing with subjects quite beyond his experience'.\textsuperscript{3} This was not the opinion of J. Moffat Thomson who in 1933 as Secretary for Native Affairs produced a report on 'The Influence of the Cinema upon Natives'; he had found that Africans had had difficulty understanding films not only because many were 'mutilitated by the censors' but also because they were in a foreign cultural idiom, and recommended that films for Africans should be in an African setting. If films were more easily understood, he thought they could be a valuable means of instruction.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{enumerate}
\item NAZ/SEC 2/1126, D. C. Abercorn to Chief Sec., 13 Jan. 1936.
\end{enumerate}
The BEKE directors and sponsors were also of the opinion, at the end of the two year experiment, that films could be a valuable means of instruction. Their wish was to have the BEKE placed on a more permanent footing. Latham proposed that a central organization be established in London with local production units in the colonies to ensure a continuing supply of educational and instructional films. Latham's fundamental argument was that government must take control of the cinema and use it for the benefit of Africa not only to educate the illiterate adult but to protect him from harmful films and, incidentally, protect the image of the ruling power. Latham defended himself from the charge of paternalism, and the view that it was 'idle to attempt to keep the Natives in cotton-wool', by saying:

it is surely our wisdom, if not our obvious duty, to prevent, as far as possible the dissemination of wrong ideas. Should we stand by and see a distorted presentation of the life of the white races accepted by millions of Africans when we have it in our power to show them the truth? There is much that is silly and sordid in the life of the West, but white people have other interests than money-making, gambling, crime and the pursuit of other people's wives and husbands; and their life is not entirely lived in palaces, night-clubs, opium dens, and police courts.1

The C.O. was also anxious to see some kind of follow-up to the BEKE and was very surprised to discover that the East African governments were not so enthusiastic.

The East African governments were highly critical of the technical quality of the films, especially the imperfect synchronization of the sound-on-disk method. Kenya and Nyasaland complained about the amateurishness of the films. Uganda was prejudiced against the BEKE from the start because of the peripheral role that colony had been allotted in the experiment: only one film was set in Uganda. Tanganyika was at first keen to see the experiment continue but changed its attitude when confronted with the intransigence of Kenya and Uganda. Latham defended the films against the charge of amateurishness, saying that, given the limited finance available and the fact that the instructional film was still in an experimental stage, one could not be too much of a technical purist: all that mattered as far as African audiences were concerned was that the film be 'intelligible'. However, it was not just the technical quality of the films that influenced the negative attitude of the East African governments; an official


2. CO 323/1421/1413, Memorandum by Govt. of Uganda for Conference of British East African Territories, April 1937.

3. CO 323/1421/1413, Memorandum by Govt. of Tanganyika, May 1937.

at the East African Governors' Conference in Nairobi in 1937 also detected 'an underlying sceptism as to the value of films as a means of educating the Bantu'.

Northern Rhodesia, by contrast, adopted a positive attitude to the BEKE. Northern Rhodesia was more cinema-conscious than most other parts of black Africa because, as a result of the mine cinemas on the comparatively urbanised Copperbelt, it had probably the largest concentration of African cinema-goers outside South Africa. The Northern Rhodesian government, alone of the East and Central African governments, was prepared to contribute financially to a continuation of the BEKE and to send a 'Bemba native' to Vugiri to make commentaries and be trained as an operator.

With the demise of the BEKE the Northern Rhodesian government entered into negotiations with a commercial firm which promised to provide a similar service. This organization, British Fine Arts Pictures, had been joined by Latham after the BEKE had folded. The British Fine Arts Pictures' scheme was only one of a number of commercial schemes for making films in Africa for Africans that had been presented to the C.O. in the inter-war

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2. NAZ/SEC 2/1121, Director of Native Education to Chief Sec., 21 Jan. 1937.
period. All demanded some kind of government subsidy, if only in the initial stages. The C.O. decided that it was certainly not willing to subsidise fledgling commercial companies 'to get a grip on a potentially large and important cinema trade in Africa'. ¹ Northern Rhodesia was advised against involvement. ²

Early C.O. film policy on censorship was contained in L. S. Amery's confidential circular of 8 January 1927, and reiterated in the memorandum on 'Cinematograph Films' drawn up by the C.O. for the Colonial Office Conference in 1927. ³ The guidelines were rather vague. Colonial governments were told that in the exercise of their censorship powers they should take into account 'the special character and susceptibilities of the native people' and to beware of anything 'which is calculated to rouse undesirable racial feeling...'. More specifically the Colonial Secretary drew the attention of colonial governors to the request of the War Office that 'films of a nature calculated to bring into disrepute the Forces of the Crown and His Majesty's uniform are prevented from being shown in the territory under your administration'. ⁴

South Africa was highly influential in shaping the censorship policy of Northern Rhodesia; in South Africa

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2. CO 859/6/1406/24, C. Eastwood to T. F. Sandford, 14 Feb. 1940.
3. 'Cinematograph Films (A) Memorandum prepared in the Colonial Office', Colonial Office Conference, May 1927, 243-244.
4. CO 323/990/26096, Amery, 8 Jan. 1927.
some films were 'banned for Native exhibition' but passed for showing to all other races. In addition films shown in special cinemas to miners on the Rand were subjected to further and more severe censorship by Ray Phillips, a social worker with the American Board of Missions. At the end of the 1920s Northern Rhodesia joined the circuit being operated by Phillips on the Rand and relied on the gradings of the South African censors and Phillips. By 1930 it was already a convention in Northern Rhodesia that Africans were not admitted to European cinemas.

In 1937 at the time of the opening of a new cinema at Wkana the Northern Rhodesian government decided that the South African censorship was not strict enough and amended the existing film censorship regulations to provide for an exclusively Native Film Censorship Board. This discriminatory censorship on the South African model was against the recommendation of the Colonial Films Committee 'that there should be no discrimination in regard to the exhibition of moving pictures to Europeans and non-Europeans' (paragraph 55). As a result of the 1937 amendment the Native Film Censorship Board was to consist of:

(i) The Provincial Commissioner, Ndola (or his alternate, a District Commissioner nominated by him) who shall be Chairman:

(ii) A European member of the Native Education Department nominated by the Director of Native Education:

(iii) Two members of the public to be appointed by the Governor by notice in the Gazette.

The guiding principles for censorship for Africans were articulated after 1945 but up to 1939 what seemed to cause most concern was the preservation of the dignity of European womanhood. A concern which was also reflected in British and American censorship regulations of the period, but intensified in Northern Rhodesia by fear of the 'Black Peril'. In 1932 African Film Productions Limited proposed an expedition to Barotseland. J. Moffat Thomson agreed with the Chief Secretary:

that the Company should be warned against introducing an European heroine into the film or any other undesirable circumstances.

But Moffat Thomson understood 'the intentions of the Company are to secure a series of films of life among the Barotse people, a copy of which is to be presented to the British Museum.'

While the 1937 Native Film Censorship Board was still in the process of being set up, the D.C. at Nkana, A. Williams, became 'very exercised about the type of

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1121, Government Notice No. 113 (The Film Censorship Amendment Regulation, 1937).

film being shown to natives at the cinema. He instanced three films: 'in the first one a European woman is shown dead drunk at a party; in the second the silhouette of a naked woman is shown behind a blind; and in the third a European woman is shown being beaten by her husband'. Films could not be allowed to endanger the prestige of the white man and that included not permitting the white woman to be shown in a less than virtuous light. 'The success of our government of subject races', Sir Hesketh Bell had told the Colonial Films Committee in 1930, 'depends almost entirely on the degree of respect which we can inspire.'

Before the Second World War the Northern Rhodesian administration had shown considerable interest in the provision of films for Africans of both the instructional variety and those providing 'suitable' entertainment. More positive action had not been taken because there were so few suitable films available. Suitable is used here not only in the sense of entertainment films not considered harmful, but films made specifically for African audiences. Northern Rhodesia's interest appears to have been quickened by the comparatively large African cinema audiences on the Copperbelt.

4. Conclusion

When we look at the overall situation concerning the development of the electronic media on the eve of the war we find that the C.O. had been quick to see the possibilities that they offered particularly for adult education and, with broadcasting, the opportunity to streamline administration. But the colonies themselves had not, on the whole, responded with enthusiasm. Finance was a major problem. It may be argued that expenditure on film and broadcasting was bound to be very low on any scale of priorities for development. They could be classified as luxuries when many more fundamental areas were starved of funds during the inter-war years. Up to World War II it had been the policy of the British government that colonies should pay their own way. The meagre results of this policy can be seen from the spate of reports critical of Britain's colonial administration which appeared on the eve of the war. The consensus was that much more money would have to be spent by the British government on colonial development; hence the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. But lack of finance does not seem a sufficient explanation in East Africa where not only was there a certain bureaucratic conservatism and a fear of Africans being subverted by listening to foreign broadcasts but particularly in the Kenyan case a decided reluctance to give encouragement to the development of the electronic media for adult education.

Perhaps government reluctance was a result of the presence of a powerful group of white settlers who would not be anxious to see the enthusiastic fostering of mass education of the African population via film and radio because their own position might be threatened by the closing of the educational gap. After all the Europeans had had their own commercial radio station run by Cable and Wireless Limited since 1928, yet no attempt was made to produce programmes for Africans until World War II. In the Kenyan case it might be appropriate to apply an underdevelopment theory i.e. that the colonial administration made sure that the mass media never developed up to the point where they could effectively serve the masses. However this would not be true of Northern Rhodesia though like Kenya it too had a politically ambitious white settler minority. Northern Rhodesia responded more positively to the overtures of the C.O. because the administration saw films and radio as having a contribution to make in the maintenance of law and order particularly on the Copperbelt. Films were valued as a means of social control: they were thought of as being instrumental in keeping African miners happy and contented, a docile work force. Such films also had to be 'suitable'; they should not tarnish the image of the white rulers.

Broadcasting was seen to have great potential for enabling the administration to communicate quickly with the work force to diffuse a tense situation, such as had occurred with the 1935 strike.

What above all seems to account for Northern Rhodesia's positive interest in the mass media seems to have been the Copperbelt strike of 1935 which made the government aware of the need to embark upon adult education. In his paper for the International Colonial Institute Conference of 1936 Dundas discussed the uses of the press, film and radio. By establishing colonial rule the British government had started a process of modernisation and aroused expectations and desires for 'betterment' - 'Our duty to satisfy cravings which we ourselves induced' wrote Dundas, 'cannot be evaded'.

Having started to educate the African child then Britain must be prepared to move to the next stage:

...if we undertake the education of the child, we must also furnish those further media for education of the adult, without which the education of the child is devoid of fruitful result and may possibly even be harmful.¹

¹ CO 323/1400/7004, 'Means of Spreading Thought'.
CHAPTER III: DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA IN NORTHERN RHODESIA DURING WORLD WAR II

1. Northern Rhodesian Information Office

This section will begin with a brief outline of the British government's war-time information and propaganda organization and policy and then go on to show how this policy was interpreted in the particular circumstances of Northern Rhodesia. There will be a discussion of the policies and organization of the Northern Rhodesia Information Office, which was now directing and co-ordinating most of the government-controlled media, and a consideration of the role of individual information officers in determining the character of the new office.

Both World Wars served as catalysts for the growth of government propaganda. Although the government agencies which were set up to produce what turned out to be some highly successful propaganda for the British cause during the 1914-1918 War were disbanded when peace came, government propaganda activities continued. A feature of government propaganda between the wars was the growth of public relations. By World War II the public relations department was being recognized as a new branch of administration; by 1940 nearly all the Social Service Departments of the government had public relations officers and staff.


2. They were described in The Times, Tuesday, 11 April 1944, as a new 'Link Between Government and the Governed'.
The C.O. had had the service of a press officer from 1931 when H. Beckett-Platt had been appointed joint Press Officer for the Dominions and C.O. The joint system had later been discarded and A. Ridgway had continued as Press Officer to the C.O. alone. According to E. E. Sabben-Clare the pre-war Press Officer had not been 'very active...his job simply was to give out information to the press that had been given to him by somebody else'.\(^1\) On the eve of the war the C.O. was giving serious consideration to 'the idea of a Public Relations Department'.\(^2\)

In 1939 the Ministry of Information (MOI) was established to direct the nation's war propaganda effort. Colonial war propaganda came under the jurisdiction of the Empire Publicity Division of the new Ministry. In 1940 the C.O. set up its own Public Relations Branch. So from 1940 there were two government propaganda agencies concerned with assembling a propaganda machine for the colonies; the MOI provided the finance, facilities and means of production for the C.O.'s publicity. The C.O. had ultimate control in that the Secretary of State was responsible for overall policy, and the Public Relations Branch had to vet all MOI material before it was sent out.

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1. In the early part of the war Sabben-Clare worked in the Public Relations Branch at the C.O. MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 394 Rhodes House, Oxford, from a transcript of an interview with E. Sabben-Clare by A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, 26 Nov. 1971.

2. CO 323/1660/6281, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, Permanent Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, to A. P. Waterfield, Civil Service Commission, 10 June 1939.
The new Public Relations Branch of the General Division was expected to work in close touch with the Geographical Departments and the Social Service Department at the C.O. Its beginnings were pragmatic. The Assistant Under Secretary of State A. J. Dawe announced that 'It was not proposed to start with any theoretical structure but simply to get the right man if possible and allow a small organization to grow up round him in accordance with practical needs'.  

Noel Sabine, who had seen administrative service in West Africa, was appointed Public Relations Officer. He discovered that the 'designation and ... functions of his new job were very little understood'. There was also some internal opposition from those who either thought that it was infra dig for the C.O. to have to be concerned about influencing public opinion or those who thought that public relations meant hoodwinking the public.  

For the most part relations between the propagandists at the C.O. and those at the Ministry were not harmonious. Dawe was highly critical of the 'little group of professors and amateurs' at the Ministry in Bloomsbury. He complained of the generous usage of the 'conventional cliches of Anglo-Saxon democracy', as words and phrases like 'freedom' and 'wars of liberation' might prove an

1. CO 323/1660/6281, Dawe, minute, 4 Nov. 1939.
2. CO 875/20/96599, note by Sabine on the future of colonial publicity, 4 Oct. 1944.
3. CO 323/1740/6281, Dawe, minute, 2 July 1940.
4. CO 323/1660/6281, Dawe, minute, 22 Sept. 1939.
'inconvenient boomerang'. Colonial subjects might 'be tempted to say they have not much freedom to defend'. In 1939 a 'War Publicity Handbook' for colonial service officers produced by Professor Vincent Harlow was suppressed at the insistence of the C.O. The Public Relations Branch then worked with the Empire Publicity Division at the Ministry to work out a basic propaganda formula which would be acceptable to Whitehall. The ultimate aim was to build up a calm, confident and loyal public opinion in the colonies which would provide the backbone of the war effort. The core message had three interrelated elements: (1) to promote loyalty to Britain in particular and the Empire in general; (2) to encourage firm confidence in the inevitability of an Allied victory under the leadership of Great Britain; and (3) to convince the colonies that only through such a victory could they realise their moral and material aspirations.

The C.O. never felt comfortable about war propaganda to the colonies. Propaganda designed to discredit the Germans might all too easily prove a two-edged sword.

The C.O. disliked the narrow expediency of the Ministry's

1. Ibid.
2. CO 323/1663/6281, Dawe, minute, 13 Dec. 1939.
3. Beit Lecturer in Colonial History at Oxford (1930-1935) and since 1938 Rhodes Professor of Imperial History at London University.
4. CO 323/1660/6281, Dawe, minute, 22 Sept. 1939.
5. INF 1/555, 'Plan of Propaganda for the Colonies', by H. V. Usill and sent to Sabine, 13 May 1942.
sell the war policy. 'It may win the war', recorded Edmetts in 1941, 'but it will not win the peace'. The Ministry justified themselves by pointing out that it was war propaganda that the Treasury were providing the money for:

The object of the propagandist in his sphere like that of the soldier, the diplomat and the industrialist in theirs is to help win the war as quickly as possible...The educational and social value which may, and in many cases should, attach to the scheme, must be regarded as subsidiary.

By contrast the C.O. looking beyond the war were reaching towards a far more comprehensive view of what colonial propaganda should be. In 1941 Sabine produced a definition which amounted to a programme for political socialisation:

I would define propaganda as a fusion of social information, adult education, and cultural expression the sum total of these factors creating a national morale and self awareness, without which no group of peoples can attain that sense of responsibility necessary for self-government.

The C.O. view seems to have had some effect on the Ministry so that in 1942 a Ministry paper theorised that war propaganda to colonial people differed from that to

2. INF 1/165/b/35/4, 'Empire Transcription Scheme; Notes on Propaganda Policy', drawn up by Rendall with Hodson's concurrence; sent to Harlow by J. C. Macgregor, 12 April 1940.
3. CO 875/5/6281, 'Imperial Propaganda', 1941.
other countries owing to the parent-child relationship, and the role of guardian that Britain performed. The guardian was responsible for the colonial subject's 'entire view of life including his attitude to his own domestic affairs'. Propaganda from this analysis was closely related to adult education and it was therefore concluded that 'there must be a close tie-up between Colonial propaganda policy and Colonial education policy'.

This 'tie-up' can be seen emerging in the report of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, *Mass Education in African Society* (1944).

In May 1939 when war seemed imminent the Secretary of State informed colonial governors that in the event of war a Ministry of Information would be established and, to facilitate planning, the governors were asked to supply details about the mass media in their respective colonies. When war broke out the Secretary of State cabled the Northern Rhodesian and other colonial governments requesting that an information officer be appointed immediately. The first choice of the Executive Council in Northern Rhodesia was Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, then unofficial member nominated to represent

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3. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, secret circular despatch from S/S to Gov. of Northern Rhodesia, 15 May 1939.
African interests in the Leg. Co. When it was discovered that Sir Stewart would have had to resign from the Council to take up the post, a colonial civil service officer, Kenneth Bradley, who had had some journalistic experience, was appointed in his stead. As Bradley was on leave at the time of the appointment C. Howe was appointed on an interim basis until Bradley took over in December 1939. Early in 1942 Bradley was succeeded by Harry Franklin, also a civil servant.

All the new colonial information officers were provided with guide-lines by the Publicity Division, Planning Section of the MOI. A fundamental principle of Ministry planning was regional organization. For example, West, Central and East Africa had propaganda guide-lines prepared on a regional basis. The memoranda had two parts. The first dealt with general principles governing the whole region and the second dealt more specifically with each territory within that region.

The Planning Section's Memo No. 341 was specifically concerned with the organization and dissemination of war

1. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, telegram from S/S to Gov. of Northern Rhodesia, 2 Sept. 1939.
2. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, minutes of the Executive Council, 15 Sept. 1939.
3. These memoranda were originally designed not only for the guidance of colonial information officers but also as an authoritative record providing background for the regional office in charge of each area in the Colonial Section of the Empire Publicity Division. The regional officials were dispensed with, however, soon after the start of the war at the insistence of the C.O. mainly because they were said to be 'duplicating the work of the existing Geographical specialists at the Colonial Office'. INF 1/28 A/108/5, MacDonald to Macmillan, 16 Oct. 1939.
propaganda in the three Central African territories of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.\footnote{CO 323/1663/6281/1B, Memo No. 341, 'Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland', 21 Sept. 1939.}

The original propaganda plan for Central Africa, Memo 303, of July 1939, recommended that Southern Rhodesia should play the dominant part in organizing propaganda in Central Africa. The Southern Rhodesian Information Officer, it was suggested, should be a Group Publicity Officer 'charged with the duty of supervising and co-ordinating publicity measures in the three territories' and directly liaising with the MOI.\footnote{CO 323/1663/6281/1B, Memo No. 303, 'Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland', 28 July 1939.} Harlow soon had second thoughts on the political wisdom of this arrangement; he felt that the circulation of Southern Rhodesian propaganda in the northern territories would create a certain 'nervousness' there in view of Southern Rhodesia's native policy.\footnote{CO 323/1663/6281/1B, Harlow to N. Pritchard (Dominions Office), 11 Sept. 1939.} It had been this same native policy that had so recently decided the Bledisloe Commission against recommending the immediate amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland although the way had been left open for a future joining together once the 'stumbling block' of the southern territory's native policy had been removed.\footnote{CO 323/1663/6281/1B, A. H. Poynton, minute, 7 Sept. 1939.} The C.O. agreed with Harlow and a 'compromise' was reached.\footnote{CO 323/1663/6281/1B, E. Boyd to Maybin, 21 Sept. 1939.}
The compromise contained in Memo 341 was that co-ordination of publicity measures in the three territories should be obtained through 'close personal consultation' amongst the information officers. Such regional co-operation was thought to be essential for economy of effort; for uniformity - migrant labourers moving from one territory to another should not be told conflicting stories in different places; and because the three territories were 'geographically contiguous' and 'economically integrated'. Although the proportion of black to white differed and the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland were each at a different stage of political development 'population strata' were seen to 'cut across political divisions'. The Memo went on to state:

There is a basic similarity of outlook among European town-dwellers, among farmers, among mine managers, among natives in reserves, among natives in employment, irrespective of where they happen to reside.

Broadly speaking Central African territories would require two types of propaganda: one would be 'material appropriate to a politically advanced European community, which would be similar to that employed by the self-governing Dominions'; and the other 'material appropriate for the natives, much of which would be similar to that employed among the natives of East Africa'. Part III of the Memo was devoted to categorising, for propaganda purposes, Northern Rhodesia's African population. Of the

1. Memo No. 341.
three groups separated out: Africans on the mines, in the town locations and rural Africans, the most important group were the African miners:

Native labour in the Copperbelt represents the most important field of publicity. It will be most important to obviate the unrest which tends to occur through ignorant misunderstanding of emergency regulations and the spread of panic rumours and false reports.

Almost as bad as another strike would be 'a serious diminution of available labour supply'.

In the first few months of the war the new Information Office was little more than a distribution centre for propaganda material despatched from the MOI. Very little propaganda material originated locally. Governor Maybin was wary of exposing Africans to war propaganda, fearing that by introducing 'novelties' like posters, placards and mobile cinema vans there might be 'a danger of unsettling the Natives'.

Howe's brief tenure had been little more than a holding operation. The new Northern Rhodesian Information Office was launched on a more dynamic career when Bradley, an ideas man with a flair for journalism, returned to take up his post. He found the Secretariat bemused by the propaganda office it had so recently acquired; ideas about

1. Ibid. There was another strike by African miners in 1940; it lasted a week and 17 Africans were killed. It was sparked off by an earlier strike by European miners but grievances were of long standing. In 1940 African miners were being paid less than they were before the depression.

the role of information officer were still extremely fluid - he was given 'two rooms and a stenographer and asked for suggestions'.

At its most general Bradley understood that his job was to keep Northern Rhodesia's plural society, 'fully and correctly informed about the war and the activities of Government, to counteract rumours, and to stimulate the war effort...'.

Bradley did not wish to restrict his mission to the narrow context of war propaganda; as a provincial official he had long felt that because of the inadequacies of the local press Northern Rhodesia's 'light has been devastatingly hidden under a bushel'. He took the opportunity of the phoney war in the earlier part of 1940 to publicise the activities of the Northern Rhodesian government both at home and abroad. At home he was particularly concerned to bring the benefits of British rule to the attention of the African population. When the Blitzkrieg started in May 1940 Bradley recorded that the publicity campaign on behalf of the Northern Rhodesian government had to be pushed into the background, 'an abrupt change in the functions of the office was necessitated and its work is now almost entirely concerned with the war'.

2. ZA, *Northern Rhodesia Newsletter*, No. 63, 18 March 1941.
3. ZA/S 935/37/1, Bradley to Gale, Southern Rhodesian Inform. Officer, 7 Feb. 1940.
4. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Progress Report for Fortnight Ending 18 Dec. 1939.
Yet in the following months Bradley did find time to publicise Northern Rhodesia abroad. His activities in this field won him high praise from *East Africa and Rhodesia* which reported in January 1941 that Bradley had 'supplied the British Press with more useful information in useable form in any one of the past six months than his colleagues in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Nyasaland combined over the whole of that period'.

Bradley felt that the Information Office's greatest challenge internally was the getting of war propaganda across to the African population. Both the medium and the message presented challenges: it was a question not only of how to reach the African but also of what to tell him. The first problem, then, was one of means - the availability of facilities. Few Africans outside the Copperbelt ever saw a film, fewer still had the opportunity to listen to the radio. Printed propaganda had the inbuilt limitation of literacy. Memo 341 had recommended the use of mobile cinema vans to show Colonial Film Unit (CFU) and other films. Bradley was interested but no van was obtainable during his term. A small broadcasting station was opened and *Mutende* was taken over by the Information Office which began to produce its own printed propaganda in the form of newsletters, leaflets, pamphlets and posters. Propaganda was also communicated personally. Lectures and lecture

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1. *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 2 Jan. 1941. *East Africa and Rhodesia* was a journal edited by H. Joelson and published in London. It was originally called *East Africa* from 1928 to 1935.
notes designed to form the basis of regular lectures to educated Africans were sent to welfare and education officers, compound managers and missions. In rural areas more emphasis was placed on personal rather than mass communications with D.O.s being encouraged 'to discuss war news with leading Africans, both at their bomas and when on tour'.

The second problem was comprehension. Most Africans did not have the geographical, historical or technological background to follow in a meaningful way the course and the causes of a highly mechanised war in remote places. In his Progress Report of January 1940 Bradley wrote:

If the intelligent appreciation of modern war shown by the educated African and the schoolboy is remarkable, the complete failure of the more primitive people to grasp the situation is even more noticeable.

The D.C. at Kalabo in Barotseland reported that explaining the war there was like 'addressing an assembly of deaf mutes on conditions in Mars'. This report confirms Ellul's maxim that 'Propaganda means precisely nothing without preliminary information'.

Related to the fundamental problem of comprehension was the question of how much information about the war should be given to Africans. Except for an extremist

1. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 2, 28 Oct. 1939.
2. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report for Fortnight Ending 29 Jan. 1940.
minority amongst European officials who thought that Africans should be kept in 'happy ignorance of the war', most agreed with Bradley that educated Africans should be fully informed. There was less agreement on how much to tell African miners and rural Africans.

Bradley had a difference of opinion with the Mine Station D.C.s on the question of war propaganda. The D.C.s thought that miners would have sufficient exposure to war propaganda through radio broadcasts and Mutende. More intensive propaganda which Bradley wished to introduce would defeat its purpose by creating an artificial war neurosis which would disturb copper production. Reluctantly Bradley gave in to their wishes.

In his first few months as Information Officer Bradley continued the policy first adopted by Howe of doing nothing to startle the rural African. But by October 1940 circumstances dictated a change in policy. It was decided to intensify information in the tribal areas because of the urgent need for recruits for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and, 'the necessity for mobilising the whole man-power of the Empire for war purposes'. The four methods adopted were '(1) leaflets (2) more organised verbal propaganda (3) the "village reader" and (4) wireless'.

1. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 4, Nov. 1939.


3. NAZ/SEC 1/1757/1, Howe, 'It would be a mistake to force war news down his throat'. 15 Oct. 1939.

4. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 19, Oct. 1940.
The new Information Office tried from its inception to keep its finger on the pulse of public opinion recognizing the necessity of feedback to guide its propaganda. P.C.s were asked to select some 'suitable non-official Europeans' to report on rumours circulating in the district; similarly members of the C.I.D. were asked to 'submit reports on the reactions of the various sections of the community towards the war'. Tour reports too were scanned for information. From August 1940 public opinion reports were put on a more regular basis with the introduction of monthly reports which were collated by P.C.s from reports compiled by D.O.s. These reports were sent to the MOI and, within the territory, copies were circulated to the Chief Secretary, the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Information Officer and the Director of Intelligence and Censorship (the latter post was created at the start of the war). The Northern Rhodesia Information Office's Progress Reports were also forwarded by the C.O. to the MOI to provide feedback.

Relations between the brash new Information Office and the staid Northern Rhodesian Secretariat were initially turbulent. In his first few months of office Bradley was on the verge of having his resignation eagerly accepted as a result of a 'territorial' dispute concerning

1. ZA/S935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 2, 28 Oct 1939.
2. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter, No. 63, 18 March 1941.
the position of the Information Office in the administrative hierarchy and the degree of autonomy that should be permitted its head.

The storm blew up in March 1940 when the Assistant Chief Secretary, R. S. Hudson, on behalf of the Chief Secretary, wrote to Bradley requesting that he submit drafts of his weekly European Newsletter to the Secretariat to ensure 'that nothing should creep into it which might be misinterpreted as a Government decision or statement of policy or view when this is not in fact the case'.

(It appears from Secretariat minutes that the instructions were issued because Bradley was 'occasionally inclined to be exuberant'.

Bradley was incensed. He pointed out that on taking up his appointment he had been given to understand by the then Acting Chief Secretary, K. R. Tucker, that he would act on his 'own responsibility', submitting nothing in draft, and that he:

would be given a free hand to create and run the Information Office subject to my removal to the Administration if my work proved unsatisfactory and... that I was a Head of Department.

Bradley claimed that Tucker had 'offered to give me the last statement in writing', but that he had not thought this step 'necessary'. Bradley's interpretation was that the government could not now make up its mind whether the Information Office 'should function as a Department or

1. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, Hudson to Bradley, 29 March 1940.
2. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, 9 April 1940.
whether it should be attached to the Secretariat...'.
But as far as he was concerned he did not feel that he could 'run an Information Office, much less a broadcasting station, as an Assistant Secretary forming part of the Secretariat machine'. He concluded by threatening to resign if the Secretariat did not change its decision on the newsletter and afford him the autonomy of a departmental head.  

The Secretariat was intransigent. Bradley must have misinterpreted his original instructions. The consensus was that his status should be equivalent to that of the editor of Mutende, coming under the supervision of the Chief Secretary. W. M. Logan who was then Chief Secretary, suggested to the Governor that Bradley be replaced. The Governor in opposing such a move pointed out that the work of an information officer was:

a form of Government work which is new and of real importance. Its importance is likely to grow as the war continues. Not only is this a new type of work for a Government Officer, but it is one for which gifts of a type not normally needed in the Government service are required.

Bradley did not resign though his demands were not met. Parity with the editor of Mutende did not last long. In 1942 it was found that with the war-time shortage of

1. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, Bradley to Chief Sec., April 1940.
2. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, Hudson, minute, 17 April 1940.
3. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, Logan, minute, 27 April 1940.
4. NAZ/SEC 1/1757, Maybin, minute, 5 May 1940.
personnel in the civil service, a seconded D.O. could no longer be spared to edit the newspaper and the job was done first by Hilda Franklin and later, in all but name, by the senior African clerk. Both worked under the supervision of the Information Officer.\(^1\) Meanwhile as the war progressed and the functions of the Office multiplied, as Maybin had predicted, the position of Information Officer also increased in importance.

One reason for the increase in status and importance of the Information Office was the recognition both in London and the colonies that the Office had a permanent role to play in government that extended beyond the immediate present of war propaganda. This recognition is apparent in a MOI piece entitled 'The Necessity for Propaganda' which appeared in the *Northern Rhodesia Newsletter* of January 1942. The article explained that propaganda departments had now become a necessity because of the increasing complexity of government and because the spread of education had 'created a demand for explanations'. Propaganda departments were considered to be even more essential in the colonies for:

> if we look into past Colonial History we shall find innumerable cases where rebellions, costly in lives and money, have occurred merely because the local inhabitants failed to appreciate the motives of our actions towards them.

Each year from 1941 information officers in East and Central Africa met in Nairobi where they evaluated MOI

2. *ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter* No. 107, 12 Jan. 1943.
material and pooled ideas. They too were soon looking beyond war propaganda to the coming of peace when they foresaw that public relations would be a vital function for a government information department. After the 1941 Conference Bradley presented the Secretariat with a lengthy memorandum on the subject of the 'Conversion of Information Centres into Public Relations Departments after the War'.  

(Franklin prepared a memorandum for the 1943 Conference which contained many similar ideas.) Bradley suggested that the simultaneous appointments of a public relations officer at the C.O. and information officers in the colonies, 'an important part of whose duty is recognised to be the interpretation of their Governments' policy to the public...indicate two very important developments in our Colonial policy'. The first was the realisation of the need to justify British imperialism to the western democracies. Bradley continued:

We must somehow convince the world that our Colonial policy is not one of exploitation but is, in fact, the greatest and most worthwhile sociological enterprise in the world today.

This image of the British colonial Empire as a 'sociological enterprise' is also found in the Ministry's


propaganda. A pamphlet by J. Kamm confided:

What is sometimes known as the British Colonial Empire is in one sense a vast laboratory where the most varied experiments are being conducted in the science of community-building. 1

Bradley's use of this problem-solving imagery may also reflect the growing trendiness of sociology following the establishment of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia in 1937. This was the first institute devoted to the study of applied anthropology to be established in the dependent Empire; its first director Godfrey Wilson (1937-1941) was convinced that modern social anthropology could be of great practical benefit to the administration. 2

Bradley also interpreted the appointment of propaganda personnel at head office and in the colonies as meaning that the British government saw a need for political education in the colonies. In Northern Rhodesia he thought that political education would be dominated by the race question. Political education for Europeans would entail the checking of their premature aspirations

1. INF/10, J. Kamm, Progress Towards Self-Government in the Colonies, with a Foreward by Vincent Harlow, (n.d.). See also CO 875/14/9100/50, Sabine, 17 Feb. 1942, "...we are primarily not concerned with present or past achievements or with romanticising the Imperial idea so much as presenting to the public of this country an unsolved problem and asking for their co-operation"

for self-government, a delicate manoeuvre which would have to be accomplished without arousing European antagonism. Propaganda would also be required to combat their racial prejudices generally and its special economic manifestation - the industrial colour bar. Bradley wrote:

...hitherto we have thought it advisable to shelve the issue rather than risk industrial unrest and further interruption of our production of copper for the armament industries. But either now or later a decision must be taken and it is certain that decision can never be made effective unless it is accompanied by intense and sustained educative propaganda. 1

For the Africans political education would be required to give them a better understanding of Europeans, to explain the development policy of the imperial government and to help speed up their political development through the medium of indirect rule. 'It is particularly important', wrote Bradley, 'that the sympathy of the educated commoner for the policy should be fostered in every way'. Bradley considered that a Public Relations Department would be even more vital if an amalgamated state were to come into being for such a step would not be acceptable to world opinion unless there were accompanying guarantees 'of an enlightened native policy'. 2

Early in 1942 Bradley was posted to the Falkland Islands. The new Information Officer, Harry Franklin, was at the time of his appointment an Assistant

1. Bradley, 'Conversion of Information Centres'.
2. Ibid.
Secretary for Native Affairs in the Secretariat in Lusaka. In April 1942 he began what was to be a distinguished career as head of the Northern Rhodesian government's propaganda service, which post he held until 1950. Franklin's appointment was not welcomed by Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, leader of the unofficial members in the Leg. Co. Gore-Browne saw the Governor and told him he did not consider Franklin 'the right man for the job'. He was told politely that politicians had no say in civil service appointments.1 This initial opposition was an augur of things to come. In the course of Franklin's career as Information Officer relations between his department and white settler politicians became increasingly strained.

Soon after Franklin's appointment the Northern Rhodesian government made a striking change in its propaganda policy when the Information Officer's duties were extended to include public relations. This departure made the Northern Rhodesian Office the first colonial information office to officially add public relations to its functions. The directive appears to have come from a War Council committee meeting.2 The

2. CO 875/7/6281/22D, Franklin to Sabine, 4 Sept. 1942.
new policy development was explained in a circular minute of 20 June 1942:

The course of the war has revealed the necessity for Colonial Governments to take the public more into their confidence. It is now, therefore, the policy of Government to release much more information regarding its activities than has hitherto been the case.¹

The innovation of the public relations function was noted with considerable interest by the C.O. and commended to other colonial information officers. This grass roots initiative was fully in accord with the war-time policy of the C.O. Public Relations Branch. Sabine wrote:

it was considered better to let the new organisations develop along their own lines and to face and solve their own problems, rather than to attempt in the earlier stages to lay down any set pattern for their future development.²

As part of the upgrading of the Northern Rhodesian Information Office all heads of departments and P.C.s were directed to keep the Information Office fully informed, which included making available material for background information which could not be made public for security reasons. There was a divided response. Some officials willingly assisted but the more conservative "refused to assist in any way, regarding the Information Department as a very brash organisation...".³

¹. NAZ/SEC 1/1770, G. Beresford Stooke, 20 June 1942.
Franklin was left to work out the details and the practical application of his new brief after having been provided with a working definition. As he told Sabine at the C.O.:

> it implies liaison between the Public and Government and the keeping of a finger on the pulse of the public both African and European, so as to be in a position to report to Government the people's criticisms, reaction to existing or contemplated measures and so on.¹

Not only were the objectives of the Information Office extended in 1942 but the Information Officer was officially directed 'to expand services, to increase efficiency and to apply for whatever funds should be necessary to obtain staff and equipment for this purpose'.² In sum he was required to build up the office into a department.³ Expansion was limited by war-time shortages of staff and equipment. Despite these restrictions Franklin managed by 1943 to broaden considerably the activities of the office. He set up a film section with a cinema van, a photographic section, and acquired a broadcasting officer and an assistant information officer. Such enterprise impressed the Ministry. 'It is remarkable', wrote M. Wathen in October 1942, 'that so much should have been achieved in so many directions with so small a staff'.⁴

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1. CO 875/7/5281/22D, Franklin to Sabine, 4 Sept. 1942.

2. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1946, 3.

3. Franklin, The Flag-Wagger, 165. From July 1942 the Office was described as the Information and Public Relations Department. And see pp. 260-261.

4. CO 875/7/6281/22D, M. W. Wathen to Franklin, 26 Oct. 1943.
Franklin was enthusiastic about the new prominence being given to mass education in colonial policy as evidenced by the publication of *Mass Education in African Society* in 1944. The inspiration for the Mass Education report was political and came from Arthur Creech-Jones, Labour MP, founder member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (and a post-war Secretary of State for Colonies). Dawe minuted:

In its origin the enquiry had rather a political character. It was strongly pressed on us by Mr. Creech-Jones, who felt that a large-scale attack on mass illiteracy in the Colonies was overdue.\(^1\) Creech-Jones first raised the subject in 1940. He was concerned about unrest in the West Indies and about industrial unrest in Northern Rhodesia's Copperbelt. Having had experience with the workers' education movement in Britain he thought that adult education could make a contribution. He noted that the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies had so far given 'comparatively little attention' to the question.\(^2\) The issue of community-centered adult education was not a new one for the C.O. Statements of principle had been made in various reports from 1925 onwards but little had been actually done.\(^3\) The most notable efforts in the field had

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1. CO 859/44/12014, Dawe, minute, 2 Oct. 1943.
2. CO 859/22/12015/1, ACBC, extract from Draft Minutes of 103rd Meeting, 16 May 1940.
been as a result of missionary or philanthropic initiative with the C.O. providing its blessing but not its finance. The C.O. had also stressed the great potential of the electronic media - film and broadcasting - for adult education in the pre-war years with little practical result.

Creech-Jones submitted that adult education was 'an essential factor for securing the health of these states where a wider participation in the social, economic and political life of the colonies is necessary'. He seized the opportunity of a strike on Northern Rhodesia's Copperbelt to press the urgency of the situation. In May 1940 the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies accepted Creech-Jones' proposal:

that a Sub-Committee should be set up to survey the adult education field in the Colonies and the types of agency available, including films, gramophones and community centres, and to make recommendations which could go forward to Governors on the further development of the work.

In the White Paper mass education was nowhere specifically defined but emerged as meaning education for the betterment of the community to improve the quality of life of the people. It was seen to involve literacy campaigns and the production of follow-up literature.

1. *e.g.* BEKE; work of the ICCL.

2. CO 859/22/12015/1, 'Adult Education in the Colonies', A. Creech-Jones, 28 May 1940.


4. Ibid.
rural development, agricultural extension schemes, health and hygiene programmes. A crucial aspect was that the community should be active participants and, if possible, the initiators of improvement schemes. The objective was not just to enable Africans to live more healthy and productive lives but there was too a political target, education for citizenship; for unless people had some general education 'true democracy cannot function and the rising hope of self-government will inevitably suffer frustration'.

It is clear then that mass education was seen to concern the education of the whole man, not least the political aspects, and closely conformed to Sabine's definition of what colonial propaganda should be all about - political socialisation: the giving to colonial man of a whole new world view. Mass education found one of its most stalwart champions in Franklin: 'mass adult education in the widest sense of the word "education"', he wrote, was 'the real task of a colonial Government Information Department'.

After Franklin took over he devoted a major part of his time to looking after the interests of Northern Rhodesia's African troops which he considered an extremely important exercise in public relations. About 14,000 Africans joined the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and saw service, mainly engaged in garrison duties, in East Africa in the Somaliland campaign, the reconquest of Italian

East Africa and Ethiopia, the occupation of Madagascar, in the Middle East - especially in Palestine, and in the Burma campaign. Franklin saw 'a definite political value in promoting good relations between troops abroad and government at home'; he hoped that the good will which would thus accrue to the government would help in the 'difficult' period of reconstruction that loomed after the war. One way of helping the troops was to keep up a constant supply of reading material, another was to strive by way of broadcasts, free letter schemes and so on, to keep the troops in touch with home. Franklin described it as waging 'a constant campaign against the barriers of illiteracy which threaten to separate askari [African troops] and family'. From their end the army also assisted as an efficient army education corps by providing literacy classes and at the end of the war Franklin claimed that 70 per cent of the troops were literate. This figure does not tally with the figures provided by J. R. Shaw who had been chaplain to the African forces of Northern Rhodesia; he reported that 90 per cent were literate in their own vernaculars whilst about 20 per cent could read English.

1. NAZ/SEC 3/134, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report, 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1944.
2. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 277, 30 May 1945.
3. 'The Distribution of Books in Northern Rhodesia', International Review of Missions, 47, 185 (1958), 90.
Part of Franklin's brief was that he should travel extensively. In 1943 he had himself accredited as a war correspondent and visited troops in Madagascar. At the end of the war he visited Burma. These visits enabled him to gain more material for publicising Northern Rhodesia's war effort at home and abroad; to obtain news of the troops for relatives and friends; and to look after the interests of the African troops. On his return from Madagascar Franklin initiated a drive to obtain more funds for the purchase of troop comforts and publicised a list of troops' complaints, including one against the use of the 'monkey epithet' by some European officers. He noted that though there was a liaison officer in Nairobi to look after the interests of the few hundred Northern Rhodesian Europeans there was no one for the ten thousand African troops and strongly recommended that one should be appointed. In 1944 a civil liaison officer was belatedly appointed for the African troops for which Franklin is probably due some credit.

While Franklin energetically campaigned for a better deal for the African troops he was more circumscribed by C.O. policy in the handling of some other local issues - anything to do with the political future of the colony or economic discrimination on the Copperbelt was to be kept off the political agenda. The Bledisloe Report (1939) had been inconclusive; it had deferred the issue.

of amalgamation, which in principle had been thought to be a good thing, until native policies should be more in harmony north and south of the Zambezi. When war came it was decided that, in the interests of a united war effort, the divisive question of amalgamation should be held over until the cessation of hostilities. This was the message of the C.O. and MOI propagandists as contained in their authoritative 'Plan of Propaganda to British East Africa' (1943), which was drafted by the Ministry's Overseas Planning Committee. In the Northern Rhodesia section it was spelt out that there was 'no question at present of any set line of propaganda to support a declared long-term policy on the part of the British Government'. But whilst, theoretically, this vital long-term political issue was supposed to be pigeonholed until the end of the war, the Europeans actually seized the opportunity to increase their political bargaining power.

Under war-time emergency conditions and with a shortage of officials, the white settlers improved their position in the central legislature. By the end of the war there were four unofficials in the Executive Council: unofficials had filled the important administrative posts of Director of Manpower, Director of Supplies and Price Controller. Gore-Browne and Welensky were included on the War Committee along with the Chief Secretary and the

Financial Secretary. Indeed it was because of their elevation to the War Committee of the Executive Council that these leaders of the unofficials had been persuaded 'not to press for amalgamation during the war'.

The propaganda plan cautioned that whilst in discussing future objectives propaganda could be made out of plans for the economic, educational and social uplift of the 'local inhabitants' nevertheless:

it is of cardinal importance that any propaganda with this in view should be so presented as to meet with the sympathy of the immigrant communities and enlist their support.

Similar caution was urged over industrial matters. European Copperbelt miners also had to be placated in the interests of war industry. In the early years of the war things had not gone smoothly on the Copperbelt. Many European miners like the unofficials, were determined to turn the war to their advantage; they staged a successful strike in 1940. A radical element led by volatile communist Frank Maybank, continued to try to force concessions from the government until 1942 when Maybank and two of his aides were arrested. The European Mineworkers' Union promoted an industrial colour bar which was against government policy; but rather than disturb the war effort this situation had to be treated 'with extreme delicacy, or preferably to be avoided altogether'. Furthermore, 'the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
effect in Southern Rhodesia and the Union of any statement of opinion or line of propaganda must be constantly watched'.¹

Andrew Cohen of the C.O. had minuted in 1939 that although it might be good for Northern Rhodesia to keep in touch with the Information Officer in Nairobi and other East African territories, it was of 'primary importance' that Northern Rhodesia should secure 'co-ordination in publicity activities' with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,² and this had been the intention of 'memo No. 341. But as events turned out Northern Rhodesia did have considerable contact with East African information officers as a result of the East African Information Officers' Conferences which began as an annual war-time affair in 1941. The original idea for a conference of information officers to be held in Nairobi seems to have come from the Southern Rhodesian Information Officer, W. D. Gale, who had the inspiration after what he considered to be a particularly fruitful exchange of ideas with Bradley.³

The first such conference in 1941 appears to have given birth to the suggestion that a principal information

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1. Ibid.
3. ZA/S 935/37/1, Gale to Bradley, 13 Feb. 1941; Bradley to Gale, 17 Feb. 1941; Gale to Bradley, 22 Feb. 1941.
officer be appointed for East Africa part of whose function should be to represent the Ministry in East and Central Africa. This was quite a sharp departure from the original wishes of the C.O. who had refused at the start of the war to allow such an official to be appointed because of the fear of the diminution of C.O. authority. But on this occasion the opposition of the C.O. seems to have been overcome by the argument that part of the Principal Information Officer's duties should include organising and supervising the information services in occupied territories within East Africa Command and for Italian prisoners of war and civilian evacuees in East Africa. The other duties were 'co-ordinating and expanding the work of the Information Officers of the Governors' Conference territories in matters which are of wider than territorial concern.' In 1942 Sir Geoffry Northcote was appointed to this post.

A further departure from the original planning scheme of the Ministry was that in 1943 the Overseas Planning Committee produced a new propaganda plan in which Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were included in 'British East Africa' whereas in the 1939 plan they had been treated together with Southern Rhodesia as a British Central African region. The propaganda plan did, however, point out that owing to the close economic ties of Northern

1. ZA/S 935/37/1, Gale to Bradley, 13 Feb. 1941; Gale to Bradley, 22 Feb. 1941.
2. INF 1/552, Harlow to K. G. Grubb, 9 Sept. 1941.
3. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 107, 12 Jan. 1942.
Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa 'owing to the dependence of the gold mines and the farmers in the latter territories upon migrant labour from the North' their problems would have to be dealt with separately. Nevertheless this East African orientation caused Southern Rhodesia's Information Officer, Gale, some anxiety. When the information offices in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were put under the supervision of Sir Geoffry Northcote, the Principal Information Officer, Gale saw in this evidence for a conspiracy theory: another move in a plan that he had noted particularly since the outbreak of war, to bring Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 'more and more into the East African orbit and thus wean them away' from Southern Rhodesia 'obviously with an eye to our amalgamation claim'. Gale's fears were put to rest in 1944 when plans were announced for the formation of a Central African Council, an advisory body whose functions included co-ordinating communications services for the three Central African territories.

It is a striking feature in the development of government propaganda agencies in Central Africa that from the beginning, in the unsatisfactory Memo 303,


2. ZA/S 935/40, Report of visit of Information Officer Gale to Kenya, to attend the Information Conference at Nairobi, 5 Sept. 1944.
propaganda had been conceptualised on a regional basis. In this propaganda policy was following the findings of the inconclusive Bledisloe Report hinting that in the future a closer political association of the Central African region was most likely. The setting up of the Central African Council which had a Public Relations Committee after the war further strengthened the regional tie.

The argument will now branch out into a more detailed examination of the government's use of the press, radio and film, noting the impact of these media and the messages they conveyed on the African population.

2. The Press

During the Second World War most printed propaganda was under the direction of the new Information Office. The bulk of the discussion, therefore, will be concerned with the press activities of this Office. Particular emphasis will be placed on Mutende which came under the control of the Information Office in 1940 and continued to be the government's main means of putting propaganda across to the African population. The war-time activities of the government-sponsored African Literature Committee which operated independently of the Information Office will also be considered.

As a foundation for his publicity campaign Bradley established a news service. This was devoted to the collection and distribution of Northern Rhodesian news to the MOI and information officers in Africa, the
European press in Africa, Mutende, local African radio stations, East Africa Command (for their newsheets and broadcasts for African troops), D.C.s and missions. For government news, the news-service relied on information being supplied by government departments, and for district news on regular newsletters sent by D.O.s and African clerks at bomas.

In January 1940 the Information Office began the practice of issuing summaries of Leg. Co. proceedings after each session. This was a highly significant innovation as previously no papers except the Bulawayo Chronicle had any detailed reports of the Leg. Co. until after the publication of Hansard. Not only did this measure gain wide publicity for the Northern Rhodesian government in the local and overseas press, but arguably it contributed to a raising of the level of political awareness amongst the European and educated African population.

Another function of the Information Office was to distribute propaganda from outside sources like the MOI, information officers elsewhere in Africa, India and the United States and the Union Unity Truth Service in Johannesburg. Information Office bookstalls staffed by voluntary workers were established in every town in the territory. Weekly summaries of the local press were collated, also, and forwarded to the Secretary of State. Franklin went out of his way to establish good relations

1. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office Progress Report No. 8, for Fortnight Ending 29 Jan. 1940.
with the press. This was part of the public relations aspect of his work and he was particularly concerned about the reporting of Copperbelt events where the situation was especially difficult. In 1942 Franklin sought out Yeats, editor of the influential Bulawayo Chronicle (which expressed strong opposition to C.O. rule), to persuade him to present Northern Rhodesian affairs 'in a more reasonable light' and considered his mission successful.¹

Quite contrary to the expectations of Memo 341 of September 1939 Bradley soon embarked upon the production of a considerable amount of printed propaganda. That Memo had urged that the northern territories should avoid 'unnecessary duplication' by simply getting their material from Southern Rhodesia 'since the format of such material would be the same'.² This suggestion was in itself provocative considering that the original Memo 303 (July 1939) had been revised because of the recommendation it contained that the Southern Rhodesian Information Officer should be in charge of publicity for the three territories and that material should originate from there. This suggests that the original intention of Memo 303 lingered on in the second Memo in an implicit rather than explicit guise. But it must be stressed that the Memo contained guidelines rather than regulations and the colonies were

1. CO 875/7/6281/22D, Franklin to Sabine, 4 Sept. 1942.
2. CO 323/1663/6281/1B, Memo 341.
free to differ if they chose. This happened in the case of Memo 341's suggestion that the Southern Rhodesian Office should produce a confidential newsletter for mine managers in the Rhodesias. The Northern Rhodesian Governor, Maybin, promptly told the Secretary of State (for communications with the Ministry had to go through the C.O.) that such a newsletter was not necessary and, even if it was, it should not be prepared in Southern Rhodesia for mining conditions varied enormously between the two territories, the north employing labour on a much larger scale.  

In January 1940 the Northern Rhodesia Newsletter designed for the European population, made its first appearance and continued to appear weekly throughout the war. It began as an experiment, a cyclostyled sheet of seven paragraphs about local affairs, and was distributed to three hundred people. The two aims of the Newsletter were to give war news and propaganda to the European population and to publicise government's activities. The European response was excellent and the Newsletter was favourably commented on in the Leg. Co. 

As a result of its success the Newsletter was taken over by the Government Printer from the fourth issue. It

2. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 100, 2 Dec. 1941.
3. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 8, for Fortnight Ending 29 Jan. 1940.
was sent to Europeans and some Africans in the territory and also widely circulated in Africa, Britain and the United States. By the end of 1941 Bradley was claiming that, with a circulation of nearly three thousand, its circulation was higher than either local newspapers and 'a more popular propaganda weapon than the local press'. Bradley fully realised that you cannot compare on equal terms a publication which was sent free and one that was bought but based his impression on the number of letters sent in by readers each week.¹

From May 1940 the Northern and Southern Rhodesian Newsletters were circulated jointly in Northern Rhodesia. They were designed to be complementary, the Northern Newsletter giving local news and the Southern Newsletter war news and war propaganda articles. Together they were intended to give 'a complete picture of the week's war news'.² This arrangement was discontinued in January 1943 when the Southern Newsletter ceased being circulated in Northern Rhodesia. The immediate cause was a shortage of newsprint but this problem might have been overcome if Northern Rhodesia had been more interested in keeping the circulation going, which it was not.³ Bradley had established a very amicable working relationship with the Southern Rhodesia Information Officer, W. D. Gale.⁴ Franklin and Gale did not get on so well. Relations

1. ZA/S 935/37/2, Bradley to Chief Sec., 24 Dec. 1941.
2. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 100, 2 Dec. 1941.
3. ZA/S 935/37/2, Gale to Bradley, 8 Jan. 1943.
4. ZA/S 935/37/2, Bradley to Gale, 27 March 1942.
became strained because of what the north regarded as exaggerated and inaccurate reporting of troubles on the Copperbelt which occurred twice in the Southern Rhodesia Weekly Newsletter during 1942. It is likely that this influenced the north's decision not to press for the continued circulation of the Southern Newsletter in Northern Rhodesia.

The first cause of friction was an item contained in the Southern Rhodesia Weekly Newsletter No. 133 of 15 May 1942. The Northern Rhodesian administration felt that the Newsletter exaggerated the extent of the hostility between the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers Union (NRMU) and the government over the latter's failure to bring in legislation for the protection and benefit of European workers. The Newsletter had also not made it clear that the request of the executive of the NRMU for a meeting with the Governor had not been refused out of hand but because of the 'peremptory' and threatening manner in which it had been expressed. Franklin was admonished by the Administrative Secretary for having allowed the offending Newsletter to be circulated in the north. A retraction was printed in the following issue, No. 134. Franklin suggested to Gale that in future before reporting on any delicate political issue they should consult each other before publication, by telephone, if the matter was sufficiently urgent.

1. ZA, Southern Rhodesia Weekly Newsletter No 133, 15 May 1942.
2. ZA/S 935/37/2, Franklin to Gale, 25 May 1942.
The second cause of friction was contained in the Southern Rhodesia Weekly Newsletter No. 154 of 8 October 1942. This time the item concerned the arrest of Maybank, General Secretary of the NRMU, and two other officials. Maybank had spearheaded the April confrontation with the Northern Rhodesian authorities. The Newsletter misquoted a South African Press Association account of the arrests in a way which had the effect of exaggerating the extent of disaffection amongst Copperbelt miners. The three had been arrested for agitation detrimental to the war effort which included attempting to bring the European miners and the Railway Workers' Union into an industrial dispute on the Katanga mines. The misquoted statement read 'the latest actions by the more extreme branches of the NRMU had gravely threatened the production of copper...'. It should have read 'members' instead of 'branches'.

Franklin had an interview with the Governor over this episode and promised to correct the error. A correction was printed in subsequent issues of both the Northern and Southern Newsletters.

Though the policy of the Information Office was that the educated African should be fully informed about the events of the war this did not mean that he should have access to the same sources of information as the European.

1. ZA/S 935/37/2, Franklin to Gale, 16 Oct. 1942.


Both Bradley and Franklin disliked Africans receiving copies of the European Newsletters. (There had briefly been an African Newsletter but it had been discontinued as an economy measure.) Bradley regretted that he had not restricted circulation to Europeans at the outset. The Newsletters, he felt, were likely to be misinterpreted by Africans as they were not simple enough. Bradley compromised on his initial mistake by not permitting the Newsletters to be sent to 'natives at mission stations or schools' because '...the teacher is much too apt to lay down the law about everything...'. Franklin was more drastic and stopped the sending of the Newsletter to Africans altogether, at a time when African circulation was about a thousand. Newsletters and lecture notes were sent to all the mission stations with the stipulation that only Europeans should conduct war news classes. Through the Newsletters the Information Officer urged Europeans to encourage their African employees to read Mutende and listen to the broadcasts, and warned readers of the danger of spreading rumours especially in a country like Northern Rhodesia which had such a large African population.

A brief summary of the type of articles featured in the Newsletter for the years 1940-1941 will give a general

1. ZA/S 935/37/2, Bradley to Gale, 29 Nov. 1941.
2. NAZ/SEC 3/134, Northern Rhodesia Information Department Progress Report for the Year 1st July 1942 to 30th June 1943.
3. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 17, 30 April 1940; Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 25, 25 June 1940.
idea of the nature of the contents. There was always a summary of the week's war news. Other frequent items were reports of the proceedings of the Leg. Co., texts of important broadcasts by the Governor and the Information Officer, articles by the Information Officer, reports on the situation in England emphasising the high morale of the British people, reports on the local war effort, publicity campaigns, news of the activities of the troops and news on the state of the roads.

The production of pamphlets, leaflets and posters largely designed to stimulate the African war effort got underway in the latter half of 1940 as a result of a policy decision to increase the flow of information to the villages. This radical policy shift was due in large measure to the poor response to the recruiting drive for a fourth battalion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment.¹ From September thousands of recruiting leaflets and posters, including a leaflet emphasising the exemption of the troops from poll tax, were distributed in the languages of the 'warrior' tribes favoured by the Regiment - Bemba, Nyanja, Lenje and Ila.² By December it was possible to relax the campaign as more than enough men for the battalion had volunteered.³

In any campaign where a variety of propaganda means are used it is very difficult to assess the comparative

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1. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 139, 8 Sept. 1942.
2. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 18, Oct. 1940.
3. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 19, Nov. 1940.
influence of each method. In the case of the recruiting campaign this includes Mutende, leaflets and posters, broadcasts, film shows by means of mobile cinema vans and direct contact through visits of recruiting officers. Publication of the conditions of service is said to have helped as did the appearance of troops on leave in the villages with plenty of money and plenty of swagger.¹

Other material produced in 1940 included posters to speed up the production of minerals and leaflets containing the Governor's broadcast to Africans. By 1941, 15,000 vernacular pamphlets a month were being produced. In the following years pamphlets were produced on such subjects as the work of the troops abroad, encouraging the growth of more food and the production of wild rubber, and explaining Yellow Fever and the Eastern Province Land Settlement Scheme.² In 1943 Mau a Askari (The Words of the African Troops) a monthly newsletter in Nyanja, the official language of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, was introduced.

Pamphlets for distribution to the African population were also imported from Nyasaland and Uganda. Pamphlets in Nyanja were supplied by the Nyasaland Information Office. For a time the arrangement was reciprocal until Nyasaland decided that neither the orthography nor the Nyanja suited Nyasaland's tastes. Pamphlets imported from Uganda which explained the war in simple English were

¹. NAZ/SEC 1/1638, P. C. Northern Province to T. F. Sandford, SNA, 2 Dec. 1940.
². See p. 183.
discovered to be very popular with educated Africans in urban areas.

In judging the efficacy of the pamphlets as propaganda one can only observe that in general Africans co-operated in the war effort by volunteering for the Regiment, by contributing to war charities and by collecting wild rubber - activities that the pamphlets (as well as Mutende) were designed to encourage. As the end of the war came in sight the emphasis changed in Information Office publications. The African and European troops' newsletters and the European newsletter were progressively discontinued. This enabled the production of brochures on subjects like the Jeanes School or African development and the controversial booklet, War and Northern Rhodesia.¹

It was a fundamental principle of Information Office policy, first initiated by Bradley and then pursued by Franklin, to give full publicity to the African war effort in the European news media not least because they hoped this would help improve race relations. The European newsletter carried stories of the bravery and loyalty of the African troops and brought local African war efforts, such as generous charity contributions, to the attention of the European population. Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 196 of 1942 carried a special supplement describing 'How four Askari earned the D.C.M. in British Somaliland'. In September 1943 one Newsletter

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1. Franklin, (Lusaka, 1945).
recorded the departure of Northern Rhodesian African troops from an East African port for India and Ceylon in the following heroic style:

The fighting tribes of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and our own Bemba, Baila and Batonga from Northern Rhodesia, with pangas waving and flashing in the sun, left the shores of their native continent eager to get to grips some day with the 'Japans'. Before they sailed they saw 'Desert Victory', now they want to make their own film record - 'Jungle Victory'.

Bravery stories included the saga of Private Litwayi Kaminyalwe who rushed three times into a burning hut to rescue his comrades,\(^1\) and items about Lieutenant/Corporal Chashi who won the Military Medal for exploits in Burma,\(^2\) and Private Mutale who won the D.C.M. in Somaliland.\(^3\)

But as subsequent history has shown such publicity failed to improve race relations in Northern Rhodesia. Prejudices, as mass communications' theorists have subsequently discovered, are not so easily altered. Indeed in the case of racial and religious prejudice, Joseph Klapper reports, 'persuasive mass communication is particularly unlikely to produce conversions and particularly likely to reinforce existing attitudes'.\(^4\)

In Northern Rhodesia Franklin's campaign to improve race relations by giving full publicity to the African

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1. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 191, 14 Sept. 1943.
2. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 219, 28 March 1944.
3. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 265, 28 Feb. 1945.
war effort bears out Klapper's theory as it was counter-productive and even had something of a boomerang effect arousing the hostility of some Europeans towards the Information Office itself. The feeling was that there had been too much emphasis on the African war effort and too little on the European. Particular exception was taken by the *Livingstone Mail* to the Information Office's booklet, *War and Northern Rhodesia*. The author (Franklin) was accused of glorifying 'the deeds of the African while skipping swiftly over the feats of Europeans, particularly the unofficial Europeans in the country'. The title should have been changed to 'War and the Africans in Northern Rhodesia', for that was what the text and pictures had concentrated on. 1

In summarising the development of the press section of the Northern Rhodesia Information Office during the war one outstanding feature is that the section struck out on an independent course. It made a determined bid to get as much publicity as possible for the colony in the world press and by producing its own printed propaganda material diverged markedly from the original propaganda blue print of the MOI as contained in Memo 341 which thought that Southern Rhodesia should provide printed material for both the northern colonies. The security situation on the Copperbelt, industrial nerve centre of the country, continued to dominate every aspect of media policy as

demonstrated in the displeasure of the Northern Rhodesian government with the handling of industrial unrest amongst European miners in the *Southern Rhodesia Weekly Newsletter*. Where the press section did not deviate from the spirit of *Memo 341* was in the discrete nature of its printed propaganda. The European newsletter was for Europeans only. Educated Africans were excluded from its circulation list for fear they would 'misinterpret' its contents which is curious considering that on a number of occasions the Information Office commented with surprise on the intelligent understanding of the nature of the war demonstrated by educated Africans. ¹ Why did the administration not wish these educated Africans to be privy to the contents of the European newsletter? Perhaps the Information Office and the C.O. it represented were inflexible in their thinking; they themselves had an image of two nations: somehow even the educated 'African mind' was different and needed a different type of propaganda! Such rigidity of thought and practice could only sharpen the racial distinction in Northern Rhodesia and heighten the African opinion leaders' sense of being discriminated against.

(a) **Mutende**

The content of *Mutende* will be looked at for its war propaganda as the paper was the main means of explaining the war to the Africans and encouraging their war effort; for its political propaganda, the long-term

¹. See p. 137.
function of giving political guidance; and for the insight it gives in its opinion columns into the developing political awareness of educated Africans. The African's political voice continued to be restricted by editorial policy (with some modifications), but during the war we have other sources of information on what Africans were thinking. These are: the letter pages of the Southern Rhodesia papers, the *Bantu Mirror* and the *African Weekly*¹ to which Northern Rhodesian Africans contributed, monthly public opinion reports sent in by Provincial Officials in the war years, and the proceedings of Regional Councils (later Provincial Councils) which were started in late 1943 and whose edited deliberations often appeared in *Mutende*. These comparative sources shed further light on *Mutende* policy as does discussion that went on behind the scenes on what and what not to print in *Mutende*. The influence on policy and related content of senior Secretariat officials, the Information Officer and unofficial politicians will also be taken into account.

Before proceeding to analyse the politics of *Mutende* some organizational changes must be noted. The supervision of the paper was taken over by the Information Officer from the Assistant Chief Secretary in 1940. G. Phillips continued as editor till 1941 when he was replaced for a brief period by C. M. N. White. The next editor was,

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¹ The Bantu Press took over the *Bantu Mirror* (formerly the *Native Mirror*) in 1936. The *African Weekly* was started by the Bantu Press in 1944.
Hilda Franklin, wife of the Information Officer, who did the job under her husband's supervision for about nine months; and then from about the middle of 1943 the senior African clerk, Edwin Mlongoti, replaced Hilda Franklin. (The government refused to officially appoint Mlongoti as editor and he was never given an editor's salary, though Franklin considered he should have been.)

With the advent of war Mutende became fortnightly instead of monthly and was reduced in size and price — from twenty to twelve pages and from 2d to 1d. In February 1941 the practice of having one composite paper in the four official languages and English was stopped. Instead, in order to save paper, there were editions in each of the four languages with an English section in each edition.

Early war-time issues carefully explained the causes of the war. D.O.s were told to refer to the relevant pages of Mutende to get the official line. At the suggestion of the Secretary for Native Affairs, T. F. Sandford, Mutende ran an essay competition on the causes of the war. Explaining the war proved to be a task of considerable difficulty given the wide range in education of Mutende readers. Phillips later recalled the trouble he had had in trying to explain the war in a way everyone would understand without 'seeming to write down' and

1. Written communication from Franklin, 18 Oct. 1982. See also Graham, 'Newspapers in Northern Rhodesia', 427. In 1948 a professional editor, J. Petrie, was appointed.

2. Winners announced in Mutende of 31 Dec. 1942 were: 1st E. C. M. Kaavu, Munali Training Centre; 2nd Nelson Nalumango, Livingstone.
antagonising educated Africans who resented being treated like children.¹

One device resorted to was the fable.² A sample is 'The Mad Bull: Another Story to Help You to Understand the Happenings in Europe' which appeared in Mutende of May 1940.³ The mad bull (Hitler) lived in a village in Europe and was menacing the neighbouring villagers. Two strong villagers, Jim (Britain) and Tom (France) built a kraal, reinforced with more fences behind the main fence, round the bull. The bull fought wildly breaking fences as he struggled to get out. The villagers mocked and jeered at Jim and Tom because they did not go and finish the bull off immediately. They retorted that they would wait until the bull had exhausted himself, 'Then friends, we will all go and make a big killing'.

Not all Mutende's war coverage was at such an elementary level. For example, a 1945 issue carried on its front page a detailed explanation of the effects of the atomic bomb.⁴ But this dichotomy between the sophisticated and the simplistic illustrates a fundamental problem of the paper's policy—which had emerged in the pre-war years—

2. In 1941 the C.O. informed the Chief Secretaries of the African colonies that Dr. Margaret Read, head of the Colonial Department at the University of London, had suggested that the war in Europe be explained to Africans using the folk-tale technique but Dr. Read's suggestion had already been anticipated in some colonies including Uganda and Northern Rhodesia. See CO 875/4/5334, H. Beckett to K. R. Tucker, 10 June 1941; Tucker to Beckett, 29 July 1941.
4. Reported with sarcasm in the Northern News, Thursday,
Whom should Mutende be for? the educated usually urban African or the less educated rural African and labourer? The question was not resolved until 1946; however, in 1944 it did play a vital part in the discussion of whether Mutende should be taken over by the commercial Bantu Press.

Initially it was the policy of colonial propagandists in London and Lusaka to concentrate on the merits of British rule rather than the sins of the Germans. Sound reasoning lay behind this ploy. The Public Relations Branch at the C.O., which had to approve all the colonial propaganda produced by the MOI, was rather nervous about the whole question of war propaganda. There was an uneasy feeling that it might prove to be a Pandora's box out of which might come popping all sorts of potentially explosive issues. 'All this stuff about the slave trade cuts no ice and talk about German atrocities is stale and can be easily counteracted by stuff about British disdoings,' minuted one official.

Government propagandists in Northern Rhodesia soon found it expedient to deviate from the original policy and place heavy emphasis on the sins of the Germans. This policy switch seems to have come about because at the beginning of the war many Africans did not appear

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, P. D. Thomas, Acting Chief Sec. to Franklin, 27 May 1946.
2. See p. 280.
4. CO 323/1660/6281, J. L. Keith to Dawe, 16 Sept. 1939.
to be sufficiently perturbed at the prospect of German rule. Generalat Banda at Fort Jameson wrote in an article in *Mutende* of June 1940:

> We are much puzzled to hear Africans talking as if the Germans will win the war and will set them free from Britain... The foolish talkers would find out what slavery was if Germany won the war. You hear much of this foolish talk in villages...¹

In his *Monthly Public Opinion Report* for September 1940 the Western Province P.C. reported to headquarters that there was a feeling 'that not enough use is made of propaganda dealing with the German atrocities and racial arrogance both in Africa and elsewhere'.² This was rectified by T. F. Sandford, in his broadcast *New Year message* of 30 December 1940 which appeared in *Mutende* of January 1941:

> Perhaps you have not heard, or have forgotten, what happened to the Hereros in South-West Africa and to the Wangoni sometimes called Bayeke, in Tanganyika Territory, when the Germans ruled there. How thousands were killed by the German rulers, men, women and children and today we know how the Germans are enslaving and murdering the Poles and other people whose countries they have taken.³

Africans were told that under German rule they would be denied education and reduced to slavery. The Director of Native Education's broadcast of 14 October 1940 published

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1. *Mutende* No. 64, 20 June 1940, 3.
2. NAZ/SEC 1/1758, Cartmel-Robinson.
in *Mutende* of October 1940 included the following:

The British know that education of all people of every colour is very important. How different is this from the Nazis and Hitler who said that to educate Africans is a crime! Hitler wants to keep Africans in darkness and ignorance so that they will be slaves...¹

The Information Office had some success with this line of propaganda as is shown by a report of an address of welcome to the Governor from Luanshya location elders in *Mutende* of July 1942 signed by Roger Tembo, Harrison Chungu and Aaron Ndhlove [sic]:

> We wish to express our thanks to the British Empire for protecting us from Hitler, for we know that if we were not protected and Hitler came and took over the country we would not have been regarded as human beings but as dogs...²

But the success was not unmitigated. There was as the C.O. feared there might be, a 'boomerang effect'.

Having been frequently told that German rule would bring slavery some people began to talk of their contemporary lot in terms of servitude. Emerging African leaders like Dauti Yamba and Harry Nkumbula wrote in to *Mutende* to complain that the position of the African under British rule was already tantamount to slavery.³ Lozi

¹ *Mutende* No. 73, 24 Oct. 1940, 4.

² *Mutende* No. 117, 2 July 1942, 1. See also *Mutende* No. 111, 9 April 1942, 8, where Ernest Mattako's vote of thanks to the government for the new Recreation Hall at Luanshya is reported; also MSS Afr. s 1159 (Rhodes House, Oxford), Capt. A. Dickson, 'An Experiment in Mass Education: Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, Tour of the East Africa Command Mobile Propaganda Unit'.

³ See pp. 189 and 193.
schoolboys at Mongu surprised the N.C. there by asking 'if Hitler treated his white slaves any better than Europeans treat Africans here?'.

Northern Rhodesia's first Information Officer, Bradley, soon discovered that while educated Africans in urban areas and schoolboys took a keen and intelligent interest in the war, apathy characterised the rural areas, the 'hoi polloi' of the villages were little influenced by external affairs hoping only to be permitted to enjoy their bucolic existence undisturbed. The war was seen as something foreign and remote - a white man's affair. As a result a major propaganda campaign was launched based on the theme, This War Is Your War Too. In 1941 Sandford wound up his New Year Message with a biblical turn of phrase:

I say to you, therefore, that those who tell you this is not your war are trying to fool you by lies, just as the Germans have lied to everyone in Europe...It is too late to repair the kraal when the lion has already got through and is killing the cattle inside.

And Governor Maybin in his Christmas message of December

2. NAZ/SEC 1/1758, Bradley to Chief Sec., 22 April 1940.
3. NAZ/SEC 1/1638, Southern Province Tour Report No. 5/40. Annexure: 'Recruiting for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Native Reactions to the War'. Compiled by J. Phibbs.
It is your war as well as our war, for the precious things for which the Europeans are fighting, namely freedom in all its aspects, are just as precious and important to the African.

In the campaign to enlist African support in the prosecution of the war the Information Office not only made use of the white ruling caste but also co-opted African leaders both traditional and modern. In the early stages of the war a feature of Mutende was the publication of a number of messages of loyalty from various chiefs including Chitimukulu, Nondo, Undi, and the Lozi Paramount. The Lungu Chief Nondo of the Mbala District appealed for recruits:

I ask my people not to hesitate. Join the Regiment and go and fight. Our King is a Christian King but our enemy does not pray to God... Although Germany is strong Almighty God will make Hitler fall.

Chief Nondo also had a special message for his civilian subjects:

I call upon all of you who work in the mines or in other places to work with all your strength because this war is not only the concern of Europeans but also of all Africans.

How valuable to the government was the support of the chiefs is difficult to judge but the Information Office obviously felt they were effective as continual use of them was made throughout the war. They broadcast in


2. This English translation appeared in the *Northern Rhodesia Newsletter* No. 48, 3 Dec. 1940.
Lusaka and Nairobi, periodically visited the Copperbelt, and were despatched to Nairobi and Burma to visit the troops.

The new leaders, the educated vanguard, were also pressed into service as this report by Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika demonstrates. Mbikusita (who later became the first President of Northern Rhodesia's first African political party, the African National Congress) sent in a report to *Mutende* of a function for African troops held at Kitwe aerodrome in 1943. He and 'some Africans of note' had been invited 'to address the soldiers and... the general public'. Other notables included Edward Sampa, Sam K. K. Mwase, Harry Nkumbula and Pyson Mwakanema:

> We encouraged the soldiers to carry on to a final finish...and also urged the general public to help to win the war and to forsake the idea that this is a European and not an African war.¹

*Mutende* specifically assisted the war effort by encouraging recruitment through explaining conditions of service and by giving full coverage to the African troops. There was an eight page *Burma Supplement* to *Mutende* in August 1945.² To keep up the morale of the troops *Mutende* gave them news from home, ran essay competitions and published their photographs, articles and letters. On the home front *Mutende* gave publicity to the local war effort, particularly the War Charities' drive and the wild rubber collection campaign.

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¹ *Mutende* No. 154, 2 Dec. 1943, 1.
Franklin, who had succeeded Bradley as Information Officer in 1942, considered there was a 'moral value' in including the African in War Charity drives. 'It brings the realisation of war closer to him, and [he] feels he has his little stake in the war too'.\(^1\) Mutende regularly printed lists of subscribers and singled out notable efforts. Dauti Yamba was reported as organising fund raising activities in Luanshya\(^2\) whilst the outstanding urban war effort was that of the Nkana-Kitwe War Fund Committee which at the end of 1944 had collected over £ 3,000.\(^3\)

African participation in the war effort did not always have quite the 'moral value' that Franklin anticipated. Africans were becoming increasingly vocal in the pages of Mutende on the subject of racial discrimination. The Central Province Public Opinion Report for March 1943 reported that one argument that was repeatedly advanced by 'the more advanced Africans' in Lusaka was:

> that both Europeans and Africans are fighting this war for the same cause and they therefore fail to see why Africans should be discriminated against.\(^4\)

Mutende explained very carefully any situation likely to cause political unrest. Some of the delicate

\(^1\) NAZ/SEC 3/134, 'Notes on Visit to Copperbelt, 24 March to 1 April', Franklin, 5 April 1943.

\(^2\) Mutende No. 143, 1 July 1943, 8.

\(^3\) Mutende No. 186, 22 Feb. 1945, 8.

\(^4\) NAZ/SEC 1/1770.
situations that arose included the rise in prices, food shortages, the Eastern Province land question, the 1940 Copperbelt strike and, at the close of the war, the abdication of the Lozi Paramount Chief. When recruiting for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment started volunteers were very slow in coming forward. The administration was particularly concerned about the apathetic response in the Fort Jameson (Chipata) region, an area renowned for producing good soldier material. The root of the problem emerged as discontent over land. Africans had been displaced from their land, which had been acquired by the North Charterland Exploration Company, and put into reserves which were becoming increasingly crowded. The P.C. for the Province reported that:

...A Chewa Chief in the presence of five officials and some hundreds of Africans had said that the view of the people, although not his own, was that they were asked to fight for their land, but in fact what was meant was not their land but the Charterland.

The P.C. hinted that there could be riots and urged that steps that were being taken to come to an agreement with the North Charterland Company should be well publicised.¹

This was duly done in the form of leaflets, a film New Lands For Old and explanations in Mutende. Mutende

of March 1941 announced that:

the North Charterland Company had agreed to the Government's suggestion that a Committee should be set up to hear the words of the Company and the Government and decide how much the Government should pay to the Charterland Company for the land it wanted to add to the reserves. The Government and the Charterland will then accept the decision of this Committee.¹

Mutende of April 1940 carried on page one a banner headline, 'The Truth About the Troubles at Nkana and Mufulira'. Following on a strike by European miners, African miners had gone on strike at Nkana and Mufulira in protest against their abysmally low wages. At Nkana the strike ended in tragedy when soldiers opened fire on rioters killing sixteen people and wounding sixty-five others. The 'truth' as told by Mutende was that while soldiers and police were trying to keep order at the Compound Office, they were stoned by the crowd. The police retaliated with tear gas which 'does no harm - it just prevents a man from seeing clearly for a little while'. When the gas failed to quell the riot, continued Mutende, the soldiers as a last resort opened fire in self-defence.²

It is not possible to say with any certainty what effect Mutende's explanation had. But indirect evidence that many Africans were not in sympathy with the strikers

1. Mutende No. 83, 13 March 1941, 8.
2. Mutende No. 59, 11 April 1940, 1.
comes from the Information Office Progress Report of May 1940:

Letters continue to be received by Mutende from Africans in many parts of the country accusing the African strikers on the Copperbelt of stupidity and disloyalty. They are not being published as these and all comment on the strike must be withheld at least until after the Commission of Enquiry has reported.¹

The Lozi Paramount Chief Yeta was paralysed in early 1939 and lost the power of speech. As a result his first wife Moyoo became extremely influential in Barotse politics and aroused 'suspicion and resentment alike in the Kuta and outside it'.² The administration decided that the only remedy was for Yeta to abdicate. Mutende handled the abdication with great circumspection. In July 1945 Mutende had a 'Special Supplement on the Abdication of Chief Yeta III'. This included a declaration from Yeta, tributes from the Secretary for Native Affairs and Gordon Reid, a former P.C. in Barotseland, a message from the Colonial Secretary and an article on 'The Barotse Nation and Its Paramount' by Dr. Max Gluckman³ which

¹ ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 13, May 1940, 136.


³ Gluckman was then Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and engaged in anthropological research among the Lozi.
provided an historical justification for the abdication:

This is the third time in Malozi history that a paramount has got old or ill, for we have seen that Ngombala was helped by two grandsons and Mulambwa by his son at the end of their long reigns. This time a Committee of Commoners will direct affairs till the new paramount is appointed. ¹

In 1939 Mutende was officially described as 'non-political', ² which in the Northern Rhodesia context meant that Africans were not permitted to discuss politics in its pages. One reason given for this was that the paper was a government paper run by civil servants. But the most important reason as Franklin explained in his memoirs was that it would have enraged white miners and politicians.³

The first direct evidence of Mutende refusing to publish a political letter comes from early 1942. The letter which was about amalgamation was written by Harry Nkumbula who was later to succeed Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika as President of the African National Congress. Nkumbula's opening salvo was 'We in Northern Rhodesia loathe the idea of amalgamating Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia, which is dominated by Europeans'. He then demanded to know:

Why is it that some Southern and Northern white settlers are worrying the Empire about Amalgamation at this critical hour of its unbroken history?

¹. Mutende No. 196, 12 July 1945, 2.
³. Franklin, The Flag-Wagger, 170
Nkumbula thought they 'should be told that they can be of more value to the Empire if they concentrate their time on war efforts'. He also demanded to know why 'some white people say that "NATIVE" opinion should not be considered?'. His most contentious remark was that 'the stumbling blocks to our progress' were the 'many white people who PRETEND to know and understand all about the Bantu'.

The letter received sympathetic consideration from T. F. Sandford who like Bradley thought that at least some of the letter should be published for the sake of the paper's reputation. Africans criticised Mutende for not allowing them freedom of expression; not to publish would damage the reputation of the paper. He sensibly pointed out that it was often said that Africans did not have any opinions 'worth considering' but the real issue was that they did not have the means to bring their views to the attention of the public. 'Publication of this letter would at least encourage the African to have views and to express them.' The letter, however, was not published. The Governor conceded that 'in ordinary circumstances I would consider the withholding of publication of such a letter to be a mistake'. But he based his decision against publication on the fact that the British government had ruled that the question of amalgamation should not 'receive consideration in

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, original letter, an enclosure in Bradley to SNA, 19 Feb. 1942.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, Sandford, minute, 3 March 1942.
present circumstances'.1 Despite the Governor Nkumbula did manage to get a platform for part of his views. An extract from the early part of the letter which also included reference to Nyasaland appeared in the Bantu Mirror of 17 January 1942 co-signed by Nkumbula and Kanje M'hang' of Nyasaland.²

In November 1942 Franklin suggested that the P.C.s' Conference should discuss the question of Mutende adopting a 'bolder policy'.³ Gore-Browne made reference to the Bantu Mirror 'and suggested that Mutende should publish some of the more critical and controversial letters received'.⁴ The Conference was sympathetic. It was decided that there should be a relaxation in editorial policy and 'the paper would not be quite so conservative and would take a more open line'.⁵

The more relaxed policy was put to the test in 1943 when Mutende received another letter from Nkumbula. The letter infuriated Sanford: 'it contains statements which are quite unfounded and are almost, if not quite subversive'. It made him wonder whether Nkumbula was 'quite so straight as he appeared to be'.⁶ The letter was

2. Bantu Mirror, 5.
3. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, Franklin, 'Note for Provincial Commissioners' Conference on Information Office's Services to Africans', 9 Nov. 1942.
4. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, extract from minutes of Provincial Commissioners' Conference Lusaka, 17 to 21 Nov. 1942.
5. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, Luanshya Management Board, extract from minutes of meeting of 7 December 1942.
not published in the original. It appeared in drastically altered form, and then only in the vernaculars. The Nyanja title was 'Ncito Ya Ma-Africa Ophunzira' (The Role of the Educated African). In this emasculated version the offending passages were refuted by Franklin. Nkumbula was not mentioned by name. The author emerged as a misguided Copperbelt school teacher who needed thought correction. (Naturally, this editorial license did not please Nkumbula.) The misguided author, the article pointed out, was not playing the role government expected of an educated African. 'It is the role of the educated African to lead his less educated brethren. African school-masters and pastors must be careful in such matters. If they don't know what is true, they should learn it rather than to go and twist the minds of their friends and misdirect them'.

Nkumbula's argument was that Europeans covetous of the wealth of Africa had seized part of the continent and reduced its inhabitants to slavery. They had given Africans the impression that they were Gods whom Africans were expected to serve forever. The new rulers despised African customs and religion and did not wish them to be followed. Franklin counter-attacked, arguing that the British had come at great cost and hardship to free Africans from slavery. Livingstone had given his life to help Africans and to help stop the Arab slave trade.

Europeans had not extracted wealth from Africa; rather they had brought wealth. 'If it were not so, would the writer have found such a good work in an African School in the Copperbelt?'. Franklin conceded 'that in a few areas there was not enough land for Africans, but at this very time the Government is trying to find what could be done for these people and their land'. Africans were not forced to work for Europeans, nor were they being conscripted into the army as were Europeans. Franklin denied that the British had only contempt for African religion and custom. Only certain aspects were discouraged as they were considered 'bad'. Examples he cited were witchcraft, the poison ordeal and the loss of an arm for theft. Native Authorities were permitted to judge according to African customary law where it was not repugnant to British justice. The article concluded, 'The writer of this letter wants to be one of the leaders, but first he must learn many things himself before he can truly lead his brethren'.

In 1943 the Northern Rhodesia government introduced African Regional Councils, later called Provincial Councils. These Councils were only advisory bodies and were designed to channel African political aspirations into government-controlled organizations both to forestall independent African political activity and to give Africans some political training under the supervision of colonial officials. The question of how Mutende was to report on these Councils was the subject of some discussion at the
Secretariat. One result of Mutende's coverage of these meetings was to put amalgamation on the political agenda; it became a live issue in 1944.

After acting as chairman for the first meeting of the Regional Council for the Western Province held at Luanshya on 20 December 1943, the Western Province P.C., H. F. Cartmel-Robinson, wrote enthusiastically of the meeting to the Chief Secretary and recommended that 'a brief account' be given in Mutende. He mentioned that Core-Browne, the member nominated to represent African interests in the Leg. Co., who had attended the meeting, thought that the African opinion on amalgamation should be given in the press, presumably in Mutende. The Secretariat decided that a report of the meeting would provide a double opportunity. First, by printing complaints about such matters as shortages of goods African would feel they were being given the much desired 'freedom of criticism', and second, the answer to the complaints given at the meeting would provide an opportunity for government propaganda. Nevertheless the report would have to be carefully edited. Phillips, the Acting Chief Secretary, wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs:

You may deem that the majority resolution about separate shops should not appear at all, the 'amalgamation' resolution could hardly be printed as a bare resolution nor could Nkumbula's speech be printed in full and there are other matters which would have to be dealt with carefully if at all.


2. NAZ/SEC 2/226, Acting Chief Sec. to SNA, 7 Jan. 1944.

3. Ibid.
Mutende of February 1944 devoted a full page to the first Regional Council Meeting. Government propaganda included reasons for high prices and shortages and, in response to a question by Nkumbula, a statement that government did not think Africans were ready for Trade Unions. The majority resolution in favour of separate shops was printed, as was Nkumbula's reason for dissenting: 'it would increase the colour bar'. Nkumbula and A. Musonda were reported as having asked for Mutende to be removed from government control but they were outnumbered by the rural delegates who preferred the status quo. Nkumbula's speech on amalgamation was not printed but the resolution rejecting amalgamation appeared together with a summary of the reasons given for this decision. The amalgamation section concluded:

All the delegates were opposed to amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and they said that they represented the opinion of all Northern Rhodesia Africans.

Thereafter the Councils received considerable coverage and to increase the space available a smaller type-face was sometimes used. When coverage lapsed early in 1945 Gore-Browne brought the matter up in the Leg. Co. Hudson could not give a reason for the omission but the matter was immediately put right and extensive coverage was subsequently given.

1. Mutende, No. 159, 10 Feb. 1944, 8.
2. Leg. Co. Debates, 4 July 1945, c. 430.
The resolution on amalgamation had repercussions in the pages of Mutende and also in the Northern News and the Bantu Mirror. Mutende of April 1944 published a long letter on 'Amalgamation and Copper' written by one of the delegates to the first Regional Council at Luanshya, D. L. Yamba. Publication of this letter shows that Mutende had relaxed the ban on the discussion of amalgamation in its pages. The editor added as a footnote: 'At the request of the writer who says he speaks from his heart this article is being printed exactly as sent to us'.

Yamba was answering an article which had appeared in the Northern News of 22 March 1944. The European writer urged the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias to get rid of the country's dependency on the C.O. which he likened to a state of 'servitude'. Yamba commented that if the British government had delivered anyone in Northern Rhodesia into servitude it was not the European but the African. He then sharply attacked the writer for saying that the resolution opposing amalgamation passed at the Regional Council meeting did not represent the views of all Africans and that reasons given for the opposition

1. Mutende No. 164, 20 April 1944, 8.

2. A letter attacking the same Northern News article also appeared in the Bantu Mirror of 22 April 1944. The writer was L. B. K. Ng'ambi.
were 'vague':

I am sure that you had collected these informations from your own house-boys or other people under your personal supervision. These men had told you lies, they were only afraid that if they told you the truth they might be discharged from your employment or gang. Truly and very true the Delegates at the Regional Council spoke on behalf of every tribe living in Northern Rhodesia...

In Mutende of May 1944 Moses K. Mubitana wrote in to 'endorse' Yamba's case, pointing out that many Africans had based their rejection of amalgamation on first hand experience of the native policy of Southern Rhodesia. They had lived and worked there.¹

The opening of Mutende's pages to correspondence on amalgamation brought Mutende under the scrutiny of Roy Welensky. In May 1944 he spoke 'in a very serious vein' in the Leg. Co. He had noted the appearance of the African point of view on amalgamation in Mutende and wanted to know 'whether it is Government's policy to refuse the right to reply to any person who might care to do so?'² The Acting Chief Secretary for Native Affairs, H. F. Cartmel-Robinson replied that Mutende 'was primarily designed for Africans and personally I would not like to see bickering going on between Africans and Europeans in the paper'.³ He pointed out that Africans 'have at the back of their minds that there should be freedom of

1. Mutende No. 166, 18 May 1944, 3.
3. Ibid.
speech and freedom of the Press and they think they have just as much right to express their ideas as we have'. Welensky conceded that Africans should have the right to express their views but still thought that Mutende's columns should be open to anyone. However, when Cartmel-Robinson pointed out that Africans had said they were not permitted to answer European letters in the press and that therefore Europeans should not complain if Mutende did not publish their letters, Welensky decided to drop the matter.

Another subject which gained considerable publicity through Mutende's reports on the proceedings of the Regional and Leg. Co.s was the mounting African antagonism to racial discrimination, particularly in its economic and commercial manifestations. Mutende of July 1945 told readers of the speech Sir Stewart Gore-Browne made in the Leg. Co. in which he had spoken of African concern about the number of Indians who were coming into the country and getting control of much of the trade whilst the government did nothing to help the Africans to resist this take-over. Gore-Browne also spoke of 'Africans being treated badly on railways and in shops...'.

Mutende failed in its attempt to convince some African leaders that Africans were not discriminated against in urban trading. An article in Mutende of April 1945 sought to convince Africans that government did not

1. Mutende No. 197, 26 July 1945, 8.
discriminate in the allocation of trading sites:

Government does not distinguish between people, but only between different kinds of trade. Shops which deal in European goods are placed in one part of the town known as the 1st class trading zone. Shops dealing in African goods are sited in another part of the town known as the 2nd class trading zone.

The article went on to point out that Africans had neither the experience to deal in European goods nor the money to build a shop in the 2nd class zone.¹

This explanation was not accepted by Western Province Regional Council delegates Dauti Yamba and Adam Frog whose opinions were recorded in the Chairman's Report of the Third Meeting of the Council which appeared in Mutende of July 1945. Yamba considered the question of African trading in urban areas 'the most important yet discussed at a Provincial Council meeting'. He rejected the editor's explanation in Mutende as 'begging the question' and declared that 'Africans were tired of being the servants of Europeans and Indians'. Adam Frog said that he did not care what 'excuses' Mutende made; 'Africans believed that the Government was against Africans having their own businesses'.²

Mutende policy can be judged not only by its content but also by what it left out. Conspicuous by its absence was that emphasis on the 'Atlantic Charter' and 'The New World Order' so frequently discussed in other

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1. Mutende No. 189, 5 April 1945, 1. A similar article was placed in the African Weekly, 25 April 1945, 4.
2. Mutende No. 196, 12 July 1945, 3.
newspapers of the period. The *Bantu Mirror* ran a leader on 'The New Order' in its issue of 15 November 1941. The leader noted that 'In almost every newspaper or magazine one sees reference to the New World Order'. From 1941 onwards the subject was frequently featured in the pages of the *Bantu Mirror* in leaders, letters and articles. The editor warned Africans not to expect too much from the Atlantic Charter as 'equal opportunities for all are more readily adopted in those countries without a race problem than in those where this problem is acute'. However, the editor saw fit to print, in ten issues of the paper beginning in January 1943, reviews of ten chapters from *The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint* by the Committee on Africa, The War and Peace Aims. When the Southern Rhodesian Minister for Native Affairs announced in Parliament that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Africans, the *Bantu Mirror* loudly proclaimed its disappointment. The post-mortem in the opinion pages included contributions


2. (New York, 1942). This Committee was set up on the initiative of officers of the Phelps-Stokes fund with the intention of 'focussing...public attention on the wise, just and adequate treatment of Africa and Africans by the Peace Conference and the Colonial Powers'; it was composed of missionaries, educators, sociologists and others with an interest in Africa plus members of international foundations and committees. The Committee felt that as the U.S. 'had no territorial interests in Africa' an American committee was peculiarly fitted to act as a watch-dog on behalf of the African interest. See 'Prefatory Note' to *The Atlantic Charter and Africa*, vii-xi.
from Northern Rhodesian Africans. 1

One was Shadreck J. Soko who wrote to the Bantu Mirror of 25 March 1944 to say that he considered the Atlantic Charter one of the 'most important events during these dark times' and insisted that it did include Africans as articles III and VIII spoke of 'all the peoples' and 'all the nations'. 2 In the Bantu Mirror of 1 July 1944, Nkumbula linked the question of amalgamation with the Atlantic Charter. He referred to the third clause of the Charter that spoke of the 'right of ALL people to choose the form of governments under which they will live' and the 'wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them'. Nkumbula stressed that Northern Rhodesia was a Protectorate where African interests should take precedence in contrast to Southern Rhodesia which was a white man's country. 'No graver mistake could be made if the Dominions' Office [sic] decided to hand over Northern Rhodesia to a self-governing state such as Southern Rhodesia...'. He concluded by insisting that the third clause of the Atlantic Charter 'must always be referred to'. 3

Another issue which received substantial and

1. Further evidence of the interest of some Northern Rhodesian Africans in 'the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and the struggle to liberate small nations' comes from The Elites of Barotseland, 159.

2. Bantu Mirror, 1.

favourable publicity in the Bantu Mirror was the establishment of the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) in 1944. The Northern Rhodesian administration had founded the African Provincial Councils to forestall such independent political activity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Nyasaland venture was allowed to pass almost unnoticed in Mutende. By contrast the Bantu Mirror gave comprehensive coverage in two issues of November and December 1944 to the first meeting of the NAC and the speech of its President General, Levi Mumba.

Despite Mutende's lack of interest in the NAC, R. S. Hudson noted in January 1945 that Northern Rhodesian Africans were 'becoming more and more politically conscious' and that 'considerable interest is being shown in the new Nyasaland Congress'. Two Northern Rhodesian readers of the Bantu Mirror appear to have been inspired by the Nyasaland example to suggest that Northern Rhodesian Africans might also form a congress. In the Bantu Mirror of 3 November 1945 Jones A. Mzaza of Ndola, who considered that the Bantu Mirror was a paper 'where Africans express their opinions freely' wrote in to 'commend Mr. A. Mwale of Fort Jameson' who suggests the formation of an African Congress in Northern Rhodesia'. Mzaza looked to the educated to take the lead. 'Northern Rhodesia without an

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African National Congress is like a large garden with different kinds of green plants, without flowers'. In explaining his imagery he likened the 'green plants' to the 'educated men', whilst the flowers would be the successes they achieved in the service of their people.1

In 1944 the owners of the Bantu Press newspaper chain, the Paver Brothers, put in a bid for Mutende. We have seen that the two Bantu Press papers in Southern Rhodesia, the Bantu Mirror and the African Weekly allowed more freedom of expression than did Mutende, after all they did have to make a profit. But they were by no means radical. Though the papers were usually edited by Africans they had European managers. A disenchanted former editor of the African Weekly, B. J. Mnyanda, described these editors as 'impotent' and 'mere copywriters'.2 In his offer for Mutende B. G. Paver assured the Northern Rhodesian administration that he worked 'in the closest possible co-operation with Government'.3 (Indeed, in South Africa during the war Paver had 'been entrusted with the propaganda work' of the Native Affairs Department.)

In a submission to the Chief Secretary on the subject of the 'Proposal that "Mutende" be taken over by the Bantu Press', Franklin first declared that it was 'a

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2. B. J. Mnyanda, In Search of Truth (Bombay, 1954), 120.
4. INF 1/546, J. D. Bold, 'Memorandum, Unity Truth Service', 12 June 1940.
generally accepted principle that the Press should not be Government controlled' then proceeded to argue why Mutende should be an exception. He conceded that Mutende had long been under fire from some educated and mainly urban Africans because it was a creature of government but he opined that they were in a minority. Franklin went on to guess, though he could not 'say with any certainty...that there might be a large majority of the simpler folk who would prefer the paper to be run by Government'. He then expressed the fear that if Mutende went commercial the interests of the rural African would be neglected in favour of the urban, for the Bantu Press papers tended to cater for the urban 'intelligentsia'. He thought such a situation would be out of harmony with the current trend in colonial policy:

Authoritative records of African Colonial Administration and recent pronouncements by the Secretary of State direct our attention to the obvious danger of neglecting the education (in the broad sense) of the rural African and concentrating too much on the minority of educated and urbanised Africans.¹

The P.C.s' Conference accepted Franklin's views and it was decided that Mutende should remain in government hands, at least until after the war. As a compromise it was proposed that the circulation of the African Weekly should be encouraged especially amongst the intelligentsia in industrial areas.²

1. CO 795/135/45392, Franklin to Chief Sec., 22 July 1944.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1133, extract from minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Conference, 1944.
Noel Sabine, Public Relations Officer at the C.O., professed himself well satisfied with this outcome. He had minuted that he 'would not even consider at this stage handing it over to any other organisation'. Apart from 'keeping literacy alive' Mutende was too valuable to the government both as 'a "public relations" channel' and as a 'propaganda medium'.1

In discussing the question of the impact of Mutende during the war, the first fact to be noted is that the readership was much larger than it had been before the war. Circulation rose dramatically. It was approximately 5,600 just before the outbreak of the war and by April 1940 had reached 8,500. Between 1 July 1942 and 30 June 1943 it rose from 11,940 to 14,1332 and in 1944 peaked at 18,000.3 In that year its circulation was three times greater than the Southern Rhodesian African papers and very much greater than any of the African papers in South Africa all of which were owned by the Bantu Press. At the end of 1945 the Secretary for Native Affairs, R. S. Hudson was euphoric, '...its circulation graph has risen in a majestic curve to be lost in the heights of unchallengeable success'.4 Then it must be taken into

account that the readership would not have been just a bare 18,000. Each newspaper bought was estimated to reach ten people; some of these would have been illiterate villagers who had the paper read to them under the Village Reader Scheme begun in October 1940. Therefore, one could hazard a rough estimate that out of a war-time population of about one and a half million about 180,000 Africans were being reached by Mutende. A fraction of the total population it might be but that is typical of newspaper circulation in black Africa both then and now. However, the leaders, both traditional and modern, were being reached. Native Authorities were issued with free copies throughout the war in order that chiefs might keep in touch with events. And the educated, the new opinion leaders, men like Dauti Yamba, Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika and Harry Nkumbula, contributed letters and articles and featured prominently in the prize lists of Mutende essay competitions.

Undoubtedly Mutende's impact was limited by the language factor. With only Lozi, Tonga, Bemba and Nyanja being used apart from English, many language groups were bound to be excluded. In 1943 the D.C. in Isoka District reported that there were no sales in his district because none 'of the many languages spoken... are printed in Mutende'. And many Lamba and Ila had a

1. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office Progress Report No. 19, Nov. 1940.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, enclosure in P.C. Northern Province, Kasama, to Chief Sec. Lusaka, 4 Aug. 1943.
negative attitude to the paper because although Lamba was akin to Bemba and Ila to Tonga, local pride was hurt. These groups continued to agitate for their languages to be printed in Mutende. At the second meeting of the Southern Province African Provincial Council at Namwala in June 1945 an Ila spokesman expressed the fear that the Ila language would die out or be forgotten in fifty years.\(^1\) Chief Chongo argued at the same meeting that 'If a man reads in his own languages, he understands what he is reading better than if he reads in a language which he sees is more or less like his own but is not'.\(^2\) Another comprehension problem was that some material in the paper was often a literal translation from the English instead of an idiomatic approximation. The result was often 'sheer nonsense which can only be unravelled by an African who happens to be used to English methods of expression and constructions'.\(^3\)

Some areas reported poor sales because of low literacy. For example the D.C. at Mkushi blamed poor sales on lack of education in his district. He compared his area with the Northern Province where the White Fathers had been active for forty years.\(^4\) In some of

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1. NAZ/SEC 2/228, 14 and 15 June, 24.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
his chief's areas no one could read or write except the court clerk. His report also indicated that sales figures can be deceptive. In December he reported average monthly sales as being 5½ copies but 'I do not believe that more than one copy out of six is read, the others being used to make cigarettes...'. Another factor which kept down readership and therefore lessened the impact of the paper was poverty. In 1943 the D.C. in Chinsali reported that 'a newspaper is a luxury even to many who can read'. In Sesheke, a district of 26,000 Africans the majority of whom had 'plenty of money' according to the D.C., sales were not more than twelve. He considered that not only had the paper failed to arouse the interest of the people, but also there was a suspicion of Mutende as a medium of government propaganda.

The veracity of Mutende was suspect too. The D.C. at Kushi reported that he had been told 'it was all lies printed in Mutende'. R. Phillpot, a Labour Officer at Livingstone, reported that at a meeting of Zambezi Saw Mills Tribal Representatives in September 1944 he was told that the reason why only about twelve copies were bought by the employees who numbered a thousand was that they 'didn't think Mutende told the truth'. Phillpot

1. Ibid.
added 'I have several times heard Lozi people use the expression, "You lie like Mutende"'.

In 1944 C. G. Stevens claimed that the belief that Mutende did not tell the truth was 'probably' confined to 'a small minority of urban intelligentsia'. Pertinent here is an observation made by Captain A. Dickson who toured Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with the East Africa Command Mobile Propaganda Unit from July 1943 to January 1944. He found that 'nearly all educated Africans' were convinced that 'Secret News' of the war was concealed from Africans, 'real news is kept only for the Whites'.

There is, possibly, a danger of making too much of these related points and implying that they were somehow unique to the colonial situation. On point one, hearty scepticism about newspapers is quite catholic - 'You cannot believe what you read in the papers'. On point two, Dickson himself noted that criticisms of a similar kind were 'levelled at the Ministry of Information at various times during the war' by people in Britain.

In conclusion, it is clear that war propaganda had a politicising effect on the African population of Northern Rhodesia; it gave the educated vanguard an insight into and a perspective on their own colonial situation. We have seen the boomerang effect of the MOI's

2. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, Stevens to SNA, 9 Aug. 1944.
3. Dickson, 'Tour of the East Africa Command Mobile Propaganda Unit', March 1944.
4. Ibid.
German enslavement propaganda; how the 'This War Is Your War Too' campaign theme only served to make Africans more conscious of racial discrimination at home; and how the publicising of the Atlantic Charter quickened African expectations about their own political future. The war period saw the emergence of articulate African opinion leaders like Nkumbula and Yamba who, in the process of writing to Mutende and the Bantu Mirror and having their opinions recorded and published in reports of Provincial Council meetings, were establishing national reputations for themselves. A coherent African public opinion was emerging on such fundamental issues as amalgamation and racial discrimination. Making issues public has a legitimising effect.

The administration continued to be trapped in the free speech dilemma, on the one hand wanting Africans to have opinions and express them freely in print, and, on the other, attempting to muzzle Nkumbula when his opinions were not to the administration's liking. The dilemma was not only inevitable but compounded by the heterogeneous nature of the press in Northern Rhodesia. The paternalist government newspaper Mutende, dispensing propaganda and guidance to its Africa charges co-existed with the commercial European newspapers which were playing a traditional role of the press in a free society in a western democracy - that of a watchdog protecting the people against an overweening government and bureaucracy. (In Northern Rhodesia the 'people' were, of course, the
white settlers. ) Inevitably this had a formative influence on the African attitude to the role of the press.

It is clear that during the war the Africans were becoming a political force to be reckoned with. We have Welensky demanding the right of reply in Mutende to African opinion on the amalgamation question and we have colonial rule on trial in the pages of Mutende when the editor replied to Nkumbula's critique of the British government's colonial record. In effect, the administration had opened a political dialogue with the African population. This was an implicit recognition of the need to take cognisance of African opinion, the need for the 'engineering of consent'. It represents a recognition, however implicit and however slight, of the doctrine of popular sovereignty - that government, in the last resort, must rest on the consent of the governed. A later disregard for this principle led to the ill-fated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

(b) African Literature Committee

During the war the African Literature Committee continued to operate from the Copperbelt on a voluntary basis. The volume of its work increased enormously. 'The number of copies of publications' sponsored by the Committee increased from 3,000 in 1939 to 21,000 by 1944. In 1945 the grant from the African Education Department was £1,000. The booklets were in the

1. Bernays, 'The Engineering of Consent', 113-120.
2. Leg. Co. Debates, 29 Nov. 1945, cc. 142-143.
simplified English recommended by the African Education Department or one of the four vernaculars: Bemba, Nyanja, Lozi and Tonga, though the Committee were willing to produce books in other vernaculars if a good case could be presented. More books appeared in Bemba than any other local language because of the demand. There was also a large demand for Nyanja booklets but as this language was also spoken in Nyasaland, many Nyanja publications were purchased in bulk from the Nyasaland Education Department.

Army authorities found that the demand out ran the supply and appeals were made by the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and East Africa Command to the Committee for help. The Committee responded by introducing the Lubuto series especially for African troops though more copies were made available for civilians. This insatiable demand can partly be attributed to the education policy of the army which ran adult education, English and literacy classes. W. C. Little referred to the army as an 'extra-mural university'.¹ He wrote of the great demand for books among the forces overseas and how the African troops had carried them around during the Burma

¹. Little, 'An African Library "In Action"', Books For Africa, 18, 1 (1947), 8. Little, who served with the East African Artillery Regiment, lived in Northern Rhodesia. When on leave in 1944 he obtained about 200 books for the African troops: 'three-quarters in English and the rest in Swahili, with a few in Bemba and Nyanja'.

campaign. He found:

The most popular books were those on learning English, and those which gave instructions in the ways of African life. Only the best educated signallers were interested in story-books. Without doubt the Number One favourite was Care of Children...

Not all the literature being read by the African troops met with the approval of Colonel Rossiter of the Education and Welfare Branch of East African Command. His views, which anticipate the thesis of *The Achieving Society*, were put to the Committee by Hope Hay. Rossiter considered:

that a great deal of the British character is based on the reading in early youth of stories such as appeared in the Boys' Own Paper about men who whilst not particularly saintly, always do 'the right thing' when it comes to the point. Kalulu the Hare, on the other hand, was not regarded as a very good influence in East Africa Command.

The Committee thought that stories about Scott (the British Antarctic explorer) or perhaps heroes of the war might be translated into the vernaculars to give Africans a more heroic image on which to model themselves. An African member of the Committee, A. Tawe, a Copperbelt school teacher, was provoked to remark that 'Africans are not without stories of bravery... citations for V.C.'s and other

1. Ibid.
3. In 1945 a small mass literacy experiment was launched at Mindolo in Kitwe on the Copperbelt under the direction of Hope Hay. See pp. 267-268.
military awards were read with interest in newspapers'.¹ The Committee decided that it was their moral duty 'to pass on to Africans the bases (especially the Greek and Roman bases) of our ordinary ideals and practices'.²

The Secretary for Native Affairs, T. F. Sandford, kept a vigilant eye on the African membership of the Committee and in 1941 he blackballed Godwin Mbikusita. He listed three objections: Mbikusita 'had an extremely off-hand manner with Europeans'; he had been less than honest when he had been employed by the Public Works' Department; and his appointment might offend the Barotse kuta (advisory council of the Paramount Chief) as Mbikusita had been out of favour there since his return from the United Kingdom where he had accompanied the Lozi Paramount Chief to the coronation.³ The Committee were not impressed with Sandford's objections. A. T. Williams, the alternate chairman, recorded, with tongue in cheek, that whilst 'a hardened criminal or a moral pervert' would not be an acceptable member of the Committee, Mbikusita was eminently suitable. He had 'considerable literary ability and reviews of manuscripts submitted to the committee which he has produced could almost be classed as scholarly works'.⁴ But Sandford was adamant. It was not until 1944, when H. F. Cartmel-Robinson had

1. Ibid.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1140, Minutes of the 62nd Meeting of the African Literature Committee, 22 June 1945.
become Secretary for Native Affairs, that Mbikusita was finally permitted to become a member of the Committee after the P.C. for Western Province, R. S. Hudson, had written in support of his candidature.¹

The question of the relationship of the African Literature Committee to the new Information Office came up in 1940. First, in June 1940 the Chief Secretary rejected a proposal that the Committee should come under the direction of the Information Office.² A feeling began to emerge that information, propaganda and literature were not compatible bedfellows. Warily and with some misgiving, the Committee agreed to collaborate with the Information Office in the production of vernacular pamphlets containing war propaganda. But when this was extended to include recruiting pamphlets there were objections from members including A. Williams, the D.C. at Kitwe, and the Rev. A. J. Cross. They argued that the association of the Committee with recruiting would destroy the confidence of Africans in the work of the organization. It would become 'suspect in the eyes of the native'.³ The Information Office respected the views of the Committee and other arrangements were made for the printing of recruiting pamphlets. In March 1941 the arrangement for the printing of other pamphlets on

¹. NAZ/SEC 2/1139, Hudson to Cartmel-Robinson, 10 June 1944.
². NAZ/SEC 2/1139, Franklin for Chief Sec. to Dir. Native Education, 19 June 1940.
³. NAZ/SEC 2/1139, Bradley to Sec. of African Literature Committee, 13 Nov. 1940.
behalf of the Information Office by the Committee was also terminated. G. H. Wilson, Director of the Publications Bureau of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (which replaced the African Literature Committee in 1948), later paid tribute to the Rev. Cross for his 'preservation throughout the war of a continuous liberal policy'.

We have here a curious but revealing use of the word 'liberal'. Both the recruiting pamphlets and the literature circulated by the African Literature Committee were purveying propaganda. They differed in style and type. The recruiting pamphlet was of the short-term, cut-and-thrust variety of propaganda, seeking immediate results. The work of the Committee had long-term aims, the propaganda was of the 'steady-drip' variety; it was basically engaged in political socialisation - the remaking of man in Africa - according to a mould thought desirable by missionaries and C.O. officials. C.O. and MoI propagandists had recognized that adult education was a form of propaganda particularly in a colonial context where there was a parent/child relationship between the government and the governed, and where the guardian was responsible for the colonial subject's 'entire view of life including his attitude to his own


domestic affairs'. What was so 'liberal' about the Committee's policy of dissociating itself from the colony's recruiting propaganda? (Liberal is obviously used here as a word of approbation.) The scruples of the African Literature Committee were, after all, only based on expediency; they were only dissociating themselves from recruiting propaganda because they thought such an association might make Africans suspicious of their own variety.

The relatively tolerant attitude that had been displayed towards the Watch Tower and its European representative in the years following the 1935 strike disappeared soon after the beginning of the war. The Northern Rhodesian administration first toyed with the idea of having the society declared illegal and then compromised in 1941 by banning the possession of Watch Tower literature. Several factors contributed to the hostile attitude adopted by the administration. Although there was not even a marginal association between the strike by African miners on the Copperbelt in 1940 and the Watch Tower, nevertheless memories of the Watch Tower's supposed connection with the 1935 strike may have had an unnerving effect on the administration. In defending the action of his administration to the C.O., the Acting Governor, W. M. Logan, reported that the

1. Sabine defined propaganda as a fusion of social information, adult education and cultural expression... See p. 129.

2. CO 323/1824/2607/1, Acting Gov. to Lord Moyne, S/S, 25 April 1941.
pacifist beliefs of the society were having an adverse
effect on recruiting in some rural areas and that members
of the society were spreading false rumours one of which
was that a German victory would mean the abolition of
taxation, the return of land held by Europeans to Africans,
and better educational opportunities for African children.
Finally, the Governor commented on the 'subversive'
content of the society's literature. He cited such
Watch Tower publications as Fascism or Freedom and War and
Peace which he condemned for their 'pacifist propaganda'
and their attack on secular government and 'recognized
religions...in particular the Roman Catholic Church...
these attacks were likely to have a deleterious effect
upon the untutored minds of Africans, and result in the
spread of subversive doctrines'.1

Phillips, the society's European representative,
was jailed both for possessing illegal literature and
because the administration refused to accept his
conscientious objection to military call-up. There was
some consternation at the C.O. over the harshness of the
Northern Rhodesian administration's treatment of the
Watch Tower. There was considerable sympathy for Phillips'
position, and outrage at the way two African members of
the society were treated; they were imprisoned for
possession of Watch Tower literature and then on two
occasions given corporal punishment for refusing an order

1. Ibid.
to burn their books. In a strongly-worded letter to the new Governor, Sir John Waddington, the Secretary of State, Lord Moyne, described this as 'a flagrant case of religious persecution. There can be no excuse for ordering men to burn with their own hands books which in their eyes are sacred'.¹ The ban on the possession of Watch Tower literature persisted until 1946 and after that it remained subject to censorship.²

3. The Electronic Media

(a) Broadcasting

*Mutende* was the main means of getting war propaganda to the African population but the electronic media was also co-opted. Concern about rumours disturbing African miners on the Copperbelt and thus interrupting copper production - led ultimately to the setting up of a government broadcasting station to broadcast war news to Africans. Cartmel-Robinson, the Western Province P.C., shared the concern of the MOI planners about the importance of the Copperbelt as a propaganda target. Afraid of rumours upsetting African mineworkers he asked a European amateur radio 'ham' in Luanshya to establish a radio news service. Provincial tests were carried out by Charles Miller in early October from Station VQ 2CM

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1. CO 323/1824/2607/1, Moyne to Waddington, 8 Oct. 1941.

to the Mine Compound and Luanshya Township Location.1 Reception reports were considered sufficiently encouraging for broadcasting to start officially from the Luanshya station on 7 October 1939.2 By December 1939 there was also Station VQ 2HC operated at Nkana by another European radio enthusiast.3 Programmes were broadcast twice weekly in Bemba, Nyanja and Lozi. African announcers were used, and broadcasts also continued from the post office at Mongu. The programmes consisted of a news broadcast and a talk. The news was prepared by the newly-appointed government Information Officer in Lusaka. The talks explaining the war were written by A. Williams, the D.C. at Kitwe, his script being checked by the P.C.

The Mining Corporations fitted receiving sets and loud-speakers in the compounds at Chingola, Luanshya, Mufulira and Nkana. Elsewhere a start was made in equipping beer-halls, recreation centres, mission stations and bomas with communal sets. Europeans were asked to allow their African employees to listen in on the household set.

For the Northern Rhodesian administration and its new Information Office, the Copperbelt experiment was something of a trial-run. If the Copperbelt experimental

2. Ibid.
3. NAZ/SEC 1/1641, W. M. Logan, Chief Sec., to Malcolm MacDonald, S/S, 6 March 1940.
news service succeeded in its objective, 'the spreading of accurate information among the illiterate and ill informed masses', the Information Office had announced it would start its own government broadcasting station. As we have seen some thought it better 'to leave the slumbering masses in a state of happy ignorance of the war, its course and its causes'. One reason given was 'that more garbled accounts of war news can be spread abroad from inattentive listeners or by reason of bad radio reception than in any other way' and another 'that the natives in the industrial areas may become unsettled if their importance as workers in the essential base metals industry is too much harped upon...'.

It was not the practice to keep records of news bulletins, but one did happen to find its way into a Secretariat file (No. 42 of 10 June 1940); it gives us some indication of the Information Office's style and approach (which is reminiscent of the mad bull story in Mutende). It must be remembered that the Information Office was faced with the difficulty of explaining a complex and highly technological European war to a people who were largely illiterate. The bulletin began

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1. NAZ/SEC 1/1641, W. M. Logan to Malcolm MacDonald, S/S, 6 March 1940.

2. ZA/S 935/37/1, Northern Rhodesia Information Office, Progress Report No. 4, Acting Inform. Officer G. Howe, Nov. 1939.

3. See p. 175.
with news of the German war in France:

The Germans have for five days now been attacking in a battle which stretches from the sea to the German border - which is the same distance as from Lusaka to Ndola. Although Hitler has sent twice as many soldiers into this battle as there are people in Northern Rhodesia, he has not beaten the French and the British...

The second half of the broadcast consisted of Northern Rhodesian and district news and included this item:

Bwana Gore-Browne who speaks for Africans in the Legislative Council, promised the Bwana Governor that everyone in the country would work as hard as he could and do everything to help the Government in these difficult times.

From the mines came a cautionary tale about 'Two Africans at Luanshya' who had 'been sent to prison for telling other people lies about the war'. Listeners were warned against telling 'lies about the war' because they frightened people. They were told only to believe what they heard on the wireless and the 'true words' they read in Mutende. 'As you see, people who tell these lies are quickly punished.'

A similar tutelary, paternal style is found in this

1. NAZ/SEC 2/425, 'News Broadcast to Africans No. 42', the D.C. at Luanshya mentioned in a note that this particular broadcast had arrived late and changes had had to be made because some of the news was out of date - 27 June 1940.
example from one of William's explanatory talks:

The leaders of the British and French people have been working hard for the past year to try and persuade the leader of the German people to stop his bad custom of stealing other countries like a thief who beats people on the road with a stick and then takes their goods...¹

By 1940 the Northern Rhodesian administration seems to have been satisfied that these broadcasts were fulfilling their function of combating rumours and keeping the Copperbelt work force quiescent (though they did not prevent the second African Copperbelt strike which took place in April 1940). The broadcasts had been commented on favourably by Europeans in the Leg. Co. and it was decided that the Information Office should take over from the amateurs and run a small government station in Lusaka.² Kenneth Bradley considered that much of the credit for the establishment of government broadcasting in Northern Rhodesia should go to the 'District Officers and amateurs' for there had been so much 'apprehension that the dangers of broadcasting to Africans would outweigh its advantages' that perhaps if they 'had not taken the bull by the horns and just started broadcasting Government would never have come to the point of approving the scheme...'.³

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1. ZA/S 935/37/1, translation of a wireless talk sent to *Bantu Mirror*, 30 Jan. 1940.

2. The amateur stations were closed down in early 1942. See NAZ/SEC 3/85, R. Nicholson for Chief Sec. to PMG, 2 March 1942.

On 18 September 1940 Governor Maybin opened Z.Q.P. Lusaka, the new broadcasting station of the Northern Rhodesian government. An African drum provided the tuning in and interval signal. In his opening address the Governor emphasised the immediate political and administrative purpose the station would serve:

Our sole object in starting a local broadcasting service at this time is to make the contact between the Government and the people closer and to provide a quicker and more convenient method of letting you know what we are doing.

This particular use of broadcasting, providing an administration with a speedy channel of communication in the time of some national emergency, was first recognised in Britain during the General Strike of 1926, when the BBC news bulletin first came into prominence. After the strike it was widely believed that the BBC news had done much to dispel rumours and had had a steadying effect on public opinion, preventing the strike from reaching more serious proportions. In Northern Rhodesia the administration had finally been brought to the point of starting an official government broadcasting station not to enlighten, educate or entertain the populace but for what was essentially a political, and administrative purpose: to broadcast

1. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 36, 10 Sept. 1940.
news and deny rumours during a national emergency, the Second World War.

Initially the role of broadcasting in the war effort was conceived almost exclusively in urban and particularly Copperbelt terms, though broadcasts could be heard elsewhere. The broadcasts were seen as having less relevance for rural Africans who were not to be startled by too intensive war propaganda. When it was found that recruits were slow in coming forward for the Northern Rhodesian Regiment, there was a change of policy. In October 1940 it was decided to step up the flow of information into rural areas. Talks by returned African troops now became a popular radio feature. The Information Office's Newsletter of 10 December 1940 reported that a special and highly successful recruiting programme had been broadcast recently to the Lenje reserve. Timed to coincide with a recruiting campaign conducted by a D.O., the programme had included a 'pep talk' by a Sergeant Major, martial music and records of African war songs.

As part of this campaign to pump more information into rural areas the Information Officer sought to arrange for more communal radio sets to be made available, particularly at Native Authority centres. Their provision was delayed because of the difficulty of obtaining radio equipment in wartime but the prospect

1. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 49, 10 Dec. 1940.
caused E. Munday, O-in-C of the Kaonde-Lunda Province, the 'gravest concern'. He wrote, 'No set should be in the hands of any Native Authority unless it is controlled and worked by a Boma official, or Britisher, a Missionary, or Location Officer'. His alarm was unnecessary for it was never intended that the sets should be other than pre-set. As has been noted the idea that African listening had to be carefully controlled was strong in Northern Rhodesian government circles; the fear of Africans listening in to hostile foreign propaganda, perennial. A further example comes from this report of an interview held by Governor Waddington, in 1943, with representatives of the Fort Rosebery (Mansa) African Recreation Hall Committee who were about to buy a wireless:

His Excellency stressed the importance of an intelligent interpretation of what they heard on the wireless and warned them of the dangers of listening to enemy propaganda...it was essential that a responsible person should present when the wireless was on.

War propaganda talks were sometimes later published in Mutende and sometimes in other newspapers so it is possible, given the considerable evidence available, to identify the major war propaganda themes. Talks were sometimes given by European authority figures like the Governor and Secretary for Native Affairs, by the

Information Officer, by traditional chiefs and sometimes by African troops.

A talk over the Lusaka radio given by Chief Mwase Kasungu of Nyasaland soon after the opening of the station and reported in the Rhodesia Herald of 24 September 1940, is a pastiche of all the propaganda themes used by the Northern Rhodesian Information Office. Chief Mwase had just returned from a trip to England and was specifically brought to Lusaka to speak over the radio by the Northern Rhodesian administration. In his talk Chief Mwase spoke of the interview he had had with 'Mr. Malcolm MacDonald the then Bwana of the Government who looked after the British countries in Africa'. MacDonald had asked Chief Mwase to thank Africans for their war effort and:

I answered him that all our people of Africa would always stand strongly by the side of the English in time of peace and in time of trouble, because we all know that the war of our King and Government is also our war. I told him that in the old days the chiefs looked to the young men to fight for their country; in the same way the Government may now look to the young men.

Chief Mwase spoke of Hitler's racial discrimination and the contempt he had for Africans, 'We shall not forget that Hitler said it was wrong to educate Africans and that they were half apes'. He continued:

In the old days the chiefs knew that all the people would help to protect their country because the country belonged to all the people. In the same way the British Empire does not belong to the King alone but to everybody, white or black, who lives in the British Empire.
Chief Mwase concluded by referring to the 'harsh treatment' suffered by Africans in Tanganyika when that territory was under German rule.

Broadcast material was not exclusively concerned with the war. From the beginning music had been included to attract audiences. Increasing emphasis came to be placed on local news when it was found to be popular. In 1941 the Lusaka broadcasting station began a number of school broadcasts in co-operation with the Director of Native Education, though at this stage only 12 schools had radios. The war-time Information Officers, Bradley and Franklin, were particularly interested in the future use of radio for mass education. In March 1942 a start was made in the direction of using the radio for 'enlightenment', when a programme for educated Africans in simple English was introduced. It included talks, music, discussions, 'post-bag' and plays. 'As far as we know', wrote the Information Officer, 'we are pioneering in this particular field in this part of Africa'.

Despite the enthusiasm of the war-time Information Officers for the potentiality of broadcasting in mass education, the mood at the Lusaka Secretariat in 1945 was one of caution. Although a new studio had been

1. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 62, 11 March 1941.
2. NAZ/SEC 1/1769, K. Bradley to Chief Sec., 'Memorandum on the Need for the Conversion of Information Centres into Public Relations Departments after the War', 24 Dec. 1941.
3. ZA, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter No. 114, 10 March 1942.
opened in March 1945 and although the administration had originally taken over the task of broadcasting from the amateurs because it was believed the Copperbelt news bulletins were having a steadying effect on African public opinion, at the end of the war many officials were not convinced of the efficacy of the medium. In October 1945 the Northern Rhodesian Executive Council decided:

That there should be no expansion of broadcasting services until the effectiveness of this branch of the department's activities had been investigated and proved.¹

Two fundamental reasons why the broadcasting service for Africans had not proved itself an effective mass communications' channel during the war were; first, that too few Africans had access to radios and second, numerous technical troubles had interfered with transmission. Mostly they listened on communal sets; at the end of the war there were estimated to be 200 or 300 community receivers in welfare halls, and bomas throughout the country.² At most only twenty or thirty Africans could afford the luxury of owning their own personal radio.³ Community listening was the worst kind of listening; halls were crowded and noisy, the receivers rarely properly adjusted, the programme in each language did

1. NAZ/SEC 1/204, minutes of meeting of the Executive Council held on 18, 19 and 20 Oct. 1945.


not last longer than seven to ten minutes before there was a switch and the broadcast repeated in another language. As one official reported:

"When the novelty has worn off the average African is not interested enough to leave his hut in the evening and walk for possibly a mile for a five minute programme three times a week."¹

It was impossible to obtain adequate equipment or staff during war-time and the station was plagued with technical problems. The monthly Public Opinion Reports of the D.O.s which were sent to the Secretariat during the war years give a clear indication of the unsatisfactory nature of the service: transmitters were too weak to cover the whole country; in some areas transmission was always poor, in others it varied with the seasons; there were frequent breakdowns.² Batteries presented another problem, especially in rural areas: they were hard to obtain and to charge. All these factors help to explain the hesitancy in the Secretariat about the future of broadcasting. Those who had always argued that Africans did not want broadcasting and would never understand it, could not yet be proved wrong. In addition, white settler politicians and some officials continued to argue that Africans would listen to subversive foreign propaganda and cause revolutions.

¹. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, Acting P.C., Kaonde-Lunda Province to Chief Sec., 11 June 1943.
². NAZ files at SEC 1/1758; SEC 1/1170-1775.
In spite of this considerable opposition Franklin had the faith of the pioneer in the future of African broadcasting. The broadcasting service for Africans, he insisted, had not yet had a chance to prove itself. What was needed was 'a proper scheme for really efficient broadcasting and...the money to put it into effect'.¹ These two goals he pursued by proposing a plan for regional broadcasting and by seeking expert technical advice from outside.

(b) Films

'In technical terms, World War II was probably the single greatest stimulus to the development and proliferation of film making round the world' according to R. M. Barsam.² Films were pressed into service for war propaganda and explanation. On the colonial film scene the particular war-time developments were both in the increase in the number of films being made specifically for African audiences - these were mainly 16 mm silent films - and in the provision of viewing facilities. In the latter area there was a special concentration by the British government on the provision of mobile cinema vans to take propaganda to rural areas. (The increase in viewing facilities is relative - there


were not even twenty such vans operating in the African colonies during the war.)

From the particular focus of interest of this work - the film in government propaganda in Northern Rhodesia, and applying the familiar formula: who, says what, to whom and with what results, we will look first at the government and quasi-government agencies providing films for Northern Rhodesian consumption. These were the CFU, the Northern Rhodesian Information Department and the Northern Rhodesian government-sponsored African Film Library and Purchasing Committee. We will also be looking at the type and content of these films which can be separated out into war propaganda, instructional, entertainment and newsreels; and conclude with a survey of the impact they made on African audiences.

The CFU was set up by the MOI in 1939. Its inaugural purpose was 'to make and distribute films mainly about the British and Colonial war effort for audiences chiefly in Africa', in order to enlist the colonial peoples' co-operation in the war effort. The CFU came under the Ministry's Films Division which had grown out of the Crown Film Unit of the GPO. The antecedent of the CFU was the work being done on instructional films in pre-war Africa. William Sellers


who had been doing pioneering work with films for the Nigerian Health Unit before the war, headed the CFU and he was joined early in 1940 by veteran film-maker, George Pearson.¹

The C.O. did not like this exclusive concentration on war propaganda. They had a more permanent role in mind for the mass education programmes that were being planned for the post-war period. The C.O. successfully lobbied to have the activities of the CFU enlarged to include the making of instructional films - which was also Sellers' main interest. In 1942 the Treasury agreed that the CFU should make such films but it was understood that they should have a 'fairly low priority' and not interfere with the primary work which should continue to be war propaganda:

whether to keep the population war conscious, or to get them to grow more food, to alter their diets, etc. and so aid the war effort.²

Funds and staff were increased in 1942 as the CFU widened its scope to include: arranging for the issue of a monthly film bulletin, Colonial Cinema, as a source of technical and other information for colonial officials about colonial cinema and mobile propaganda units; and the provision of courses in film techniques for colonial officers on leave.

² CO 875/10/6282/300, draft letter for Mr. Thomas' signature to H. V. Usi11, Dec. 1942-Jan. 1943.
The CFU held certain fundamental principles about how films should be made in order that they might appeal to 'the native mind'. They concerned both context and technique. Wherever possible it was desirable that films should be made with African actors in African settings. Then since most mobile cinema van audiences would be film illiterates - people who not only had never seen a film but lacked a basic education in the western sense - special techniques would be required. Sellers had found African audiences baffled by the swiftness of sequences and by film techniques like the fade-in and the flash-back. In ordinary films too much was left to be inferred. 'The ordinary cinema fan who sees a shot taken on a battleship appreciated that the sea is just off the picture. The African has to have this explained to him with views of the sea and the ship'.

George Pearson, drawing on his Hollywood experience, thought that the best type of film would be a silent 'explicated by a slow live commentary'.

It was soon found that because of staff shortages it was not possible to send CFU film-makers to Africa (with the exception of a party which went to West Africa in 1945) with the result that the majority of CFU films did not have African settings. An attempt to get round this problem of the scarcity of African material

1. Nyasaland Times, 23 March 1942.
was the Raw Stock Scheme introduced in 1941. Under this scheme some officials in the colonies were provided with cine cameras and 16 mm raw stock so that they could send back African footage to Britain for processing, editing and titling. Most of the limited amount of African material there was came from these part-time amateurs. Northern Rhodesia joined the scheme in the latter part of the war.

By mid 1943 the CFU had put out sixty-seven films, twenty to twenty-five of which were original. In 1944 the total number of films carrying the CFU label was 115. Not all of these films were actually produced by the CFU. Some came from the War Office, two were from Russia and some of Sellers' Nigerian films were included as were some made by the Northern Rhodesian Information Department.¹

By far the greatest number of films shown by the mobile cinema vans were war propaganda films and newsreels. The war propaganda films can be broken up into different categories: information, exhortation, goodwill and the Projection-of-England. A series of information films with titles like This is an ARP Warden and This is a Barrage Balloon sought to explain the mechanics of modern warfare in as simple a style as possible. Food From Oil Nuts urged Africans to produce more ground nuts to promote the production of margarine whilst We Want Rubber exhorted

¹. e.g. Plainsmen of Barotseland and On Patrol. See p. 240.
them to help overcome the critical shortage of this commodity after the fall of Malaya. The image of a beleaguered Britain enduring, with stoicism and good humour, the hardships and sacrifices of war was projected in *A British Family in Peace and War*. *Katsina Tank* and *Comforts from Uganda* are examples of goodwill films made to show British appreciation of the colonial war effort. Another variety of goodwill film showed Africans visiting England or working or studying there - the C.O. had wanted to see films made 'showing how Colonial activities constantly cut across British life...'¹ In this category were *An African in London*, *An African in England*, *West African Editors*, *Nurse Ademola* and *Private Peter Thomas* (about a Nigerian who was the first African to qualify for a commission in the RAF). *British News*, despatched by the British Council, was a compilation of items from five British newsreels. From 1943 the CPU prepared a special newsreel, *British Empire at War*, which ran to twenty-five editions.

Post-war plans and policies for the use of films were put forward in *Mass Education in African Society* which recognised the film 'as the most popular and powerful of all...visual aids'. The report further urged that documentary films be used to extend the horizons of villagers and help them to adjust to 'changing political, economic and social conditions' and that news

¹. CO 875/10/6282/120, minutes of meeting held at MOI, 17 Feb. 1943.
films could help develop a 'national' outlook. Films could explain new types of organizations like trade unions and co-operatives and new techniques and processes like crop-rotation, sanitation and making brick kilns. Great stress was placed on the importance of producing entertainment films as the instructional type would lose their effectiveness if they were to dominate a cinema programme. It was hoped that the colonies themselves would show some initiative:

... we believe that the resources within the Colonies themselves have hardly yet been touched in planning for the production of colonial films... An initial step towards the creation of colonial film producing units is the training of selected colonial personnel...

One colony which did believe in self help when it came to films was Northern Rhodesia. As we noted in the pre-war period the Northern Rhodesian administration was considerably exercised by the need to provide 'suitable' films for the large African cinema going audiences on the Copperbelt. After a film survey tour of East and Central Africa in 1944 A. M. Champion recorded that:

in matters of exhibition of films Northern Rhodesia is ahead of all the other territories...The briefest visit to the Copper Belt is sufficient to convince one of this. One of the operators' boxes contained two of the most up to date American projectors obtainable, complete with sound producers representing over £1,000 and halls capable of seating audiences of two or three thousand natives.

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2. INF 1/564, A. M. Champion, Report on Tour, 22 June 1944.
In her brief sojourn at the MOI before the regional section was scrapped, Margaret Wrong prepared for Professor Harlow a memo on 'Films For Africans'. She divided the subject into three categories one of which was 'Films to be shown in mining compounds and canteens in industrial areas, where expenses are borne by the Mining Companies and the canteen profits'. She had Northern Rhodesia in mind and mentioned that the territory's chief censor had asked 'whether it might be possible to select more suitable films in Great Britain and to supplement these by films made locally...'. 1 Northern Rhodesia was to be disappointed again. The first set-back was the discontinuation of the BEKE; now London was unable to help.

What followed was an attempt to solve the problem locally. To this end in November 1940 the African Film Library and Purchasing Committee was founded as a sub-committee of the Central Native Welfare Advisory Committee. 2 The new Committee aimed to produce or purchase 16 mm films of the interest and educative variety which would be for and about Africans. Originally the intention was that they should supplement the commercial films shown in mine cinemas but the ultimate aim was to supplant them. The rather ambitious hope of the Committee was to end the dependence of the mine cinemas on their South African supplier. The Committee's chairman was the

1. CO 859/1431, 1939.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1122, minutes of first meeting, Nkana, 7 Nov. 1940.
The librarian/secretary was the welfare officer at Nkana. Financial support came from the Town Management Boards at Luanshya, Nkana and Mufulira, which each contributed £250 on two occasions. Later contributors were the Boards of Broken Hill and Chingola which each contributed £25 once.

The beginnings were small. The library started its activities by obtaining one and two reel silent films from local amateurs except for some films on Association Football purchased in South Africa. Some of these amateur efforts were: Babel of the Kraal (scenes of the Ila country); Kasoma (the story of a journey of an African from his village to the Copperbelt); Smoke That Thunders (about the Victoria Falls) and films of sporting events. To supplement this the library bought its own camera and recorded 'the more important social and sporting events'.

(In 1944 Colonial Cinema carried a picture of the African Film Library, Kitwe, Northern Rhodesia captioned 'A Production Unit at Work'. There was talk of more ambitious planned scenarios; Louis Nell, before he joined the Northern Rhodesian Information Office as its

1. 'The Cinema in Northern Rhodesia' Colonial Cinema, 2, 6 (1944), 22.
2. Colonial Cinema, 2, 7 (1944), 28. The picture shows an a European director with a megaphone and four African production assistants.
3. NAZ/ACC 72/10/1, J. D. Cave, Kitwe Management Board African Welfare Department, 'General Policy and Main Activities for 1942'.
first cinema officer, made a film for the Committee, Ushifwayo based on the cartoon character which appeared in *Mutende*. Ushifwayo, the archtypal country bumpkin, who makes all kinds of mistakes on his first visit to town, is also featured in Franklin's book, *Ignorance Is No Defence*.

Though originally the library was set up to service the mine cinemas it responded to a request to extend its services to static cinemas elsewhere. In 1944 although the library covered three centres on the Copperbelt and eight cinemas in other provinces, it was not fulfilling the grandiose expectations of its founders. The Copperbelt contributors did not think they were getting their money's worth. They found that most of the library's films 'did not appeal to Africans' and only took a full programme from the library in an emergency - as when a commercial programme had been banned. By 1945 Mufulira and Chingola had pulled out of the African Film Library and Purchasing Committee altogether. In addition work was being duplicated by the Information Office for it supplied ninety per cent of the library's films. These consisted of British News, propaganda and general interest

1. Nell was then employed as a time-keeper on the mines on the Copperbelt. Franklin, *The Flag-Wagger*, 177.

2. The first film made by the Central African Film Unit was *Mulenga Goes To Town* - also about a country bumpkin, directed by the seconded Louis Nell and based on *Ignorance Is No Defence*. See p. 82.

3. NAZ/SEC 2/1122, extract from minutes of a meeting of the Central Native Welfare Advisory Committee, Kitwe, 13 Oct. 1944.
films supplied by the British Council and the MOI. The Northern Rhodesian Information Department, after examining them, forwarded the films to Kitwe for censoring and distribution. The situation was rationalised in June 1945 when the Committee ceased to exist and its functions were taken over by the film section of the Information Department.

The film section was established in 1943 by Harry Franklin who did not believe in the exclusive purveyance of unadulterated war propaganda; he wanted to encourage film shows with a large percentage of entertainment. For Africans in rural areas the MOI planners had recommended the mobile cinema van - such vehicles had been used before the war by Sellers in Nigeria, by the BEKE, and by the Nyasaland Tea Marketing Expansion Board. Northern Rhodesia was not given a van in the original allocation by the MOI so Franklin scouted around and found one in South Africa. He had to make do with this van for most of the war though he was helped for a time by the Nyasaland Marketing Board which loaned a van that was mainly used for recruiting purposes in the Eastern Province. ¹ In 1945 a start was made on the construction of some more mobile units with assistance from canteen funds.

The Information Department van had a European narrator and an African assistant. By the end of 1943 it had

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called at all centres of population accessible by road and some 80,000 Africans had seen mainly war and other interest films and newsreels and local films. At this stage the primary purpose of the van was to bring war news and assist in the military recruiting drive. Entertainment films provided the sugar that coated the propaganda pill.

The film section, under the direction of Louis Nell, produced some films of its own. Some of these were a contribution to the war effort. There were several recruiting films and a 'target film' to assist in the War Charities' Drive. Some film was also contributed to the "OI for inclusion in the major film of the colonial war effort - *Morning, Noon or Night*. Other films made by the film section included: *Keepers of the Peace* about the training of policemen; *Chilumba's Choice* about the training and work of a veterinary orderly; a film on copper production and the Northern Rhodesia war effort; and a local interest film on the African iron-working industry. Towards the end of the war locally-produced news films were also introduced. Franklin had great expectations for government-sponsored Northern Rhodesian films. He hoped

2. See p. 347.
some would:

eventually be shown in other parts of the Empire, perhaps even in England, thereby helping in what seems to me a most necessary and important task of spreading more knowledge within the Empire of each of its component parts. ¹

In 1948 a cinema officer in Nigeria, as part of a contribution to a mass education drive, carried out an experiment on African reactions to films in the Udi district, using the mass observation technique. Of the seven films used, four were made by the CFU and three by the Northern Rhodesian Information Department. These latter films were Keepers of the Peace, Plainsmen of Barotseland, and On Patrol. Plainsmen of Barotseland which featured the Kuomboka ceremony,² scored a great success at a showing of colonial films at the MOI and was later blown up to 35 mm and a soundtrack added before it went on general display in England. In Udi it was greeted with loud applause. Of all the films shown there, On Patrol seems to have been the most popular. It was an advertisement in story form for the Northern Rhodesia police: a man has his bicycle stolen and appeals to the police for help, they succeed in finding the criminal and the film ends with an exciting bicycle chase. Apparently

¹. CO 875/6281/22D, Franklin to Sabine, 4 Sept. 1942.
². The Kuomboka ceremony takes place annually in Barotseland, the Western Province of Zambia, when the Zambezi floods the plain and the local people move away from the flooded region to the edge of the plain; the annual migration is led by the Lozi Paramount Chief in a ceremonial barge procession.
'nandemonium broke loose in the closing stages of the chase until the thief was finally handcuffed to the bicycle'. The Cinema Officer singled out 'At least two films made in Northern Rhodesia [which had] supplied a good lesson in civics to people in Nigerian villages'.

When we turn to look at the impact of these films, both local and imported, on the African population in Northern Rhodesia we find systematic evidence lacking. What exists is a random collection of European opinions, conjectures and, at best, educated guesses usually based on reactions that have been observed. First-hand African opinion does occasionally surface but it becomes more voluble after the war. Censorship regulations do tell us something about impact but again what we are hearing at this period is a European voice. It is only at the end of the war that Africans were included on the censorship board. The censorship regulations tell us more about the fears of the censors, the psychology of the colonial rulers, than what effect films were really having on Northern Rhodesian Africans.

Having outlined the handicaps it remains to review the variables: audience size, amount of exposure, and the films themselves - their type, technique and content. First the audience: - at the cinemas serviced by the African Film Library and Purchasing Committee; 7,000 attended on the Copperbelt and 10,000 elsewhere, it was

1. 'Showing Films in the Villages', Colonial Cinema, 6, 3 (1948), 63.
reported in 1944. There is no indication of frequency but presumably viewing was much more frequent on the Copperbelt. The mobile van reached eighty thousand odd in 1943 and presumably the annual figure remained in this vicinity until other units came into service at the end of the war. The African population of Northern Rhodesia was estimated at this time to be about 1.6 million. The cinema audience was then very small, relatively speaking. Furthermore it must be taken into account that in rural areas serviced by the cinema van exposure, if it happened at all, only happened once a year.

Audience reactions came in two stages. The first stage was the reaction to the medium itself. The second is the reaction to individual films. For people seeing films for the first time there was an element of magic (the same phenomenon as when people were first exposed to the radio). There was talk of 'white-man's magic', of confusion and suspicion, and of the villagers looking for the lion's spoor after the screen had been taken down. But the adjustment appears to have been made fairly rapidly. In 1941 the Native Development Board

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1. 'The Cinema in Northern Rhodesia', 22.
2. Nell, 'The Mobile Cinema in Northern Rhodesia'.
Sub-Committee on Films for Africans concluded that:

from reports on programmes shown in
the Districts so far received, they
appear to be extremely well received
by African audiences, many of whom
have never before seen a cinematographic
picture.¹

In 1943 a Western Province official reported that African
audiences had been 'enthusiastic' about the cinema van
which had been used regularly:

I was surprised to see how quickly
untutored Africans picked out the
features of the films. A Rodeo film
of cowboys riding bucking horses and
steers was received with wild
enthusiasm by all.²

He added that he was 'doubtful if many appreciated fully
the propaganda films, but it is certain that some did'.

In the Eastern Province the number of recruits
coming forward was equated with the showing of the cinema
van movies. They increased when films were being shown
and when the van broke down the number dropped off.³

There was one early study of films popular with
Africans on the Copperbelt made by Owen Wright, a
welfare officer at Mufulira, in 1941. He found that
cowboy and gangster films were by far the most popular.
He thought that audiences probably did not understand
the whole of the story and noted that 'Love scenes...are
hailed with roars of vulgar laughter'. He opined that

1. NAZ/SEC 2/465, 9 July 1941.
2. NAZ/SEC 1/1771, Cartmel-Robinson, P.C. Western Province Intelligence Report, Jan. 1943.
of the educational films only a very small number were 'suitable for the general audiences, and are not understood without commentary in the vernacular'. The few films he had shown about Northern Rhodesia were very well received: 'I am sure that pictures of rural villages would be very welcome, one picture I had showing the Luapula was given a great ovation'.

In 1942 a labour officer, W. F. Stubbs, observed an audience of 420 Africans at a film show in the welfare hall at Roan Antelope and reported that:

Musical and song and dance items appeared popular. English village scenes seemed to make little impression except where a goat appeared or where the labourers were seen drinking. It is obvious that the audiences have advanced enormously in the last two years and understand more and more of what is meant.

There is some evidence about rural reactions as a result of a questionnaire sent out by the CFU in April 1943. The questionnaire was answered by cinema van operators who based their answers on the reactions of audiences who were mostly illiterate and who had had no experience of commercial cinema. The most popular film was Killing the Killer which was under the CFU label

1. NAZ/SEC 2/465, Native Development Board, Sub-Committee, 1 Aug. 1941.
3. NAZ/SEC 2/1280, MOI questionnaire sent via C.O., 28 April 1943.
though it had been made by Kodak; it was an allegorical tale about a fight to the death between a mongoose and a cobra, Churchill being the mongoose and Hitler the cobra. The cobra had the upper hand at the beginning but the mongoose bides its time and eventually triumphs.¹

(Kenya also reported that this film was 'received with the wildest enthusiasm'.²) Action films like Ride 'em Cowboy were very popular.

The least popular film was Machi Gaba (the village that crept ahead) a Sellers film made before the war in Nigeria. The Northern Rhodesian African found the 'Mohammedan dress amusing and instead of being taught that clean village life makes for healthier living, he is left with the idea that Nigerians are funny people'.³

Another foreign African film shown in Northern Rhodesia which demonstrated that a strange background and 'actions of distant tribes' interfered with the effectiveness of the message was Mr. Wise and Mr. Foolish Go To Town. This film about venereal disease was originally made in South Africa and had been edited and shortened by the CFU.⁴

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1. The film was not originally allegorical - the CFU commentary had given the film this twist. See Nyasaland Times, 23 March 1942.


3. CO 875/08988, analysis of answers to questionnaire.

4. W. V. Brelsford, 'Analysis of African Reaction to Propaganda Film', WADA: The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department: Annual No. 24, 1947, 7. Brelsford's method was to ask several audiences variously composed of African troops, Jeanes School students and teachers, chiefs and welfare hall audiences to write essays about the film from which he analysed the content.
In the CFU questionnaire in answer to the question, what would be suitable subjects for films? Northern Rhodesia suggested films about the royal family and war pictures that showed plain shots of different weapons and that lasted long enough for the commentator to give an explanation. Africans preferred colour to black and white and found some camera techniques difficult to follow though a lot depended on the skill of the commentator.¹

Quite a thorough assessment of the impact of war propaganda films of the MOI and CFU was made by Captain Dickson of the East Africa Command Mobile Propaganda Unit which toured Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in the second half of 1943 and early January of 1944. The major part of the programme was a kind of military circus displaying military equipment and techniques, 'a potted, mobile edition of the Aldershot Tattoo'.² The explicit purpose was to explain the war and the implicit: to encourage recruiting. The programme also included films.

Dickson was scathing on the subject of the MOI's war propaganda films. 'Practically 100% of films sent out by

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1. Further explication of this point comes from Champion in 'Introducing Africans to the Cinema Screen': "Considerable difficulty has been encountered in getting the explanations across, as the native languages naturally lack the necessary words. For instance, a torpedo has had to be described as a long sort of gun which swims in the water like a fish with a little leg behind, there being no word for wheel or propeller'.

2. Dickson, 'Tour of the East Africa Command Mobile Propaganda Unit', March 1944.
the Ministry of Information proved to be quite impossible for Africans (e.g. "Balloon Barrage", and "What Is A Fireman?"). He complained that the war films seemed to 'consist of "snippets" from newsreels, unimaginatively and apparently un-professionally strung together with no connecting link...'. The films jumped ahead so quickly that even a skilful commentator could not keep pace with them:

The 'angles' of the photography are entirely European, and are either unintelligible or pointless to Africans. How many times in war reels, does one see heavy guns being fired, the camera leaping from the shell to the breach, from the gun-muzzle to the Commander's up-stretched hand - and backwards and forwards again with demoniacal speed?

A teacher from Chalimbana urged, 'Show us films of actual fighting face to face, bombing towns, sinking ships, so that we may understand war: not manufacturing aeroplanes, repairing guns, inspecting troops etc., which are mostly unintelligible and quite uninteresting to us Africans'.

Another complaint of Dickson's was the very 'rare' appearance of Africans in the MOI films and when very occasionally they did appear they were usually West Africans. He singled out as a specific target for criticism a film on the war effort of the Empire which not only had only two scenes concerned with African troops, but they were so ill-chosen that after showing

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
the film once he took it off the programme:

oneshowed Askari of a West African Battery portering enormous gun-carriage wheels on their heads, up to their neck in river water. This kind of thing revives the most hideous memories of the Carrier Corps in the E.A. campaign of 1914-18 and confirms Africans' worst suspicions regarding present-day service conditions. The other scene showed Nyasaland Askari in Ceylon, in jungle training, naked but for shorts and boots, and wielding machettes. Trained Askari appreciated the necessity for this, but Africans at home assume that 'they don't even give you proper uniform in the K.A.R. now'.

Apart from the war propaganda films Charlie Chaplin comedies were, for the most part, extremely well received. One criticism sometimes heard was that films should not show people stealing. Another interesting complaint against a Chaplin film came from an African from Mumbwa and it highlights a problem of early African film viewing that Hortense Powdermaker was later to single out in Copper Town.² This was the confusion between the real and the unreal: Africans were being shown documentary and educational films that were 'real' alongside fiction films showing actions that were humanly impossible. As

1. Ibid.

the correspondent from Mumbwa explained to Dickson's unit:

It is not good to show how that men can be hit on the head with a sack and yet come to life again without any slight symptom of being hurt, for it will make Africans believe Europeans to be magicians who have fairies who come to life again after death...¹

Another complaint from Africans heard by the unit, which would be heard again, was about Africans being shown naked on the screen - it was an affront to their dignity; on this occasion the complaint arose from an ethnographic film on the wedding customs of the Zulu.² It is not hard to sympathise with this point of view; after all, Europeans were never shown naked on film in the pre-permissive society.

During the war the Native Film Censorship Board continued to meet on the Copperbelt and was enlarged. (At the end of the war its duties were taken over by the Information Office and a Board reconstituted in Lusaka.) The war-time chairman was the P.C., Ndola, with the D.C., Kitwe, as alternate chairman. Others were the D.O. at Mufulira, several clergymen, the welfare officer at Nkana and a number of European women. The Board had been enlarged to allow for a roster to be

¹. Dickson, 'Tour of the East Africa Command Mobile Propaganda Unit', March 1944.
². Ibid. I was informed by a former Northern Rhodesian cinema van operator, J. B. Jolly that Africans objected to the showing of Daybreak in Udi at Lubwa mission in the later 1940s because Africans were shown naked and they felt insulted. (Lusaka, Nov. 1975.)
drawn up so as not to call on people too frequently.
Women had been included for the chauvinistic reason that it was thought to be a bit much to ask 'busy men' to sacrifice a couple of hours a week 'to witness the bunrvities of Popeye or the banalities of Betty Boop', and partly because:

if any unpleasant crimes by natives in this area should be attributed to anything seen on the films, the fact that the film had been passed by representative local women would disarm criticism.¹

The files yield no direct evidence of what the censor saw but they do contain lists of films censored by the Kenya Board in 1940 and 1941. Since the Northern Rhodesian Board followed the rulings of the Kenya censors the list does give us some idea of what was considered unfit for African eyes at this time. Films passed for showing to Europeans in Kenya but not for Africans included: Gone With the Wind, Return of the Scarlet Pimpernel, Son of Frankenstein, Blackmail, Angels with Dirty Faces (a James Cagney gangster film which took a searching look at the different causes of crime), Edgar Wallace's The Four Just Men, The Last Train From Madrid (about the Spanish Civil War), Murder in the Museum, The Oklahoma Kid, North West Frontier and The Four Feathers. In the above list what seems to have perturbed the censors were the subjects of crime, war, horror and racism. Another batch seems to have been banned because

¹ YAZ/SEC 2/1121, A. T. Williams, D.C. Kitwe, to J. D. Cave, Welfare Officer Kitwe, 6 Aug. 1940.
of either the frivolous life-styles portrayed or the appearance of women of easy virtue as in: *Naughty But Nice*, *Girl in a Taxi*, *Love and Kisses*, *Glamorous Night*, and *Bachelor Mother*.  

In 1945 G. Phillips suggested that an African 'would be a valuable asset' to the Censorship Board. From his **Mutesende** experience and from attendance at Information Office film shows he had concluded that 'few Europeans seem to have a sound grasp of what the African really likes'.  

R. S. Hudson, the Secretary for Native Affairs, referred this proposal to A. Williams who had had experience in Kitwe of censorship. He disagreed with Phillips:

> it is not the function of the Censorship Board to decide whether or not a particular film is likely to be to the taste of African audiences. The Board's function is to decide whether a film is of a kind likely (a) to have a bad effect on an African audience or (b) (which is really a part of (a)) of a kind likely to cause trouble between the races.

Williams went on to question whether because of 'the very nature of the Board's function it is desirable to have African members'.  

Williams' views were in accord with a statement on censorship in *Mass Education in African*.

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1121, Memos of Meetings of Nairobi Film Censorship Board, 29 Oct 1940-17 June 1941.


Society:

The aesthetic and educative value of the programme is not within the purview of colonial boards of censors whose function is a negative one of preventing the display of material which is blasphemous, or is likely to cause inter-racial feeling, or to encourage crime or juvenile delinquency or to undermine morality.¹

Although Hudson concurred with Williams they were overruled by the Executive Council and Arnold Chelemu and Edwin Mlongoti joined the Board.²

We have seen that during the war in Northern Rhodesia the opportunity for Africans to see films had increased. In the towns there had been an extension of viewing facilities; in the rural areas some had had the opportunity to see films for the first time. The film section of the Northern Rhodesian Information Department had shown great enthusiasm for producing films for Africans. On the Copperbelt the problem of 'suitable' films remained unsolved. From the admittedly scanty and disconnected evidence on African reactions it emerged that: (1) the cinema was just as popular a form of entertainment as elsewhere in the world; (2) the most popular films were westerns and Charlie Chaplin comedies; (3) many of the war propaganda films were ineffectual and unsuitable; and (4) instructional films did not have an across the

¹ Mass Education in African Society, 45-46.
board appeal just because they had an African setting - the setting needed to be not only African but familiar.

4. Conclusion

World War II, as we have noted, saw the acceptance of the government propaganda agency as an indispensable aid to modern administration. Let us examine the outstanding characteristics of Northern Rhodesia's government propaganda agency as it evolved during the war. It increased considerably in size, scope and status, being elevated from an office to a department, and it broadened its activities to include public relations. Like the C.O. propagandists in London the Northern Rhodesian information officers, Bradley and Franklin, soon began to consider how the propaganda plant that had been assembled to dispense war propaganda could be converted to peace-time ends. Like Sabine, Franklin took a broad view of propaganda and was anxious to use radio and films in mass education. During the war he pioneered in the use of broadcasting for education and entertainment; the Northern Rhodesian station was the first in East and Central Africa to interest itself in this area. (In Africa only in the Gold Coast and Nigeria had there been similar attempts.) Similarly, he fostered some pioneering work in film production as the film section produced some instructional and entertainment films as well as newsreels on a small scale.
A question that demands to be answered is: Why was the Northern Rhodesian Information Department so singularly active, innovative and creative - being commended by East Africa and Rhodesia and the MOI? Why was Northern Rhodesia the first of the colonial information offices to officially add public relations to its job description? Public relations is basically a matter of wooing the public although a government propaganda agency might use the neutral terms 'explain' or 'inform'. The Northern Rhodesian administration had announced that it had recognized the necessity of keeping people informed and explaining government policy. But the Northern Rhodesian Information Department was doing more than just providing explanations and information; it was trying to persuade people to accept the government's policies, it was attempting to engineer consent. But why of all the colonies was it Northern Rhodesia who first felt the need to 'explain' and 'inform'?

It has been noted that the Copperbelt was the cause of considerable concern to the administration, particularly in the early years of the war. Both European and African miners went on strike on separate occasions in 1940 and there was considerable agitation from the left-wing leadership of the NRMU until their arrest in 1942. It was in 1942 that the administration became disturbed about the reporting of the Copperbelt unrest in the Southern Rhodesia Newsletters and, perhaps significantly, it was in 1942 that the decision was made by the War Cabinet to add public relations to the gazetted activities of the
Information Office. Weight is lent to this hypothesis by the fact that it was the same stimulus - fear of copper production being disturbed - that led to the establishment of the Lusaka broadcasting station and the African Film Library and Purchasing Committee.

The pioneering Northern Rhodesian Information Department had a very difficult task in the plural society of Northern Rhodesia, if it wished to improve relations between the government and the governed. Propaganda is the tool of policy but on the most vital political issues affecting the future of the country, which were uppermost in the minds of its white and black population, there was no policy: sensitive issues like closer union with the south and racial and economic discrimination were being shelved. The Information Department was in an invidious position. It was a government propaganda agency for what amounted to a transitional government whose future policies, structure and composition were uncertain; both racial groups favoured different solutions and the final solution had not yet been revealed.

It was noted that many Europeans were not at all happy with the performance of the new department. They felt it was too pro-African. It will be remembered that Bradley, in his prognosis for post-war propaganda, had written of the need to check the 'premature aspirations' of the Europeans for self-government. Bradley, like Franklin, reflected the view of many colonial civil servants in Northern Rhodesia in that he anticipated
that Northern Rhodesia like the West African colonies would, in the fullness of time, be granted black majority rule. He was out of sympathy with the urgent campaign for closer union with the south that was being prosecuted by the white settlers. The settlers felt this lack of sympathy with their aims. Many were not enthusiastic not only about the extensive coverage given to the African war effort but with the mass education and development plans of the C.O.\(^1\) Such was the hostility of the unofficials that at the end of the war Gore-Browne suggested that the Information Department should be closed down; in 1947 Franklin analysed the settler antagonism to his department thus:

unofficial members dislike on principle the Government having control of the media for what they call 'Propaganda'. They feel that the department will always associate itself with the official view and with Colonial Office policy and control, with which they profoundly disagree.\(^2\)

As a result of the war many Northern Rhodesian Africans had been exposed to a host of extraneous influences, experiences, images and ideas. African troops came back full of their war-time experiences in East Africa, the

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1. NAZ/SEC 2/1122, Franklin, Confidential Memorandum for Information Officers' Conference; 'Post-War Future of Information Departments of Colonies', 6 Sept. 1943.

Middle East and Burma; Stephen Mpashi wrote a novel based on his, Cekesoni Aingila Ubusoja (Jackson becomes a soldier). Tutonde was full of war news and pictures. It was now idle to talk of keeping 'the Native in cotton wool'. What then was the overall effect of the propaganda activities of the Northern Rhodesia Information Department and the MOI on the African population? Did the activities of the Department, in the words of Governor Maybin, 'unsettle the natives'? The answer would have to be - Yes.

It was found that in order for people to make an effective contribution to the war effort they could not be left in 'happy ignorance'; the level of information had to be raised. This could not fail to have a politicising effect; some war propaganda had a boomerang effect; the mass media drew people closer together and gave them a sense of identity as Northern Rhodesian Africans; it let them know what was happening in other parts of the country and publicised African grievances. The mass media also had a polarising effect. The separate propaganda being put out for the two races and the supposedly pro-African leanings of the Information Department exacerbated race relations and in a plural society like Northern Rhodesia public relations were race relations.

CHAPTER III: DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA IN NORTHERN RHODESIA 1946-1953

1. Northern Rhodesian Information Department

The main concern of this section will be to discuss the policies, organization and personnel of the Northern Rhodesian Information Department in the period up to the imposition of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. Separate sections will be devoted to developments in the press, radio and films. To introduce this section there will be a brief outline of post-war developments in C.O. propaganda policy and organization.

When the MOI was phased out at the end of the war the C.O. assumed full responsibility for the whole machinery of public relations in the colonies. After Creech-Jones became Secretary of State in 1946 greater emphasis was placed on 'information and public relations work both at home and in the Colonies' according to Ivor Thomas, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Colonies. Creech-Jones believed that the government information department was 'an integral part of modern administration'; the Public Relations Branch was completely restructured and considerably enlarged now being known as the Information Department of the C.O. Sabine resigned in 1947 and Kenneth W. Blackburne was appointed Director of Information.

2. NAZ/SEC 3/134, Creech-Jones to Officer Administering Northern Rhodesia, 15 July 1948.
Services; he was succeeded in 1951 by C. Y. Carstairs. 

Servas Huxley, the only colonial propagandist at the MOI to win C.O. approval, was appointed honorary adviser on Information Services to the C.O. 

The post-war role of information and public relations work in the colonies was explored at a number of conferences and in memoranda and reports. Blackburne told a C.O. conference in 1947 that 'it was now felt that it was important to throw out ideas as to what Public Relations were and what we were trying to do'.

1. Blackburne had seen service in Nigeria and Palestine; he had been Colonial Secretary in the Gambia and had recently been Administrative Secretary to the Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies.

2. In 1953 Carstairs became Assistant Under Secretary of State for Colonies.

3. Huxley had served his propaganda apprenticeship under Sir Stephen Tallents as a junior staff member of the Empire Marketing Board. He was briefly at the Empire Publicity Division first as an honorary adviser and later as a head of department before being assigned to work on propaganda to America.


that were purely local. In its annual report for 1946, the department outlined its objectives which followed closely those recommended for colonial information departments by Oliver Stanley in a despatch to Governor Waddington in 1945\(^1\) and those enumerated in 'The Work of Information Departments in the Colonies' (1948). These included: keeping the Northern Rhodesian population informed of government actions and policies, assisting in an ancillary capacity with adult education and development campaigns and supplying information about Northern Rhodesia for use by the C.O. in domestic, foreign and Commonwealth propaganda, and aiding the C.O. Information Department in the projection of British colonial policy and the British way of life to the inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia. (Northern Rhodesia added an extra function - the promotion of tourism.\(^2\))

Franklin considered that the objectives concerned with public relations and mass education were the most important: 'Africans were not yet capable of assimilating a great deal concerning developments in the United Kingdom or information on the British way of life'.\(^3\)

Outside agencies assisted in the two way flow of information between the colony and Britain. The Regional Information Office in Nairobi, an outpost of the C.O. Information Department, liaised with Northern Rhodesia

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2. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1946, 5.

in order to obtain information relevant to the projection of a favourable image of British colonial policy abroad. In 1947 a major part of the responsibility for publicising Northern Rhodesia overseas was taken over by the Office of the Commission for Northern Rhodesia which the Leg. Co. decided to establish in London. It concentrated on encouraging trade, winning favourable publicity for the colony and providing information for intending immigrants.\(^1\) When a British Council Office was opened in Northern Rhodesia at Ndola in 1950, the office assisted in the Promotion-of-Britain.

After the war the Information Department in Northern Rhodesia was caught up in the controversy over closer union in Central Africa. Throughout the continent as African nationalist activity accelerated the British government began to place more emphasis on giving Africans training in local government in preparation for eventual self-government. This policy was reflected in the report *Education for Citizenship in Africa* (1948)\(^2\) the political offspring of the Mass Education report which had noted that ideas about citizenship in Africa would have to be reformulated in view of the British government's policy of gradual progress towards self-government. *Education for Citizenship in Africa* explored this theme further, first surveying the enormity of the task: the implanting of

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democratic 'habits of mind and habits of action' in the African peoples, a process that had been slow and evolutionary in the west—spread out over several centuries, would have to be accomplished in a matter of decades in Africa.

One of the proposed methods was practical experience at the local government level which where possible could be associated with the tribal system. Other methods recommended for citizenship education were: leadership courses of the type that were being conducted for chiefs and councillors at Chaliriana in Northern Rhodesia, training in Britain for selected leaders, and experience gained in co-operative societies, local education committees and local welfare and development committees. It will be noted that all the methods so far mentioned have to do with getting to the leaders rather than the masses. The report does also urge that the masses should be reached out to through the wireless, cinema, film strip and pamphlets but it was recorded that so far mass education had had little effect on adult literacy: 'The majority of the rural population live their lives beyond all effective contact with the Government'. ¹ Education for citizenship, because of the 'abstract' nature of the subject matter, could only be carried out 'with comparatively small groups of leaders'. ²

1. Education for Citizenship, 10.
2. Ibid., 30.
In *Education for Citizenship in Africa* a distinction seems to have been drawn between community development in the sense of improving the quality of life of the mass of the colonial peoples through improvements in areas such as agriculture, health, etc., and political education. Community development/mass education was for the masses; political education/education for citizenship was for the leaders albeit at the local government level. The greater emphasis on the political education of leaders in *Education for Citizenship in Africa* than in the earlier Mass Education report was a sign of the times. By 1948 it was becoming clear that the decolonisation process would begin much sooner than had been anticipated when the Mass Education report was tabled during the war.

The plotting of propaganda strategy for Northern Rhodesia was complicated by the presence of politically ambitious white settlers. It was seen that during the war the Information Department had been warned to steer clear of the subject of the political future of the colony in the interests of war-time unity; however, the white settlers still managed to increase their power at the centre as several unofficials had been appointed to the Executive Council for the purposes of war-time administration. After the war they stepped up their campaign for closer union with the south to prevent the forces of black nationalism triumphing and achieving black majority rule. In the memorandum 'Public Relations
in the Colonies' the general objective of public relations work was stated as being to:

develop mutual understanding and trust among all sections of the community in each Colony, and the particular objective...to develop a closer association between the people of the Colony and the local Government, so as to make the people accept the Government as 'their' Government.

The days of 'benevolent autocracy' were over. 'An active political consciousness has appeared among the people'; it was imperative they be taken into government's confidence.

The dilemma for the Northern Rhodesian government propagandist is obvious. Who were the local leaders who were to be associated with the administration: Africans, white settlers, both? How could 'mutual understanding and trust' be developed when each group had such conflicting expectations?

The Governor and top Secretariat officials, with the exception of Franklin, did not think that the contents of the memoranda, 'Public Relations in the Colonies' (1947) and 'The Work of Information Departments in the Colonies' (1948) should be made public because of the disturbing effect this would have on both sections of the population.

1. 'Public Relations in the Colonies'.

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The Governor vetoed the publication of the 1948 memorandum which contained this passage:

True self-government must be based on a well-informed public; able to control its affairs in an orderly manner with the views of the majority prevailing, but with due regard to the legitimate views and interests of the minority or minorities.

He dismissed it as a 'pious and well meaning document' which did not tell 'us or the public much that they don't know and reference to the views of the majority prevailing would not go down too well with our Europeans'.\(^1\) As it happened the views of the majority did not prevail as by 1952 the British government had decided that a federation of the three Central African territories of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be established in the face of widespread African opposition.

Franklin had from the outset of his career as Northern Rhodesia's Information Officer been a keen devotee of the ideals of mass education. At the C.O. Summer Conference on African Administration in 1948 which discussed 'The Encouragement of Initiative

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in African Society' Franklin led Group V which reported on 'The Technique of Mass Education'.

Mass education/community development was something of an umbrella word. In post-war Northern Rhodesia the term was applied not only to the activities of the Information Department in using the press, radio and films - the mass media - to put across development propaganda on behalf of the various government departments; it was also applied to other activities outside the province of the Information Department including mass literacy, a rural development programme, the Native Authorities' courses at Chalimbana and the work of the Publications Bureau of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (successor to the African Literature Committee).

One of the earliest experiments to be mounted as a result of Mass Education in African Society was a mass literacy experiment conducted in Northern Rhodesia at Mbandolo Mine compound in 1945/1946 on missionary initiative with funds from the Colonial Development and Welfare vote. After the initial experiment literacy teachers were


2. The term 'mass education' was replaced after the war by 'community development' with UNESCO preferring 'fundamental education'. Mass education was thought to have an unfortunate political resonance hinting at 'an inferior kind of education specially designed for primitive peoples'. C.O. Information Department, 'Notes On Education in the Colonies', Memo No. 24. Revised Oct. 1961.

trained to go into the rural areas. By 1948 there were literacy primers in seven different languages and the total number of newly literate was given at 10,387; of these over 4,000 were in rural areas where the work had not begun till two years after the Mindolo beginning.¹

In 1949 the newly literate total was given at 14,205.² Mutende was the chief diet of the newly literate and they were also supplied with simple reading material by the Publications Bureau. Mass literacy came within the province of the African Education Department and literacy work came to be associated with rural development centres set up after 1948 as part of the Education Department’s rural development programme.³ The programme was based on the concept of area centres which were envisaged as being centres for development for surrounding areas. The scheme was only just getting underway at the start of the Federation when four of the projected eleven centres had been established.

Mass education was 'intimately bound up with the development of local government' in colonial policy.⁴

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1. Northern Rhodesia African Education Annual Report, 1948, 44.

2. Ibid., 47.

3. To its rural development programme the African Education Department also applied the terms: Community Development, Mass Education and Fundamental Education. In 1952 responsibility for the co-ordination of adult informal education in the rural areas was taken over by the Commissioner for Native Development.

4. C.O. Information Department, Memo No. 24.
Opening the 1951 Cambridge Conference on African Administration, the then Secretary of State for Colonies, James Griffiths said that local government and community development 'were really two aspects of the same subject'.

Since 1939 courses for chiefs had been held at the Jeans Training School, Chalimbana, under the auspices of the African Education Department; the curriculum included local history, geography, civics, agriculture, hygiene, village improvement and rural development. After the war the courses were more varied, D.O.s were called in to give lectures and councillors as well as chiefs attended the Native Authority training programme. Education for Citizenship in Africa cited this Chalimbana training programme as a working model of the kind of education the report was advocating, in particular, it was training the community leaders. At the Conference on African Initiative Group II 'agreed that for adults service in the local government is by far the most practical means of teaching the duties of citizenship'. The Chalimbana programme can be seen not only as an example of education for citizenship in action but also as fitting in with the prevailing ideology of native administration in Northern


2. Education for Citizenship, 30.

Rhodesia - indirect rule. The inclusion of the councillors who were not hereditary appointments reflects an attempt to bring indirect rule up-to-date, to give positions of authority to people who qualified by ability and training rather than birth for their posts.

Northern Rhodesia had two separate avenues of political advancement for its population in keeping with the two nation character of the colony. Europeans who had the right to vote could elect members to the central legislature where African interests were represented by Europeans nominated by the Governor. Africans at the periphery of power were administered by traditional chiefs guided by D.O.s; it was here at the local level that councillors were introduced in an effort to inject an element of democracy into the Native Authority system. But despite this adaptation indirect rule did not correspond to political reality as the real leaders of the African population were men who based their claims to leadership on their education and the ability to enter into a dialogue with the administration on behalf of their fellow Africans. We have seen their letters in the pages of Mutende, the Bantu Mirror and the African Weekly. These men had more radical ambitions than to be merely a councillor to a chief in the rural oriented Native Authority structure. During the war, prompted by Gore-Browne, the administration gave tacit recognition to the emergence of these new leaders with a new power base, by introducing in 1943-1944 a system of provincial councils with members coming from Urban Advisory Councils.
welfare societies and Native Authorities. In 1946, to complete the pyramid, an African Representative Council was added at the top with members coming from the Provincial Councils. The Councils, presided over by European officials, were heavily weighted in favour of rural areas with the chiefs predominating. The setting up of the council system was both a recognition of that awakening African political consciousness alluded to in the memorandum 'Public Relation in the Colonies', and according to R. S. Hudson, an attempt to contain it in official channels. The introduction of Mutende was based on the same strategy: attack is the best method of defence.

Education for Citizenship in Africa commended Northern Rhodesia's system of advisory councils as an example of how educational work was being 'accompanied by parallel advances in political responsibility'. In practice the political responsibility was minimal; the councils were only advisory, they had no real power, and functioned as a safety valve where some politically conscious Africans could be given the opportunity to 'let off steam'. In spite of all, the authentic African voice did manage to break through and perhaps the real value of the councils was that the speeches of some of

3. Education for Citizenship, 30.
the new opinion leaders were reported in Mutende thus giving publicity to African grievances and contributing to the emergence of an African public opinion.

In 1948 Africans were finally permitted to walk in the corridors of power when for the first time two Africans were given seats in the Leg. Co. Chosen from amongst members of the African Representative Council they were only a token African presence as they were far outnumbered by the European unofficials and there still remained two Europeans nominated to represent African interests; but, token or not, the white settler population correctly regarded African representation in the Leg. Co. as the writing on the wall for European political ambitions and they pressed ever more strongly for union with Southern Rhodesia.

In the first half of the period under discussion the public relations and mass education activities of the Northern Rhodesian administration were dogged by uncertainties about the political future - Who was going to inherit the political kingdom? In the second period when the decision had finally been made - the Europeans - it had to contend with the hostility of the African population to this decision. The position of the Director of Information was a particularly difficult one, given these fluctuating circumstances. Franklin continued to be the head of the department until 1950 in the course of which time his title changed from Information Officer to Director of Information. His position became increasingly awkward as he was harassed by white settler
politicians who considered his department too pro-African. This was the only critical quarter. Praise continued to be heaped on the department by East Africa and Rhodesia, and it received a glowing tribute from the Regional Information Officer from Nairobi after an inspection in 1947 which provoked a message of congratulations from the Governor. The Administrative Secretary, A. T. Williams, minuted:

One seldom hears anything adverse to the Department except from some of our local critics and it is a pity that we haven't been able to convince them that in the I.O. we have something to be proud of.

In 1947 there came a settler demand that the Information Department should be 'removed from the influence of Government'. In 1950 an editorial in the Northern News accused the department of anti-settler bias and called upon Welensky to try to have the department placed under the control of one of the unofficials. The editorial was occasioned by the visit of BBC broadcaster Colin Wills, for a 'very hurried' seven days; he had 'spent most of his time in Lusaka under the aegis of the Information Department' and then reported 'there is quite a lot of opposition to

1. 'Has any other Information Department in Eastern Africa taken so enlightened a view of its duties?' East Africa and Rhodesia, 25 Sept. 1947.


federation'. The editorial claimed that though government departments were supposed to be 'non-political...there are strong tendencies by this Department to influence visitors on certain...lines'. The editorial also commented critically on the fact that Franklin had recently been conferring in London and Paris with UNESCO on the subject of mass education: 'We are confident that this is in no way connected with the welfare of Europeans in this territory'.

Though Franklin was unsympathetic to European political aspirations he was no friend to the African nationalist either during his term as Information Officer. He disputed the claim in the 1947 memorandum that 'an active political consciousness' had appeared at least amongst the Africans of Northern Rhodesia 'except among a handful of clerks upon whom it had been thrust'. He considered this group were alienated from the majority of Africans and accelerating their advancement would create 'nationalist movements which do not now exist, nationalist movements of a tiny minority' who would 'repress and destroy' their fellow Africans. Therefore, he thought the administration should 'soft pedal' on their political advancement until the masses could be brought up to their level. Franklin further claimed

2. During the Federal era Franklin became a member for African interests in the Leg. Co. and later a founder member of the multi-racial Constitution Party.
that though African opinion was very difficult to gauge he thought that many Africans shared his opinion: 'I know that a number of them dislike and distrust the African Provincial and African Representative Councils'.

Hudson labelled Franklin an 'optimist' for seeming 'to assume that we can avoid political development'.

At the C.O. Summer Conference on African Administration in 1948 which had discussed 'The Encouragement of Initiative in African Society', Margery Perham and Professor C. H. Phillips both endorsed the idea of associating nationalist leaders with government as they were 'the only force strong enough to integrate African societies and to supply the energy and initiative for spectacular progress'. Franklin disagreed. He had that profound distrust of the emerging group of educated African leaders which was typical of colonial civil servants. His mass education policy was aimed at counteracting the influence of the new leaders; he hoped that mass education would raise the level of information amongst ordinary people so that they would not be 'exploited' by the more educated.

In 1950 Franklin decided that he could no longer carry on as Director of Information in view of the altered political situation and decided to retire. As long as he had had the support of the Governor and

officials in his conduct of the department he had been able to put up with the broadsides from the settler politicians. But increasingly from 1948 he had felt a change in the back-up system. He was now being told that he had to try and get along with the politicians.\footnote{1} Federation was imminent and Franklin found himself out of sympathy with this new development in British policy. The 1948 memorandum in listing the qualifications required of a head of a colonial information department had nominated as top priority - 'the right outlook' which included 'an understanding of British colonial policy, and a sincere belief in the future of the Colony in which he is working'. In 1950 Franklin's 'outlook' was out of step with the times.

Franklin's successor, W. V. Brelsford, was more in sympathy with the new policy developments. He had deputised for Franklin in 1945 and 1948 when Franklin had been on leave; he too had a natural flair for the job, his special interest being Northern Rhodesian history and ethnography.\footnote{2} Brelsford was a popular choice with the settlers. After he stood in for Franklin in 1948 the \textit{Central African Post} praised him highly in a premature eulogy which also implies a criticism of Franklin.

\footnote{1}{Franklin, \textit{The Flag-Wagger}, 196.}
\footnote{2}{He edited the \textit{Northern Rhodesia Journal}; his published works include: \textit{The Tribes of Northern Rhodesia} (Lusaka, 1956); \textit{Primitive Philosophy} (London, 1935); \textit{Aspects of Bemba Chieftainship} (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1944).}
He was described as 'one of the most popular of officials, a genial fellow and accessible at all times'. He had a 'gift of dealing with the press'; he was 'perfectly impartial in his handouts and anxious to help at all times'. In addition he had an 'invaluable sense of proportion'. With the coming of Federation Brelsford became Director of the Federal Information Service.

The political federation of Central Africa was prefigured after the war in a limited way by the regional organization of some information and public relations activities. In 1945 there was some talk of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland pooling their propaganda activities so that Northern Rhodesia would handle 'all native propaganda for the three territories, leaving European work for Southern Rhodesia', a proposal favoured by Brelsford, but as in 1939 'differences of policy with Southern Rhodesia' (presumably native policy over which the Bledisloe Report had stumbled) prevented such a step. A Northern Rhodesian proposal to join forces with Nyasaland was stymied by Nyasaland's Governor. It was in the fields of broadcasting, films, and literature for Africans that the principle of regional organization manifested itself. Broadcasting


2. *Northern Rhodesia Minutes of the Administrative Conference of Provincial Commissioners and Heads of Social Service Departments* 1945, 15.

and films were organised on a regional basis under the aegis of the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council. In 1944 the British government announced the setting up of a Central African Council, an inter-territorial council to co-ordinate economic and other non-political activities in the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Some, including Roy Welensky, hoped that the Council would be a step towards the realisation of the white settler dream of political unification. Another joint venture was the Publications Bureau of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which succeeded the African Literature Committee. It must not be thought that this trend towards regionalism was merely an offshoot of the Central African political scene; it had been a prominent principle in British government plans for the development of mass media services in the colonies since the days of the Plymouth Report (1937). In 1945 Oliver Stanley in a despatch to Northern Rhodesia's Governor, Sir John Waddington, had suggested that for practical and economic reasons colonial governments should consider when setting up production units that they should be organised on a regional basis.  

The preceding section has concentrated on giving an overview of the Northern Rhodesian department during the post-war period, identifying some of the more significant trends in policy and organization. Perhaps the outstanding feature of the period was the way in which the settlers'
success in their closer union campaign was reflected in their success in ensuring that the Information Department promoted the settler cause.

2. The Press
(a) Mutende

After the war Mutende had a stormy passage; it became the centre of a political row as the settlers felt its reporting was prejudicial to the settler cause and as a result they fought to gain greater influence over editorial policy. Before describing this controversy I give some details about major policy and organizational changes that occurred in the post war period.

In 1948 Mutende acquired its first professional journalist when John Petrie was appointed editor; Petrie had previously been manager and editor of Habari za Leo, the African newspaper in Kenya. On 3 January 1950 Mutende became a weekly as a result of the purchase of a cossar machine. A considerable drop in circulation followed which was attributed to the doubling of subscription rates. After the war Mutende's circulation had fallen from 20,000 to 18,000; it fell further in the next two years and began to climb again in 1948, reaching 16,200 at the end of that year. At the time when it became a weekly Mutende's circulation was again 18,000. In 1952 the circulation began at 11,000 and finished at 13,000.

1. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1952, 12.
In this period, too, the paper clarified its policy about who Mutende should be for, the peasant or the labourer. As the Acting Administrative Secretary, S. R. Denny, infelicitously remarked in the Leg. Co. in 1950, "Mutende was aimed at 'the lower grade literates... those who are not very bright...'." For the educated Africans the government encouraged the circulation of the Bantu Mirror and the African Weekly (which had been circulated free to Northern Rhodesian troops during the war). To assist the circulation of these papers in Northern Rhodesia the Director of Information provided a free press and photographic service. There was an informal arrangement that the editor should check with the Director of Information on 'the accuracy of any material which is doubtful'. In March 1948 the African Weekly announced that Bemba was being introduced into the paper by popular demand from readers on the Copperbelt and other Bemba areas.

In 1946, as a result of a demand by Roy Welensky that unofficials should have some say in the direction of Mutende, an advisory board was set up for the paper. The Board's membership included unofficials, the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Government Printer, the Director of the African Literature Bureau and the Director of

Information. At first there was one African member; this was later increased to two.\(^1\) Aware that Mutende was the government's main means of giving 'guidance' to Africans particularly on political matters,\(^2\) the settlers were determined that that guidance should not run counter to settler interest; however, it was not so much through the Mutende Board that the settlers brought pressure to bear on Mutende policy but through open confrontation.

The Board met at first at three monthly intervals and later in 1948 this was extended to a minimum of six monthly intervals.

It was in 1948 that Mutende found itself thrust into the political spotlight. In writing an epitaph for the paper in the final issue of 30 December 1952, the editor wrote that he knew of no other newspaper which had been quoted so frequently either in the Leg. Co. or the African Representative Council.\(^3\) Mutende's two most virulent critics amongst the unofficials were Gore-Browne and Welensky. At first Gore-Browne's criticisms echoed those of Africans - the paper was not political enough; it ignored the political life of Africans. In particular Gore-Browne criticised Mutende's reporting of the 1945 railway strike; this received only a brief paragraph

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1. In 1948 these were Edwin Mlongoti a broadcaster and member of the Mutende staff and the Rev. H. Kasokolo, one of the first African MPs; NAZ/SEC 2/1130, minutes of Mutende Board, 13 Nov. 1948.


3. Mutende No. 468, 10.
which stated that the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister 'has assured the public that adequate preparations have been made to meet the situation caused by the striking of African railway employees, should it endanger essential services'. Gore-Browne considered this 'is surely an inadequate way of describing an episode that was exciting a great deal of comment all over the country'. The *Santu Yirror*'s coverage was far superior.¹ In the heated dialogue between Africans and Europeans over Gore-Browne's proposals for responsible government put forward in 1948, Gore-Browne as we shall see came to criticise Mutende from a more orthodox unofficial perspective.

In 1947 Welensky was extremely irritated by Mutende's reporting of a reduction in food prices for Africans which, he claimed, wrongly gave the government all the credit and minimised the unofficial role:

> I just quietly moved a motion in the House but subsequent to that the Government did everything. I want to suggest that it is quite possible to ignore Unofficial Members...but I would suggest that you cannot ignore the taxpayer who is making the greatest contribution towards this reduction in the food price for the African.²

A storm blew up around Mutende's handling of the responsible government proposals made by Gore-Browne in January 1948 and a follow-up letter written by Nelson Nalumango. Until 1948 Africans had been shielded by the British government from the strident demands of the

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settlers for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. They were confident that the C.O. would save them from closer union and looked, in particular, to Gore-Browne who had represented African interests in the Lez. Co. since 1938, to champion their cause. Indeed, Sir Stewart had resigned as chairman of the unofficials in 1946 because he was out of sympathy with their demand for amalgamation. Then suddenly and unexpectedly, at the beginning of 1948, Gore-Browne delivered an ultimatum to the British government: either grant responsible government to Northern Rhodesia or the unofficials would paralyse the government.¹

Gore-Browne claimed to have devised a way of overcoming two major obstacles that were thought to have been standing in the way of responsible government: the lack of political expertise in Northern Rhodesia because of the small number of white settlers and African backwardness, and the British government's unwillingness to hand over the African population to a government dominated by white settlers. Gore-Browne asked that his proposals be forwarded to the Secretary of State for Colonies but, maddeningly, refused to say what they were until the new Governor had arrived.² G. E. Thornton, the Financial Secretary, then remarked that 'Unofficial Members have

2. This episode is dealt with in some detail in R. Rotberg, Black Heart (London, 1977), 265-275.
made it clear they regard [their proposals] as no more than the prelude to amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia'.¹

This was denied immediately by Gore-Browne but according to him the damage had already been done, 'the African population went up in fire and smoke'.²

Leading the African outcry against Gore-Browne's proposals was the Kitwe African Society which held a meeting to discuss the situation on 5 February, attended by 250 people. The Hon. Secretary read out the text of Gore-Browne's speech from the Mutende report and it was then translated word by word into the vernacular.³ The Society then passed a series of resolutions condemning Gore-Browne's proposals and these were subsequently published in Mutende, the Bantu Mirror and the African Weekly.⁴ In the resolutions the Society declared that they preferred C.O. rule to being dominated by the white settlers; they agreed with Thornton that responsible government was a prelude to amalgamation and deplored the fact that African interests would no longer be paramount. They further declared that Gore-Browne and other members representing African interests should not act independently without first listening to the African viewpoint which could be obtained from the various African societies and councils.

In the issue which published the Kitwe African Society's resolutions, Mutende of March 1948, there also appeared a letter from Nelson Nalumango, a member of the African Representative Council, which served to further enrage the unofficials. This was the paragraph which caused the furore:

Surely most of the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia are not in favour of amalgamation but most of our Europeans here are in favour of it because they want to take all the land from the chiefs in the same way Southern Rhodesia has done to its Africans. The boundaries of the Native Trust land are not known to all chiefs and it will be easy for the proposed Responsible Government to violate these boundaries in future at any time they wish to do so.

Welensky denounced Mutende both in his vehicle the Northern News and in the Leg. Co., as a government "propaganda weapon". (There was even talk of Welensky himself producing a newspaper for Africans.) "Any decent newspaper" said Welensky, would have corrected Nalumango's error about Native Trust lands. The government was well aware that these lands were vested in the Secretary of State for Colonies and could not be altered without the consent of the British government. R. S. Hudson replied that the public were permitted to make up their own minds.

1. Mutende No. 265, 18 March 1948, 8.
about opinions expressed in the papers. When there were any 'glaring mis-statements of fact' he thought that a note should be put in the paper about it, but on this occasion his correction of Nalumango's mis-statement required more than a footnote. An article had been prepared but it needed a map by way of illustration. The publication of the article had been delayed because a printer's block for the map had to be prepared in Salisbury.¹ (In April, Mutende carried a map showing native reserves, Native Trust land and European-occupied and Crown land together with an article in the four official local languages explaining the reserves and trust lands.²)

This action did not placate the unofficials, and in the Leg. Co., in June, Gore-Browne held Mutende largely to blame for the African opposition to responsible government. He accused the government of partiality in allowing statements to go unchecked in Mutende. Thornton's uncorrected statement about responsible government being a prelude to amalgamation had 'swept the whole country as far as African opinion is concerned, and...is the main reason for the hostile attitude adopted by the Africans'.³ Nalumango's statement had been the final straw. Stung by Welensky's attack Mutende hit back in

an issue of April 1948. The editor wrote:

Mutende is NOT a propaganda paper, unless propaganda means spreading information about education, assisting the medical authorities in their fight against sickness, helping the welfare authorities by spreading their information, helping the agricultural authorities to tell people on the land how best to grow their crops, helping out-of-work Africans to find jobs.

Mutende is glad to be able to assist the African in any way possible even though this good work is called by another name, and will be proud to publish many more such articles.¹

An incensed Welsensky demanded an explanation in a belligerent letter to Hudson:

You might tell the Editor that I don't mind a fight and if he looks for one, he will have it, but I don't want to misunderstand him if that is not his intention.²

Brelsford, then Acting Director of Information, wrote to Hudson saying that the article was not meant to be 'provocative' but had been written in 'editorial self defence'; he understood that it had not only been approved by Franklin but 'by somebody upstairs' and concluded that 'If the paper is to have any life in it at all the editor must express some opinions some time. But such opinions will not be based on any desire to start a small-town slanging match'.³ Hudson then wrote to Welensky assuring him that the passage was not intended to be 'provocative...nor will anything

¹. Mutende No. 266, 1 April 1948, 6.
². NAZ/SEC 2/1130, Welensky to Hudson, 24 April 1948.
³. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, Brelsford to SNA (n.d.).
provocative be put in deliberately'.

Despite the strong words in Mutende No. 266, it was Welensky who emerged the victor and thereafter Mutende avoided political controversy; the showdown having demonstrated the increasing political clout of the white settlers.

At a meeting of the Mutende Board in April a working distinction was made between 'political education' and 'politics'. One of the principal functions of the paper was seen as being to give 'political education and information to the masses'. For this maximum coverage was desirable and therefore it should be given in both English and the vernaculars. But it was not felt desirable that 'politics' should have such broad exposure; politics being defined by the chairman of the Board as 'correspondence and articles on political issues in regard to Central Government in its relation to the Unofficial Members'. This material should be confined to English.

But the fight had gone out of Mutende. In an issue of May 1948 Mutende announced its decision to opt out of political controversy in an editorial entitled 'Without Comment'. The editorial offered an 'explanation' but not an 'apology' for only having printed one of the many letters sent in by Africans denouncing the responsible government proposals. It had never been the policy of the paper 'to take sides on any question of politics'. African Councils all over the country were debating the issue, the

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, Hudson to Welensky, 3 May 1948.
paper did not want to influence their deliberations. "When a decision has been reached, one way or another, it will then be the time to comment but not before."¹

The many African letters sent in got no further than the files but the editor did not feel the same constraints about printing letters from unofficials although it had once been the policy of the paper not to publish letters by Europeans. The editor explained his policy under a sub-heading 'Cooperation' in Mutende of July 1948:

For the benefit of some of our readers who have not understood the position of the elected European members when they speak in Legislative Council, we have asked the unofficial members for their assistance in making this matter clear. Below are published two of such letters one from Mr. Welensky, leader of the unofficials and the other from Mr. Sergeant, member for Lusaka. It is hoped to publish letters from other unofficial members very shortly.²

Though Mutende silenced the African voice other papers came to the rescue including the African Weekly, the Bantu Mirror, the Livingstone Mail, the Central African Post and the Northern News. The African Weekly, in May 1948, after having been inundated with letters ('it seems as if the polemics on the Responsible Government proposals will go on indefinitely'), urged that readers should cease discussing the topic till after

1. Mutende No. 269, 13 May 1948, 6.
2. See p. 195.
3. Mutende No. 273, 8 July 1948, 6.
the decision of the African Representative Council (which later denounced the proposals); but as the paper was still swamped with letters the editor decided to keep the subject open for the next two issues. ¹

Europeans on the Copperbelt, especially, became extremely annoyed with the Northern News, Welensky's own paper, for publishing so many letters from Africans on the responsible government proposals. ² What was Welensky's strategy? One contemporary theory was that it was a ploy to draw 'the enemy's fire' so that all the African arguments would be known. ³ Another explanation could be that Mutende was aimed at the 'lower-grade literates', the people whom the government propaganda machine had identified as its target audience, and these people would not have a sufficient command of English to be able to read the European newspapers. They could not therefore be influenced by the letters of the better educated being published in these papers.

Whatever Welensky's motive in publishing these African letters, in other ways his editorial policy in 1948 could only exacerbate race relations. Welensky had been instrumental in sweeping political controversy from the pages of Mutende, no criticisms of unofficials were permitted, while the Northern News, which Welensky

2. CO 537/3647/47272/2, Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, June 1948.
3. Ibid.
founded and owned until 1950, was violently anti-African. In 1948 as a result of new constitutional changes two Africans were elected for the first time to the Leg. Co. Europeans were, on the whole, very resentful of this innovation, and the Northern News reflected this antagonism by publishing some extremely insulting, racist cartoons. In one cartoon one African is shown saying to the other: 'Do you think they will swear us in or just stamp our situpas'. Another one shows an over-dressed African saying to his employer: 'The last wage award gave me a higher standard of living, now I want more money to live up to it'. On 12 August during an outbreak of rabies the Northern News published a cartoon showing a poster on a wall which read 'Rabies. All stray dogs will be shot.' A large rabid dog labelled 'Paramountcy of Native Interests' is shown springing on to a prostrate European child. The caption is 'Kill the dog and spare the child'.

The Central African Post often carried as many letters from Africans as Europeans but for motives more laudable than those of the Northern News. The editor

1. Situpas were identity certificates which only Africans had to carry.

2. CO 537/3647/47272/2, Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, Aug. 1948.
explained his policy on 19 May 1949:

Several Europeans have complained to us that we publish too many letters from Africans. Why should Africans not be allowed to express their views in the Press? We thought that the exclusion of African letters on federation by Mutende was unfair and we did our best to remedy it. ¹

The ultimate effect of the responsible government proposals was to awaken the sleeping giant; they acted as a catalyst in the process of arousing African political consciousness. In July, after the flurry of letter writing, the Federation of African Welfare Societies at its annual meeting, registered its opposition to any kind of association with Southern Rhodesia and transformed itself into the territory's first political party, the Northern Rhodesia African Congress. The African Affairs Annual Report for 1948 commented that in the first half of the year 'the more sophisticated Africans' had shown 'considerable concern' about 'the proposed constitutional changes in this territory'. This vigorous reaction had 'proved that there is now a very definite and vocal African opinion'. ²

Though Mutende had helped to provoke this 'definite

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¹. Central African Post, 10. Dr. Alexander Scott, a retired physician, founded the Central African Post in 1948 as a vehicle for his views. He was opposed to Welensky and his campaign for the federation of the three central African territories. See Kasoma, 'The Development, Role and Control of National Newspapers', 68-75.

². Northern Rhodesia African Affairs Annual Report, 1948, 3.
and vocal opinion' Mutende had indicated that it was no longer going to provide any platform for their expression. From 1948 a definite policy on the future of Northern Rhodesia could be seen to be taking shape - the policy favoured the white settlers - therefore Mutende as a government propaganda weapon now began to adapt its policy to favour the interests of the white settlers.

Mutende continued in its heavy paternalist style, to provide 'political education and information...for the masses'. The paper persistently took the view that when Africans expressed opposition to government action or plans it was because in their childlike simplicity they did not understand the issues involved. These had to be painstakingly explained. One example comes from 1950 when some members of the Central and Western Province Councils announced that they had 'lost some of their trust in Officials of the Government' because they had abstained in a vote on Federation in the Leg. Co. Mutende explained that officials had abstained rather than vote against the proposal because government had 'an open mind' on the subject and wished 'the Motion to go forward as an expression of views of the majority of the Unofficial Members of the Council'. Mutende of 25 April 1950 lectured:

It is of great importance to this country that African leaders should understand the facts of that debate in order that they may be able to explain them properly to others.

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1130, minutes of meeting of Mutende Board, 14 April 1948.
report of an interview with Sefton Delmer of the London Daily Express it was noted that Mutende 'never...mentioned that thoroughly demoralising body, the African Congress'.

Mutende was no more generous with its space to the stirrings of African nationalism elsewhere. There was the occasional fleeting reference to irresponsible agitators. Mutende of 28 March 1950 carried a story that the Governor of Nigeria had condemned a 'small minority' of 'African agitators' who were 'spreading discontent...for their own personal gain'. Nkrumah received considerable attention from the Central African Post but not from Mutende. In Mutende of 21 August 1951 Nkrumah was pictured being greeted by West African students in London with no other explanation and in Mutende of 22 April 1952 his picture with the caption 'Prime Minister of the Gold Coast' appeared, again without comment.

Whilst Mutende attempted to minimise the importance of and even to discredit politically conscious educated Africans, it praised the sterling qualities of the district messenger; Mutende of 28 February 1950 told Africans:

Those men, for the most part have had very little education yet they are the class of African which is perhaps most admired by the European. This is because the European has been taught to admire the qualities of integrity, conscientiousness and physical strength and endurance above those of cleverness and learning.

3. Mutende No. 397, 12.
Mutende frequently reminded Africans of all the benefits Europeans had brought; they had been rescued from a miserable existence punctuated by raids and warfare. They now had 'more cattle, more food, better houses, hospitals and schools'. Was not this 'progress' asked Mutende of 4 April 1950?¹ Emphasis was placed on the continuing need Africans had for Europeans. The Kenyan example was cited in a report on a visit which Lennox Boyd, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, had paid to Kenya in Mutende of 5 February 1952. Lennox Boyd had been 'impressed with the good race relations in Kenya' (not very prescient of him on the eve of Mau Mau) and most impressed 'with the sense of responsibility' Europeans displayed towards the Africans there. '...in British investments and British farming Kenya had priceless assets which it was in the interests of all races to preserve'.² When trouble broke out in Kenya later in the year Mutende of 28 October 1952 reported that strong action was being taken by the Kenya government and that:

Many loyal Africans throughout the Colony of Kenya have expressed pleasure at the firm way in which the Government is handling the situation and there is relief in some districts that certain people have been arrested.³

In its twilight years Mutende attempted to sell Federation and its legitimising creed, partnership, to

1. Mutende No. 325, 6.
its readers. The concept of the senior/junior partner was explained in an editorial in *Mutende* of 27 March 1951:

The senior partner is senior by reason of the amount he contributes to the business, generally, in money and resources, but also in experience, and in the ability that he has of controlling the business for its good. There is no reason why Africans should not some day become senior partners, but they will have to earn that position, and the idea that some Africans have, that partnership means that both parties to the partnership are equals, is, of course, quite beside the mark, there must always be senior and junior partners. 1

*Mutende* of 19 June 1951 reporting on the conference on closer association of the British Central African territories held in London, told readers that a form of federation had been advocated and then reassured them in heavy black type:

There is no question of Africans being deprived of any of the rights they possess at present. In fact, there is provision for Africans to take a full part, as they are taking now, in the Government of their own territory, and also to take part themselves in the new Government through the Federal Legislature and the African Affairs Board of the three territories together. 2

*Mutende* of 24 June 1952 introduced its explanation of the Federation White Paper with the sub-heading 'What Four Governments Think Is Best For Central Africa'. 3

*Mutende*’s political coverage became so anaemic that

even the *Northern News* was driven to comment on the paper's 'lapse of memory' in its reporting of the strike by African railway workers in 1952. Some strikers had tried to prevent railwaymen from returning to work. A large and hostile crowd gathered and when they refused to disperse the police turned tear gas on them. The *News* was scathing about *Mutende*'s emasculated version: 'It contrived to report the Broken Hill affair in these words: "a number of men returning to work at Broken Hill last week were stopped by strikers and police were called to disperse the crowd". That was all. No mention of what caused the use of tear gas, no mention of tear gas either'. The paper reminded the government that a newspaper should report what actually happened and 'not that part of what happens that a government regards with approval'.

Strikes by African workers were *Mutende*'s particular *bête noire*. In 1940 *Mutende* had very carefully explained the second Copperbelt strike (and had been more frank than the account of the Broken Hill strike in 1952 as at least tear gas had been mentioned). Gore-Browne's criticism of its coverage of the 1945 railway strike has been noted. *Mutende* had been started as a form of insurance against another strike on the Copperbelt and the Information Department considered that it had on at least two occasions helped to diffuse a strike situation.

In its annual report for 1948 the department recorded that:

The paper played a part in averting possible disturbances on the Copperbelt which might well have arisen from false rumours regarding maize rationing. The true facts were featured in all languages and hundreds of copies of the paper were delivered to the Copperbelt by air.

The 1951 annual report had a similar story: '...during a labour dispute on the Copperbelt the editor made a midnight rush by road and was able to distribute 2,000 copies the next day of an issue which gave the strikers a full and straightforward account of what the strike was all about'.

In 1952 a Mutende report explained that a strike had been called by the African Mineworkers' Union because a demand for a wage rise had been rejected; but, the paper stressed, the Union had agreed 'to maintain all essential services' and its president, L. Katilungu:

said that he felt that the strike would be peaceful, because union members realised the responsibility of taking strike action.

Mutende concluded by commenting on the 'quiet and orderly' manner in which the strike was being conducted.

Mutende may indeed have, as the department claimed, exercised a calming influence on Copperbelt miners on these occasions, nevertheless, the department was also, at the same time, concerned about the low sales of Mutende on the Copperbelt.

1. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1948, 4.
2. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1951, 12.
In 1950 the administration began to have second thoughts about the wisdom of producing Mutende primarily for the less educated. Too late the administration began to feel that it might have backed the wrong horse. Its message was not reaching politically active Africans, particularly on the Copperbelt; sales were alarmingly low in the mining hub of Northern Rhodesia. The Mutende Board conducted an enquiry and found that the reasons why Mutende was not popular were, 'Simplicity, lack of controversial matter, and non-criticism of Government'.

The decision was taken that the paper should be made more attractive to the better educated and the more politically conscious Africans on the Copperbelt by the addition of a special supplement. Printing difficulties prevented the inclusion of the supplement in 1951 and then in 1952 the decision was taken to cease publication of Mutende.

The Information Department began the publication of a special monthly journal for radio listeners, the African Listener, in 1952; whilst the gap left by Mutende was filled by a commercially run newspaper for Africans, the African Eagle, which was published by African Newspapers Ltd., in Salisbury. Brelsford explained the reason for the demise of Mutende in the paper's final issue, Mutende of December 1952:

...the time has come in Northern Rhodesia when Africans want newspapers - African newspapers that can contain criticism as well as news and which can indulge in debate on topics and events in a way that a government newspaper could not.

2. Mutende No. 468, 30 Dec. 1952
But the government found during Federation that it could not leave the African newspaper field to commercial ventures and began the publication of separate newspapers in each of the four major local languages and English plus a paper in English for the whole territory - Nshila. ¹

(b) Publications Bureau of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland

In 1945 discussions took place on the question of making all post-war mass communications work the responsibility of one department under the Information Officer. Eventually it was decided that with the development in broadcasting and the increasing use of the cinema and film strips together with the demands of internal and external public relations, the government propaganda scene was too complex for one department; too much centralisation would be impractical. ² It would also, I suggest, have been impolitic. We have seen how careful the African Literature Committee were to dissociate themselves from the short-term war propaganda being purveyed by the Information Office. The long-term aims of the Publications Bureau, like those of the African Literature Committee would have been jeopardised by too close an association with the Information Department.

1. Lyashi in English and Bemba (1957), Nkani Za Kum'mawa, in Nyanja, Intanda in Tonga and Zwelopili in Lozi. The latter two were later combined in one paper - the South-Western Star. Graham 'Newspapers in Northern Rhodesia', 430.

2. NAZ/SEC 3/1341, meeting held 20 Dec. 1945 to consider Mass Education, Publications Bureau and Information Office.
In 1948 the pre-war desires of the African Literature Committee were realised when the work of the Committee was put on a professional basis with the establishment of the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Publications Bureau. Funds were provided from the Colonial Development and Welfare vote; during 1952 the total provision for the first eight years was increased from the original £68,136 to £75,859; further contributions were made from territorial funds. The Bureau took over the work of arranging for books for Africans to be written, printed and sold from the African Literature Committee (1937) and the Territorial Bureau (1947). The African Literature Committee had been set up in 1937 at the suggestion of the Secretary of State as a particular response to a local crisis in Northern Rhodesia. The idea of the literature bureau was later incorporated into the mass education strategy of the C.O.; literature bureaux were expected to provide follow-up literature for mass literacy campaigns, and generally to assist in mass education campaigns. But as the Northern Rhodesian Bureau chief, G. H. Wilson, pointed out in 1950:

The Publications Bureaux are not, as is commonly supposed, an afterthought to the recent campaigns in Africa for Mass Literacy, but represent a stage in a process which has been going on for quite a long time.  


2. Wilson, 'The Northern Rhodesia-Nyasaland Joint Publications Bureau', 60.
In its annual report for 1949 the Publications Bureau of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland formulated its objectives; there was an admixture of the political, the commercial, the educational and the literary:

(i) The production of books of general interest to Africans;

(ii) Thus indirectly providing counter-attractions to pernicious literature;

(iii) The encouragement of African authorship;

(iv) Thus indirectly providing the rising intelligentsia with a happy and useful outlet for their abilities, and bringing them in with us on Development in a positive way;

(v) Co-operation with Education Departments and others concerned with Development in all its phases;

(vi) Co-operation with British publishers;

(vii) Arrangements for the distribution of books on a commercial basis;

(viii) The gradual achievement of a healthy book trade on sound commercial lines.¹

The Bureau did not have its own press but arranged for printing to be done by commercial or mission presses, the latter on a commercial basis. The Bureau made extensive use of British firms such as Longmans, Macmillans and the Oxford University Press and were thus, in the words of the director, 'helping in the process of opening up Africa to British trade'.² It will have been noted that there was a heavy emphasis on the political

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reasons for promoting both the production of books and the encouragement of African authors. After the war 'pernicious' was now seen to apply in Northern Rhodesia not only to Watch Tower literature but to communist publications. One of the major cold-war propaganda objectives of the C.O., as we have seen, was to demonstrate that 'the Western democratic way of life' was superior to that which the communists had to offer. In 1948 there was something of a stir about the circulation (albeit very small) of the South African communist newspaper for Africans, Inkululeko, and another South African communist paper, the Guardian; there was too, some communist activity in the trade unions but the government in its political intelligence reports to the C.O., did not display undue alarm at either manifestation.  

Welensky did, however, and in 1949 suggested that a top-level conference be called to discuss ways of combating communism in Africa. At least in part Welensky was playing to the gallery, hoping to convince the British government of the need to set up a white-dominated state in Central Africa as a bulwark against communism - employing 'red scare' tactics. The Central African Post thought Welensky was over-reacting. It did not consider 'seepage into the country of the kind of subversive publications in which so-called Communists indulge' a

1. CO 537/3647/47272/2, Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Reports, April, May, June 1948.
serious threat. It jocularly suggested some counter-
propaganda measures:

Why does Mr. Welenksy not write some 
very pointed and pertinent pamphlets 
just to show the Africans the way they 
should choose? He might even write a 
film script showing the African who 
chose the democratic way and finished 
up with a seat in the Federal Senate 
and another who chose the communistic 
path and came to a sticky end on the 
Copperbelt.

Godwin Lewanika told a group of MPs in the Committee 
Room of the House of Commons in 1950 that he did not 
' think that there are even five Africans in Northern 
Rhodesia who know and understand quite what "Communism" 
is'. Labelling an African as a communist, he thought, 
was 'only a cunning way to silence people and discredit 
them before the Government for fear of their strong 
arguments'.

The Mutende strategy for combating communist 
ideology was explained by Bush, the Secretary for 
Native Affairs, in a quarterly newsletter to 
P.C.s in 1949:

Our present attitude is not to give 
communism too much advertisement. 
Africans hate the thought of another 
war and in such references as we make 
to Communism in Mutende etc. we make 
a point of associating it with the 
aggressive Russian nation.


Committee on 25 July; he was then President-General 
of the Northern Rhodesian African Congress.)

3. NAZ/SEC 2/233, Quarterly Newsletter to Provincial 
Commissioners, 31 March 1949, R. P. Bush.
In a talk over the CABS in 1950 Wilson sought to 'correct a misconception... that this Bureau is intended chiefly to combat communism'. The policy of the Bureau was not based on fear of subversion...'. African authors were encouraged:

not just to prevent them going sour, but because we believe it to be positively good to bring the best out of people so that they can be happy and make others happy.¹

The approach of the Bureau was by way of long-term propaganda for a whole life-style and world view.

Welensky continued to use the spectre of communism in his Federation campaign. In 1952 the African Weekly reported that he had said:

The Communists did not want 'us to produce a scheme which will give racial peace. A considerable amount of Communist literature is already pouring into Northern Rhodesia. Quite a lot of it is coming direct from Moscow, and it is very well produced with plenty of coloured pictures which Natives understand.'²

The Watch Tower movement continued to attract a large following in the post-war period³ but despite the fact that some D.C.s considered 'the danger from Watch Tower to be much greater than from Communism',⁴ Watch

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1. Talk over the CABS, 29 Sept. 1950.
3. For example, in Aug. 1948 nearly 7,000 Africans were reported to have attended a rally at Mufulira: CO 537/3647/47272/2, Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, Sept. 1948.
4. CO 537/3647/47272/2, Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, May 1948.
Tower literature was in no danger of subverting the African literati. The appeal of the Watch Tower continued to be to the less-educated; its doctrines alone disqualified it from having any strong attraction for the budding African politician, since it was opposed to any form of secular authority - African or European. (The government of independent Zambia was to find the Watch Tower as irritating as did its colonial predecessor.)

The encouragement of African authors had originally been a particular project of Margaret Wrong. She had thought that Africans would naturally produce the type of literature that other Africans would want to read. In the aims of the Publications Bureau this objective took on a strongly political bias; Wilson considered it the most important of the Bureau's objectives. It was in harmony with the recommendations set out in Education for Citizenship in Africa where it had been suggested that advanced Africans should be urged to invest their energies in safe channels i.e. government-sponsored projects, rather than in independent political activity.¹

The Bureau did succeed in part of this objective, the encouragement of African authors. Between 1938 and 1951 about one hundred books had been published, of which about half had been produced since the Bureau was set up in 1948. The total comprised about twenty original

¹ Education for Citizenship, 12.
works by Africans and fifteen translations by African authors; most of the others were by Europeans or joint productions.¹ In 1952 there were twenty-five new titles of which sixteen were by Africans.² Books by Africans were mostly in the local languages. This was partly for the sound commercial reason that the Bureau found from its sales that Africans did not want to buy books in English written by Africans,³ but there was also a political motive as Wilson indicated to the Rev. Claude de Mestral, a successor to Margaret Wrong as Secretary of the ICCLA:

I think, also, from the point of view of authors and other leaders of African opinion, we help by encouraging the writing of original works in the vernacular, to decrease paradoxically the likelihood of their reacting into vernacularist, nationalist, anti-English, anti-Western ways later on - that is what is happening in the Far East...⁴

An outstanding feature of the books written by African authors is that they were utilitarian in nature and concerned either with preservation or adaptation; African authors showed a keenness to write down their own history, culture and traditions, material which in a pre-literate society had been handed down verbally

¹. Commonwealth Survey, Part II Vol. 4 (c) 1951, 32.
⁴. Ibid.
from one generation to the next. In the annual African authors' competition of 1946 conducted by Mutende there were forty-five entries, tribal history was the most popular topic there being eight manuscripts submitted; this was followed by a subject described as 'Manners and Behaviour in the Modern World, General' concerning which there were six manuscripts. There were also five 'Accounts of Various Customs', three books on marriage and three relating traditional stories.¹ At the top of the Bureau's best seller list for 1952 was the Nyanja work, Banja Lathu (1945)² written by E. W. Chafulumira who joined the Bureau from Nyasaland in 1950. In 1952 Banja Lathu's sales amounted to eight thousand (in order to qualify for the best-seller list a book had to have sold more than one thousand copies). Banja Lathu, which gave advice on the rearing of a family, was one of the Bureau's all-time best sellers; in 1949 sales reached sixty-three thousand and in 1953 it had reached its ninth reprint. At the bottom of the best-seller list in 1952 was another of the genre of improving literature, Ubusuma Bubili (1955)³; written in Bemba by Stephen Mpashi, it gave advice to women on their appearance and conduct, and had sales figures of just

2. Zomba, Nyasaland, Department of Education.
over one thousand. In 1950 Wilson reported that the African reading public had a taste for works on local history and morals but that novels and works on agriculture did not sell well.¹

In this post-war period Northern Rhodesia's population was around two million.² The Bureau's reading public was not large. There were few libraries from which Africans could borrow books; they were mostly confined to a few mining towns on the Copperbelt and supported by Welfare and/or Canteen funds.³ Factors inhibiting the sales of the books were illiteracy, distribution and cost. The books were subsidised and were sold at a 'slight loss': the prices ranged from 10d for Banja Lathu to 3s for Bradley's The Story of Northern Rhodesia; but African wages were low.⁴ Illiteracy has already been discussed with reference to Mutende. A major problem with distribution was the sparseness of the population with vast areas of four to the square mile. An associated problem was expense. It was not possible to have a complex distribution network employing many middlemen as it would make the books too expensive. The books were distributed through two depots: Mindolo

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1. Wilson, 'The Northern Rhodesia-Nyasaland Joint Publications Bureau', 68.
2. Colonial Office Annual Reports Northern Rhodesia, 1945-1952.
4. 'The purchase of a book had to compete with the necessities of life'. ICCLA Box 17, Bruce Roberts, Acting Director, Northern Rhodesia Publications Bureau To S. Pinfold, 23 January 1954. Institute of
Bookroom on the Copperbelt and the Lusaka Bookshop (of the United Society for Christian Literature). These depots arranged for the books to be on sale at mines, bomas, mission stations, in village stores and on farms. Retailers, it was estimated, gained a net return of 10 per cent on their investment.¹ The Bureau's annual report for 1950 noted that:

The majority of people have not yet got the desire to read, or the habit of reading for pleasure, though there is evidence that it is spreading.²

W. F. Stubbs, in the Quarterly Newsletter to P.C.s of 31 March 1951, also testified to the fact there was a rise in African readers:

We have evidence that an increasing number of people are willing to buy books if they have the opportunity to get what appeals to them and that even farm labourers and domestic servants are beginning to be keen on reading.³

Evidence of this increase can be seen in a comparison of the Bureau's sales in Northern Rhodesia in 1948 and 1953 of volumes which it sponsored: 32,485 and 66,795.⁴ These figures would probably represent no more than one tenth of the total of books sold as they represent the books sponsored by the Bureau.⁵ 'Foreign' best sellers

1. Ibid.
included *Pears Encyclopaedia*, the *Oxford Readers for Africa* and, of course, the Bible.¹

The 'morals' theme figured prominently in the work of perhaps the Bureau's most distinguished African author, Stephen Mpashi, who joined the staff of the Bureau in 1951. In 1946, while still working in army broadcasting in Nairobi, he won the 1946 African authors' competition (sponsored by Mutende) with *Umucinshi* (modern morals and manners considered in relation to traditional ideas). In 1961, with several novels in Bemba to his credit, he was awarded the Margaret Wrong Memorial Prize, being described by Irvine Richardson as 'the father of Bemba literature' and as 'a kind of African Geoffrey Chaucer'.²

In his first novel *Cekesoni Aingila Ubusoja* (1947) Mpashi draws on his war experiences in East and North Africa and demonstrates how traditional Bemba culture is being destroyed as a result of the inroads of western civilisation. After Mpashi joined the Publications Bureau his novels are directed more at young urban Africans. Mpashi considered that the role of the


nervousist was didactic:

In fiction one should bear one thing in mind, this is that although the book is fiction, it should have something to teach readers... The qualities of the good characters should be evident so that the reader can emulate them whenever they are applicable.  

He advised:

If one of your fictitious characters does something wrong secretly, put police detectives on his trail so that they eventually arrest and deal with him for his wrong deed...  

Like the Colonel in East Africa Command Mpashi did not approve of the 'rabbit trickster narratives', not to show the suffering of the villains is not good writing. 

In Pio na Vera (a novel of courtship in two parts) pre-marital sex is deprecated. In one scene a young couple are staying in the same resthouse and the distracted young man fighting to overcome temptation, paces up and down outside the room where his beloved is saying the rosary! According to Kalunga Lutato the strongly moralistic tone is derived from the oral narrative tradition in Bemba culture which is strongly


2. Ibid., 34.  


4. Lutato, 34.  

5. (Lusaka, 1968). This is a combination of two novels: Uwakwensho Bushiku (Cape Town, 1951) and Pio Akobekela Vera (Cape Town, 1957).  

didactic, the narratives being employed to socialise the young. The 'sound' and 'wholesome' sentiments of Mpashi's work must have been at the very least, reinforced by his attachment to the Publications Bureau.

To what extent did the Publications Bureau succeed in deflecting African authors and employees from political activism? Civil servants were not permitted under the law of Northern Rhodesia to engage in political activities; nevertheless the novels of Stephen Mpashi seem to indicate some sympathy with the activities of nationalist politicians. M. Frost sees in Uwauma Nafyala (1955) what is tantamount to a defence of those Africans who are working in schools, hospitals...(or Publications Bureaux?). They are not traitors but are performing necessary functions and at the same time are able to serve their people and be in readiness for the day of self-government - 'a kind of sabotage/counter-sabotage plot'. In the opening pages of the novel a Lozi man who expresses support for European rule is accused of being an informer.

It could not be said that the Bureau succeeded in its objective of deflecting literary-minded Africans from political activities. Africans who had books sponsored

1. Lutato, 32-33.
2. The first part of a Bemba proverb: If you are going to beat your mother-in-law...do it thoroughly. Publications Bureau, 1955.
by the African Literature Committee or the Publications Bureau included Dauti Yamba, on whose initiative the Federation of African Welfare Societies was transformed into the country's first African political party in 1948 and the first president of Congress, Godwin Lewaniaka, who was both an author and a member of the African Literature Committee; when Lewaniaka proved too moderate he was replaced as president in 1951 by Harry Nkumbula who had a book on Ila customs to his credit. Henry Kasokolo, one of the first two Africans to take a seat in the Leg. Co., wrote a book of advice for the times based on Bemba proverbs for the Publications Bureau. Safaeli Chileshe, one of the first Africans from Northern Rhodesia to study in the United Kingdom, did a course in anthropology and philology at the School of Oriental and African Studies and was at one time employed by the Publications Bureau. Chileshe was particularly concerned with the training of junior African staff; but he wished to engage in political activities which was forbidden to civil servants, so he left government employ. Chileshe was a founder-member of Congress, a member of the African Representative Council and in 1954 led a boycott of Lusaka butcheries. On the political spectrum he was a moderate

2. Ibid.
and in 1952 he and Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika angered more uncompromising members of the Congress by expressing a willingness to enter into a dialogue on the Federation proposals with the authorities. ¹ Dixon Konkola, a trade union activist, went to prison for his activities on behalf of Congress but he later blotted his nationalist copy-book by becoming a Federal MP. In 1952 the Bureau published Konkola's *Ifyo Bamwene Mu Nkondo* (the experiences of R. S. M. Mulenga Mulunda in the Army).

Henry Swanzy formerly of the C.O. reflected in 1950 that one of the lessons of history was that the encouragement by an imperial government of regional culture had a boomerang effect, 'literary nationalism [had given] place to political nationalism where it did not actually found it...'. ² Yet we find the Publications Bureau deliberately following a seemingly contrary policy by fostering the writing of books in the local languages; and that this policy was, in part, followed to forestall any independent literary-cum-nationalist activity. (This is not the first time that the Northern Rhodesian administration used this pre-emptive strategy: one reason for the founding of *Mutende*, it will be recalled, was to forestall the setting up of an independent African newspaper and, similarly, the chain of provincial


2. Swanzy, 'Regions of the Mind', *Corona*, 2, 7 (1950), 244.
councils culminating in the African Representative Council had been established to contain African political initiative in a government-sponsored organization.) The contradiction in Northern Rhodesia's policy is apparent rather than real for in Northern Rhodesia there was not just one 'literary nationalism' that might be fostered: the Publications Bureau had books produced in the four main local languages and a fewer number in five less widely spoken languages.¹ Such a policy would be more likely to encourage ethnic particularism than 'political nationalism', though it must be pointed out that the encouragement of ethnic particularism was quite contrary to the stated intention of the Northern Rhodesian administration. In 1948 R. S. Hudson, in refusing a request for Mutende to be partly printed in Lunda, emphasised 'that the distant goal of the work of the Information Department is to advance our Africans as a whole and as one people and to discourage tribal jealousies, insularity and a babel of tongues'.²

Indicative of the fact that literature work was considered a safe channel into which to divert African intellectual energy is that both the African Literature Committee and the Publications Bureau allowed more room

1. The main languages were Nyanja, Bemba, Lozi and Tonga; and the minor: Lunda, Ila, Lala, Nsenga and Lwena. Wilson, 'The Northern Rhodesia-Nyasaland Joint Publications Bureau', 64.

2. "AZ/SEC 2/1130, circular minute, 11 May 1948."
for African initiative than most other fields of government propaganda work. Africans were in on the process of literature production from beginning to end. They were consulted on production policy. Wilson wrote that on the African Literature Committee 'African opinion was counted at least as highly as European...'.

Some African members were sent to train for their work at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London; a move strongly recommended in the Report of Group V at the Summer Conference on African Initiative in 1948.

With the proviso that literature had to be 'wholesome', African literature tastes determined to a large extent what types of books were written. Wilson wrote that whilst the Bureau did take into account the 'judgment and the opinions of the Committee members and readers including Africans' in deciding what books the Bureau should publish 'actual sales figures give firmer evidence of the effective opinions of a larger number of people'.

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1. Africans were also allowed considerable initiative in broadcasting. See Fraenkel, Wayaleshi.


4. Franklin led Group V but dissented from the view that Africans should be sent to the 'Oriental School of Languages' in London as he considered the course 'quite unsuitable'; he claimed that the C.O. Welfare Officer agreed with his view. Northern Rhodesia, Minutes of the Administrative Conference of Provincial Commissioners and Heads of Social Service Departments (Lusaka, 1949), Appendix F3, 'Community Development - Technique; Note by Director of Information'. However Bureau members P. P. Chella and Mufaya Mumbuna did attend the school in 1950.
In conclusion it can be said that the Bureau and its predecessor were successful in promoting the production of literature by and for Africans; indeed, they were more successful in promoting the development of literature in the local languages than the independent government of Zambia has been; but the Bureau did not succeed in deflecting the 'rising intelligentsia' from political activities; literature did not prove an effective weapon in 'the combating of sedition and sourness'.

3. The Electronic Media

(a) Broadcasting

During the war at the Information Officers' Conferences held in Nairobi, when the question of post-war broadcasting came up, regional broadcasting was again advocated - for reasons of economy and efficiency. There was uncertainty whether Northern Rhodesia should form part of an East or Central African zone. This problem was solved in 1944 when the British government announced the setting up of the Central African Council. One activity the Central African Council was to co-ordinate was Public Relations, and it was to the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council that Franklin submitted his plan for regional broadcasting.

1. Wilson, Talk over the CABS, 29 Sept. 1950.
2. NAZ/SEC 2/1136, H. Franklin to Chief Sec., 25 Nov. 1943.
3. Ibid.; and also NAZ/SEC 2/1134, Franklin to Sir Geoffrey Northcote, Principal Inform. Officer, Nairobi, 15 Sept. 1943.
The plan was that all African broadcasting in the three territories should be undertaken by the Northern Rhodesian Information Department in Lusaka and all European broadcasting by the Southern Rhodesian Broadcasting Service in Salisbury. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland's share of the scheme, being concerned with African broadcasting, was to be partially financed by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. The technical side of Franklin's plan for a Central African broadcasting station was based on the recommendations of BBC engineer, W. Varley, who had been appointed to advise on the technical aspect of broadcasting in East and Central Africa at the end of the war and had visited Northern Rhodesia in January 1946.¹

When Franklin's scheme was discussed at the second meeting of the Central African Council in October 1945, H. F. Cartmel-Robinson, now Chief Secretary, had lost much of his earlier interest in broadcasting. He told the Council that the Secretariat had sent round to listening centres for reports, and, on the evidence received back, doubted that the African broadcasts had 'very much value'.²

The subject of Franklin's regional broadcasting scheme for Central Africa was to come up again at a


meeting of the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council in January 1946. Prior to the meeting Franklin circulated a forceful memorandum in which he stated that he did:

\[
\text{not believe that given reasonable reception and trained broadcasting staff, the spoken word from the receiver is either dangerous or unintelligible as far as Africans are concerned.}
\]

He hoped that 'before very long' cheap dry battery receivers would be available so that individual African listening would be possible.

The body of his argument was devoted to what he saw as the prime function of broadcasting: to be an aid in mass education. Franklin saw mass education not only in its essential terms of the 'enlightenment and education of the more backward sections of the population', to use again the phraseology of the Plymouth Report, but also as having an ultimate political objective. That objective was very much in the Lugard tradition:

Much of the very serious political and economic trouble experienced in our older Colonies and in India has been due to the education of a very small minority of natives and the total neglect of the masses. The 'educated' soon come to despise and oppress their own humbler fellow natives, and a discontented small 'white-collar' class breeds agitators who mislead and cheat the totally ignorant mass of the population into misguided action. 1

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1. NAZ/SEC 1/204, Franklin, 15 Jan. 1946; see also Franklin, 'African Broadcasting and Mass Education', broadcast to Africans over CABS, 7 June 1949.
This process was already becoming apparent in Northern Rhodesia and so Franklin considered mass education was 'absolutely vital to avoid this danger'.

Franklin succeeded in winning the approval of the Central African Council for his plan which had also to be submitted to the three territories individually and to the Secretary of State. By March 1947, after many delays, the scheme had finally been approved by all parties and funds allocated. The African side of the agreement was implemented in 1948, but it was not until March 1950 that Southern Rhodesia finally began broadcasting to the European population in the northern territories.

The launching of the CABS in Lusaka, in 1948, coincided with a renewed interest in colonial broadcasting on the part of the C.O. In May 1948, the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones, despatched a confidential circular on the development of broadcasting services in the colonies, the first to have been sent out on that subject since 1936. Creech-Jones noted that in the interval between the two circulars broadcasting developments had been slow, largely due to the war. He

1. NAZ/SEC 1/204, Franklin, memorandum for CAC Public Relations Committee meeting held Salisbury, 17 Jan. 1946.

2. Colonial Development and Welfare Fund was to provide £76,100 capital expenditure for 8 year scheme and half the recurrent expenditure of £16,000 - the rest being divided in due proportion between the three Central African territories.

endorsed the conclusions of the Plymouth Report, that colonial governments should promote broadcasting as a public service and that the radio should be used as an instrument of social and educational advancement. But matters of more immediate imperial concern seem to have occasioned the circular, and given it its sense of urgency. Uppermost in the Colonial Secretary's mind appears to have been the rising tide of African nationalism.

Obviously broadcasting had to be introduced into the colonies sooner or later, in view of the 'quickening pace of social, economic and political development'.

Creech-Jones was pressing for sooner:

Recent events in the Gold Coast, for example, have underlined its value as a means of spreading widely and speedily authentic information and ideas, and of correcting false impressions and rumours in time of civil disturbance.

This situation parallels the earlier introduction of government broadcasting in Northern Rhodesia during the war primarily to prevent the spreading of false reports and wild rumours. Northern Rhodesia had again


2. Ibid. See also Colonial Office Handbook of 1959 on Sound and Television Broadcasting in the Overseas Territories. 'Immediately after the war Governments were concerned with reconstruction and a return to normal, but the urgent need to build new broadcasting stations in the Colonies was soon recognised. The war had left confusion in its wake; false rumours and impressions were believed because in the remote parts of many territories there was no way of learning the truth.'
anticipated C.O. policy.

In June 1948 a confidential 'demi-official' letter sent by Andrew Cohen of the C.O. to the East African governments, reinforces the idea that the prospect of increasing political unrest in the colonies was behind the quickening of the C.O. interest in broadcasting. A significant passage reads '...interest is now being taken at a high level in the development of colonial broadcasting as a public service for reasons connected with Imperial Defence and International Politics'.

In his circular, Creech-Jones regretted that financial reasons had prevented most colonial governments from including broadcasting in their development plans. For example, as emerges from Cohen's letter, when Varley's plan for the technological side of regional broadcasting in Central Africa had proved too expensive, Franklin had modified his plan to suit his purse. By contrast, one reason given by the East African governments for rejecting Varley's plan for an East African regional broadcasting service based on Nairobi, was that it was too expensive. It was not until 1949 when £1,000,000 was made available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund for the development of broadcasting in the colonies that significant progress began to be made in

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2. Ibid.
most colonies. In 1952 a further £250,000 was allocated.¹

Creech-Jones mentioned in his 1948 circular that for the first time it now appeared likely that cheap wireless receivers selling at about £5 might go on the market, which would make it possible for Africans to buy their own radios. This was an allusion to the Saucepan Special. Franklin had realised that no amount of improvement in transmission or programmes would be of any value unless Africans could become individual listeners. For most Africans in the 1940s this was out of the question; the radios on the market were beyond their means. Franklin was determined to find a solution to this problem. He refused to accept Varley's conclusion that in Central Africa for a long time to come individual African radio ownership would not be possible.² He and his staff drew up specifications for a receiver suitable for African conditions, then Franklin began a three-year search in Britain and the dominions to find a firm willing to produce a cheap dry-battery, short-wave receiver. In 1948 his persistence was rewarded when the Ever Ready Company agreed to produce such a set - the Saucepan Special.³ Taking its name from its 9-inch round aluminium casing which made it resemble a saucepan,

1. COT, 'The Development of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom Dependencies'.
2. NA2/SEC 2/1136, Franklin to Chief Sec., 13 Sept. 1946.
3. For Franklin's account of the genesis of the Saucepan Special see, The Flag-Wagger, 153-156.
it had four valves and a range from twenty to ninety metres so that the set could pick up stations in Rhodesia and the Congo as well as the BBC. The Saucepan Special was to make individual African radio ownership possible in Central Africa, in the days before the transistor.

Since the 1930s the C.O. had always been ready to encourage colonial governments to develop local broadcasting services but it had been up to the colonies themselves to decide whether or not they would take up the challenge. The pioneering role of Northern Rhodesia in the development of colonial broadcasting was very much the result of local initiative, ingenuity, and personal enthusiasm. In the beginning there had been the D.O.s and amateurs; now their progressive, experimental approach was being continued by Information Department Director, Harry Franklin, and his broadcasting staff.

Scarcely had the CABS got underway than it was put in jeopardy by the manoeuvrings of the Southern Rhodesian government. Southern Rhodesia, though it had given its assent to the CABS scheme, soon became apprehensive about allowing the African population of Southern Rhodesia to listen to programmes broadcast from Lusaka, despite the fact that scripts for the Shona and Ndebele programmes were prepared in Salisbury. In 1945 a Select Committee appointed by the Southern Rhodesian Parliament recommended the setting up of a Southern Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation and, what was most
disconcerting for Northern Rhodesia's Information Department, that African broadcasting should originate from Salisbury.1

When the matter was discussed at a meeting of the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council in December 1948, it became clear that Southern Rhodesian Europeans were afraid that through listening to the Lusaka station, the Southern Rhodesian Africans might be exposed to what was described as the 'imperial complex' of the Northern Rhodesian Protectorate government.2 According to Godfrey Huggins, Southern Rhodesia's Prime Minister, the northerners were 'not so particular about what is put over to their own native people'.3 Southern Rhodesian employers of African labour were particularly concerned about broadcasts emanating from the black north.4 In Southern Rhodesia the white settlers had had responsible government since 1923. Discriminatory land and labour legislation ensured that they would continue to dominate the African majority. In Northern Rhodesia in 1948 the closer union question was still not settled and the southern whites disliked


2. Ibid. D. Macintyre MP, Southern Rhodesian representative, 110.


4. NAZ/SEC 1/190, W. Gale, Seventh Meeting of the CAC - Public Relations Committee - Salisbury, 23 Nov. 1948, 3.
the Lusaka broadcasting station being in the hands of C.O. officials whose 'native policy' was thought to be too liberal and some of whose officials were known not to favour amalgamation of the two Rhodesias.

The CABS, however, survived this early challenge and a compromise was arrived at whereby Southern Rhodesia exercised stricter control over programmes being broadcast from the Lusaka station to the Africans of Southern Rhodesia. The Southern Rhodesian government appointed and paid the salary of a liaison officer to take charge of the Southern programmes in Lusaka. And, towards the end of 1949, an African Broadcasting Advisory Board under the chairmanship of Sir Harold Dartnel-Robinson was set up. Though it was on the subject of African broadcasting that advice was being sought, there were no Africans on the Board which included Native Affairs officials, MPs, Information Department personnel and representatives of African labour from the three Central African territories. Franklin regarded the Advisory Board as an exercise in public relations: he thought that the new Board 'suitably publicised, should help allay whatever fears may exist that our African broadcasting will spread "Colonial Office propaganda"'.

The 'great leap forward' for African broadcasting in Northern Rhodesia came during the years 1948-1952. During this period experiments on both the programme and

technical side were carried further than in any other African colony.¹ The period saw both the devising of mass education and entertainment programmes with strong audience appeal and, complementing this, such a dramatic increase in the size of the audience as a result of the introduction of the Saucepan Special in October 1949, that Franklin's dream of a radio in every village came close to realisation. The set cost £5 and the battery, which lasted three hundred hours, £1.5s; this contrasted with the £30 or £40 for the ordinary radio sets available in Northern Rhodesia which only Europeans could afford to purchase. In the first four months Africans had bought an estimated 1,200 sets and the station had received 312 letters of appreciation.² In the next few years more than 50,000 set were imported.³

Back in the thirties the then Director of Native Education, Tyndale-Biscoe, had mapped out a provisional plan for programmes for the projected Broken Hill experiment; Franklin had attempted during the war to lighten a heavy diet of war propaganda and news with music and the occasional instructional programme. In 1949 with the appointment of an experienced professional


3. In 1953 the estimated number of Africans listening to the Lusaka station in Northern Rhodesia was 150,000. In 1952 there were about 100 receivers being used for communal listening in schools, and welfare halls. C.C.L, 'The Development of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom Dependencies'.
broadcasting officer to take charge of the CABS, this early promise as regards programme experimentation and the use of radio in mass education began to be fulfilled. Michael Kittermaster was well qualified for the job. He had previously worked for the South African Broadcasting Station conducting the Johannesburg Bantu programmes; he had a knowledge of Bantu languages and music and had studied sociology. What he did not have was South African racial attitudes. Kittermaster would not tolerate racial discrimination at Broadcasting House. He surrounded himself with an enthusiastic staff, European and African, and the sane, non-discriminatory atmosphere at the CABS was, according to contemporaries, almost unique in Northern Rhodesia.

By 1950 broadcasting hours had reached 24½ a week. The daily transmission in the six main languages spoken by Africans in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland lasted for 3½ hours. On one night a week the programme was in simple English and in 1951 a more sophisticated programme in advanced English was added. In 1952 broadcasting hours were doubled. A few hours of broadcasting time each week were set aside for European programmes even after the belated implementation of the Southern Rhodesian side of the CABS scheme in 1950, because Europeans were dissatisfied with the service Salisbury was providing.

Part of the work of the CABS was to be an 'instrument

of advanced administration' which meant keeping people informed, explaining the workings of government and justifying government policy: activities of the political education and public relations variety that Mutende had been engaged in since 1936. In 1942 a local government series was introduced by R. S. Hudson, the Secretary for Native Affairs, in which he attempted to influence African public opinion on issues that had first been put on the political agenda in Mutende in 1948 as a result of the controversy surrounding the European responsible government proposals. Hudson 'could not remember an instance where unofficial members had refused to provide money to be spent on African advancement' and, in what is clearly a reference to Nelson Mulumango's letter to Mutende No 265 of March 1948, 'he reminded Africans that Native Reserves and Native Trust Lands were fully protected by law'.

Other themes he touched on were 'the importance of the policy of partnership between all races' and the great advancement that had recently been made 'in every department of African life'. For example:

he pointed out that there were already three African Trade Unions in existence; much was being done in the sphere of technical education for Africans, and expenditure on African education in the Territory had increased nine-fold in the last ten years.

The Secretary for Native Affairs, in explaining the

workings of local government, spoke of Native Authorities, Native Courts, Native Treasuries, African Provincial Councils and the African Representative Council. Heads of departments gave talks explaining the functions of the various departments and in 1950 the practice was begun of explaining, in a simplified manner, the proceedings of the Lex. Co. On a broader canvas there were programmes designed to inform people about Britain—aimed at cementing the ties of Empire; broadcasts of royal occasions were given particular prominence. Broadcasting was extending the reach of government propaganda, Mutende only reached the literate; a wider community was now being brought into the political discourse.

Kittermaster insisted that the radio should not be a mere vehicle for government handouts as he thought this would lose the station the confidence of the African people and he fought fiercely to keep the news bulletins independent. The news was kept brief and simple with most emphasis on local news. In 1951, in response to popular demand, the CABS began relaying the BBC news which was not only appreciated by the educated but by some who could barely understand it. Franklin had insisted that the Saucepan Special should not be pre-set.

2. Fraenkel, Nwaleshi, 32.
He felt it would be 'psychologically wrong' for:

Many educated Africans wish to listen to Daventry and if they thought they were being prevented from listening to anywhere but Lusaka, a prejudice would be created which would defeat the ends of broadcasting.¹

As 'in those post-war years of Labour government, new ideas of colonial administration were gaining ground' wrote Fraenkel, Franklin obtained the grudging permission of the Secretariat for a non pre-set Saucepan Special.²

In 1950, inspired by the greatly enlarged radio audiences, the Northern Rhodesian Information Department using all the media at its disposal: newspapers, posters, pamphlets, film and broadcasting, launched a five-year propaganda campaign for mass education. The campaign concentrated on six areas which included improved hygiene, education for girls and better agriculture. Kittermaster was particularly anxious to bring enlightenment to the women of Northern Rhodesia and so, in 1950, he started a women's programme and the first African woman announcer went on the air. The series 'Know Your Own People' aimed at explaining one ethnic group in Central African to another.³ There were also quizzes, health programmes and language lessons. In 1952 as an aid to listening the Information Department started a monthly radio journal, the African Listener; at the end of the first year of

2. Fraenkel, Wavaleshi, 19.
3. Mutende No. 313, 10 Jan. 1950, 7; and Mutende No. 327, 18 April 1950, 6.
circulation it had reached 2,600 and averaged sixty new subscribers a month.¹

Entertainment programmes were designed to attract audiences for weightier political and development propaganda, but they also had a conscious social purpose, providing new forms of entertainment for a people whose life-style was undergoing rapid social change.² Top of the popularity chart was the ubiquitous request programme. Music was a mixture of the traditional village music, which tended to appeal most to people in the rural areas, and the new town music. The CABS recording vans toured Central Africa to record and preserve traditional music which in many areas showed signs of disappearing, and began building up what was to become 'the biggest collection of African music in Africa'.³ Instructional programmes were often served up in the form of plays to make them more palatable. Especially popular were plays improvised in the vernaculars by the African announcers. Pioneering work on the programme side was guided by feed-back from the audience through listener research - a field in which the Lusaka station led the field in Africa.⁴

The experimental work of the CABS soon attracted

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¹. CFI, 'The Development of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom Dependencies'. The first editor was Edwin Mongoti.

². See also, J. Merle Davis, Modern Industry and the African.


⁴. The listener research was in the form of questionnaires. The pioneering role of CABS in this field is noted by Jon Powell in Sydney F. Head (ed.), Broadcasting in Africa (Philadelphia, 1944), 126.
considerable attention and broadcasters came from as far away as the Polynesian islands to study its techniques. ¹

The CABS was visited by BBC personalities like J. B. Clark, Deputy Director of the Overseas Services; talks producer, Sylvia Hingley; John Grenfell Williams, head of the Colonial Service and author of the UNESCO survey, Radio in Fundamental Education in Undeveloped Areas (Paris, 1950); and the well-known broadcaster Cyril Ray. All had high praise for the seminal work being done at Lusaka in the field of vernacular broadcasting. ² Cyril Ray wrote that Northern Rhodesia had 'made one of the biggest contributions to the whole field of mass communications'. ³

The BBC, UNESCO and the C.O. might be happy about the success of the CABS at Lusaka; Northern Rhodesia's white settlers were not. Their representatives, the unofficials in the Leg. Co., as we have noted, looked upon the Information Department with considerable suspicion, regarding it as a bastion of the trusteeship doctrine which interfered with their demands for continued white settler dominance through union with the south.


2. For Clark's comment see Lutende No. 308, 10 Nov. 1949. Hingley is reported in the Central African Post of 25 Jan. 1951, 16, as saying that the Lusaka African broadcasting service was 'very highly developed and a model for all other Colonies'.

3. Ray, 'The Saucepan Set', The Times Educational Supplement, Friday, 10 March 1950, 176. This was before the Saucepan Special was made obsolete, an 'historical curiosity' by the advent of the transistor.

4. WAZ/SEC 2/426, Franklin to Amin, Sec., 15 Nov. 1948.
Settlers begrudged the money, time and initiative spent on the station because it was a service not directly benefiting Europeans. Unofficials had considerable power over the Estimates and frequently used it against the Information Department and its broadcasting service for Africans.  

Northern Rhodesian Europeans never liked the division of broadcasting which had made Northern Rhodesia responsible for the African side of the scheme. Since 1940 they had been used to a few hours broadcasting each week from the Lusaka station; they also listened to Daventry and Salisbury. They had become parochial about the station, they liked the local, personal touch. 'There is more Northern Rhodesian patriotism about than we are always aware of', reported an article on broadcasting in the Central African Post.  

Settlers persisted in seeing the spectre of paramountcy, the survival of the 'old Colonial Office policy of Northern Rhodesia for the Africans' in the arrangement that made Lusaka the centre for African broadcasting.  

When the Southern Rhodesian side of the regional broadcasting arrangement was implemented in March 1950 the Central African Post lamented 'The north has become black'.

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4. Ibid.
One unofficial thought the African broadcasting station gave Northern Rhodesia the wrong image. During a debate on broadcasting in the Leg. Co. in September 1950 Guy van Eeden [sic] demanded 'a proper European broadcasting station as distinct from an African one'. He did not think it right that 'our radio programmes should be completely composed of primitive dialects'. This gave the 'outside world the impression that this is a completely savage and primitive country'.

Franklin sought vainly to try and reconcile the settlers to his broadcasting arrangements. One such attempt was a talk he gave over CABS on 12 June 1949, the aim of which was to clear up some of the European 'misconceptions' about African broadcasting. Apart from the complaint that Lusaka was not interested in European broadcasting - in the answering of which he painstakingly rehearsed again the background to regional broadcasting - Franklin dealt with deprecating remarks about 'educating the natives'. He pointed out the value of mass education in political terms: the African political consciousness was rapidly being awakened, that awakening needed to be guided, the right ideas needed to be implanted for 'there are always people, even as far afield as Moscow, looking for idle minds in Africa'. He appealed to the Europeans' self-interest; better informed Africans would be better workers; radio provided

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1. Leg. Co. Debates, 1 Sept. 1950, c. 49.
entertainment which would help to make Africans 'a happy and contented people', and keep them out of the beer-halls at night. He explained again to those Europeans who thought that African radios should be pre-set to Lusaka why this was not a psychologically sound move, and corrected the misconception that the government was subsidising the Saucepan Special. 1

But the most friction between unofficials and the government radio station came about as a result of the Federation campaign. At the same time as the 'poor man's radio' was revolutionising African radio listening the political situation in Central Africa was moving toward a climax. At first Franklin tried to steer clear of political controversy. He and his staff were concentrating on mass education/community development (which as we have noted included political education) in the belief that the protectorate government would eventually hand over power to the African majority albeit many years hence. 2

Franklin had agreed with the Varley plan that as soon as the CABS was well established it should be divorced from government and an independent broadcasting corporation set up. But it was impossible to isolate the broadcasting station from the burning political issue of the day. It was not possible to keep the politics of African nationalism off the ether, as they were kept out of Mutende. The

1. Franklin, 'The Development of Broadcasting in Central Africa', Outpost, 26, 8 (1949), 12.
activities of Congress were not reported over the Lusaka station; for this information Africans tuned into the BBC.\(^1\) But the white settlers insisted on the CABS being used as an instrument of political persuasion to put across Federal propaganda.

When Africans showed that they were just as hostile after 1948 to the new Federation formula as they had been previously to amalgamation, the unofficials claimed that it was because the C.O. officials had not given them a 'firm lead' and D.C.s and Information Department personnel were now ordered to 'plug' Federation.\(^2\) In November 1951 Franklin resigned rather than have to oversee the CABS being used as a propaganda weapon in the cause of the white settlers. The Lusaka station then proceeded to pour out Federal propaganda. In 1952 the Secretary of State for Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, recorded a message on Federation in London for Africans from the two northern territories which was broadcast from Lusaka.\(^3\) The White Paper was explained to saturation point. S. S. Jere complained in the Central African Post in July 1952 of 'the vigorous pro-Federation campaign that is being waged by the hitherto non-political institution of the

\(^1\) Fraenkel, Wavaleshi, 170; and in Munali No. 9, May 1952 (magazine of Munali Secondary School, Lusaka). E. S.? (initials not clear) Wina reported that the politically-minded students always read the Central African Post and listened to the 6 pm BBC news from London.

\(^2\) Fraenkel, Wavaleshi, 170.

\(^3\) Clement Attlee and Northern Rhodesia's Governor also spoke in support of Federation. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1952, 9.
Information Department'. He particularly objected to the interruption of a popular musical request programme to give 'an ordeal of "explanation" of the white paper'. Jere suggested that both sides should be invited to debate the issue on the air. 1 This actually had been Kittermaster's intention but apart from the fact that no African in the north could be found to support Federation over the radio, the Central African governments themselves did not think it politic to have the issue the subject of a radio debate. 2

The goodwill that had been built up between broadcasters and listeners was damaged by the Lusaka station's pro-Federation stance. The station's support for Federation led to a new version of the 'banyama' myth, at the core of which was a belief in the existence of 'vampire-men' or banyama who kidnapped people and sucked their blood. 3 On this occasion many of the unsophisticated believed that the announcers of the CABS were vampire-men, that their victims lost the will to resist Federation, and that the station's green van was used to transport the kidnapped victims. Two African announcers received threatening letters. People in the rural areas no longer

2. Fraenkel, Manyaleshi, 187-188.
3. See 'WAZ/SEC 2/429, Native Affairs: Banyama; Mutende No. 38, April 1939, 14 and Mutende No. 41, July 1939, 12; see W. V. Breulsford, 'The Banyama Myth', NADA, 9, 4 (1967), 49-60.
welcomed the itinerant recording van; they refused to record songs or, if they did, their songs often had the refrain, 'We don't want Federation'; the recording engineers were all 'Government spies and banyama'. Fraenkel wrote, 'The faith that our audience had once had in our broadcasting station had collapsed completely'.

(b) Films

In this section on films in the post-war period before the coming of the Federation we will look at what happened to the CFU after the war and then see how it extended its activities into East and West Africa. Having sketched in this colonial film scene in other parts of British Africa for the purposes of background and comparison we will then focus on the film scene in Northern Rhodesia. This will include a discussion of the work of the film section of the Northern Rhodesia Information Department and of the CAFU. The section will conclude with a survey of the evidence on what impact films, both local and imported, were having in Northern Rhodesia, and a discussion of censorship in the period.

After the war when the Central Office of Information (COI) replaced the MOI, the CFU became a department of the COI under the administrative control of the Controller of the Films Division. The COI had no policy-making power; it was simply an agency whose function was to supply technical advice and facilities to ministerial

1. Fraenkel, Wayaleshi, 207.
departments. Production policy rested with the C.O. During the war the CFU had been financed by imperial funds but after the war, as its main function was now the production of instructional films, it was thought more appropriate for the unit to be financed under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1945) with the exception of the Projection-of-England films. A single allocation of £250,000 was made in 1947 which financed the CFU until it was disbanded in 1955.1

The main objective of the post-war CFU was the promotion of film production in the colonies which, it was hoped, would ultimately assume full financial and administrative responsibility for the work in their territories. In working towards this local take-over emphasis was placed on decentralisation and Africanisation. As George Pearson told the British Film Institute Conference on 'The Film in Colonial Development' in 1948, the aim of the CFU was to produce 'films for Africans, with Africans, by Africans'.2

There were regional differences in the implementation of the policy in Africa. The CFU did not operate in Central Africa where the CAFU was established in 1948 to serve Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Between 1945 and 1950 the CFU had twelve production units

in eight countries in East and West Africa. The units were to make films on subjects suggested by local governments, to train local people and to stimulate local film production. The C.O. took sole control of the CPU in 1950; dissatisfaction had arisen because of the administrative inefficiency of the dual control system and because the COI personnel were thought to be too remote from colonial problems. 1

Another policy change that came in 1950 was the decision of the CPU to cease its own film production. All the CPU units were withdrawn from Africa and the CPU then concentrated on providing technical and advisory services for the local colonial film units which were now established in some colonies; it continued with the publication of Colonial Cinema and the Raw Stock Scheme which provided newsreels and magazine films for colonies like Somaliland, Sierra Leone and the Gambia which were too small to have their own film units.

When the CPU was disbanded in 1955 Sellers stayed on at the C.O. as Adviser on Oversea Film Production. In 1958, looking back on the work of the CPU, he told a conference in Brussels on the cinema in Africa south of the Sahara that films were more likely to be effective if they were made 'entirely by Africans'. Though the CPU films had been 'technically' and 'pictorially' of high quality many had aroused 'little emotional interest in the minds of illiterate rural audiences' which he

attributed to the fact that European film-makers did not have sufficient understanding of the customs and culture of the people for whom they were making the films.¹

Film Section of the Northern Rhodesian Information Department

After the war the film section of the Northern Rhodesia Information Department grew rapidly. In 1945 there was one cinema van for the whole country. In 1947 there were six mobile cinema units. Four vans operated in Northern, Southern, Central and Eastern Province and two cinema barges (large dug-out canoes) operated in the Barotse Province and on Lake Bangweulu in Northern Province (Nigeria in 1948 with a population of twenty million had four vans). The four cinema vans and the barge cinema were scheduled to give a combined total of 1,560 shows annually. In 1950 the annual audience reached by the six mobile units was estimated at approximately 250,000.²

The mobile cinema van operator was a jack of all trades. He did more than just show films. He often acted as a colporteur selling booklets to the villagers; he sold Mutende; he acted as a news correspondent for the Lusaka radio station and Mutende; and he gave vernacular


lectures on education subjects with illustrations from strip-film projectors. Some van operators were also trained as mass literacy instructors. The vans had their limitations, however. In Northern Rhodesia with such vast distances to be travelled break-downs were a real problem. Sometimes spares could not be got and the vehicle would be off the road for months. The van was considered to be a good way of introducing people to the cinema but it eventually became departmental (as well as C.O.) policy to encourage the building of static cinemas in the villages. This would not only concentrate departmental resources but prevent cinema attendance being affected by the elements.

In 1946 there were twelve 16 mm static or fixed point cinemas. By 1951 the number had increased to seventy and they were multiplying at the rate of three or four a year. A major factor in this accelerated growth rate was the introduction of small silent projectors suitable for small halls which could operate from a twelve-volt battery. The static cinemas were to be found at welfare halls along the line of rail, at bomas and missions in the rural areas and at several European farms. In the rural areas the static cinemas were operated by African Welfare Committees under the direction of the Provincial Administration staff. It

1. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Reports, 1946-1952.

was claimed that the Committees had to be supervised by the local D.O. if the cinemas were to be run satisfactorily because of the unreliability of the African staff.¹

The rural areas lagged far behind the urban areas in the provision of viewing facilities; apart from the cinema vans there were, in 1950, a mere twenty static cinemas. It was not departmental policy to strive for parity. In a despatch of 21 April 1944 the Secretary of State had written that 'careful attention should be paid in the industrial areas to the provision both of instruction and entertainment through the medium of broadcasting and the cinema...'.² Franklin had interpreted the despatch to mean:

that improvement should be made in instruction and entertainment in the industrial areas to counter the possibilities of industrial unrest, without worrying unduly about any disproportion between the facilities in the industrial and rural areas.³

The Department's film library also grew rapidly; started in 1945, by 1946 it had 540 titles and in 1952 the films numbered 1,250. In 1951 subscribers numbered 146 of whom 77 took their regular programmes from it. The library supplied the programmes for the mobile cinema units and the rural fixed-point cinemas. A typical programme included British and

1. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1949, 7.

2. NAZ/SEC 2/1280, Franklin to Chief Sec., 20 May 1944 re: Confidential Despatch from S/S No. 49 of 21 April 1944.

3. Ibid.
Northern Rhodesian newsreels, an African documentary (usually about Northern Rhodesia and locally produced), a documentary of agricultural or industrial or other interest, an educational film, and an entertainment film from the United Kingdom or America. The local African films came either from the Information Department's own film section or from the CAFU. Commentaries in one of the four official languages of the territory were read by the projectionist.

The Mass Education report had strongly recommended the production of news films and documentaries as an aid to mass education. Both could help to extend peoples' horizons and help them adjust to changing political, economic and social conditions. It was felt that the news film could assist the press and broadcasting in promoting a 'national' outlook amongst colonial peoples. Each year the film section produced a number of one reel, black and white 16 mm silent newsreels— the Northern Rhodesia News. Similar to the newsreel only that it was in colour was the Northern Rhodesia Gazette. Both had been started during the war and had been designed for African audiences. They were part propaganda and part informative concentrating on local ceremonial occasions, the visits

1. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Reports, 1946-1952.
of important people and local news. Northern Rhodesia Newsreel No. 15 featured:

His Excellency the Governor Leaves for England; Northern Rhodesia Africans in London - Brian and Chileshe go Sightseeing; Victory Celebrations for ex-Askari at Mufilira.

And Northern Rhodesia Gazette No. 16:

Secretary of State visits Port Jameson; Kasama and countryside. 1

It is apparent from this random selection of items that the Northern Rhodesian newsreels, like newsreels elsewhere, were concentrating on the ceremonial aspects of political life: in this case the symbols and rituals of colonial rule.

We have seen how the increasing political power of the white settlers led to the complete emasculation of Mutende so that after 1948 even 'moderate' African public opinion could not find expression in the paper. The policy of the film section similarly reflects the change in the relative strength of settler as opposed to African interests. From 1949 there was a change in emphasis in the newsreels. Previously newsreels had been made primarily for the African population but from 1949 the emphasis was put on getting items placed overseas. This was in response to the white settler lobby which had long wanted films to be made in 35 mm rather than 16 mm so that they could get publicity for the territory overseas. In 1952 the Newsreel and Gazette

1. Northern Rhodesia Information Department, Information Department 16 mm Film Library Catalogue, n.d. (1952), 3-4.
were replaced by a new 35 mm sound newsreel, Northern Spotlight. Copies were flown to Britain each week and items were often used in British and South African newsreels as well as BBC television. In its first year the Spotlight took a strongly pro-Federal line; a 16 mm version was shown in African cinemas.

In 1949 J. M. Fennell was appointed to the new post of cameraman with the specific job of producing films about Northern Rhodesian development projects. These development propaganda films made both in 16 mm and 35 mm ranged over such subjects as the cement works at Chilanga, the Lukashya Training School, the Mumbwa groundnut scheme, anti-rabies control, pine-growing and forestry. Several travel films about the game parks were also made. These films illustrating the C.O.'s major post-war propaganda theme of development were evidently made to project a favourable image of both the Northern Rhodesian administration and British colonial stewardship.

The Central African Film Unit

In 1944 A. M. Champion, who had made some successful films under the Raw Stock Scheme in Kenya during the war, visited Northern Rhodesia as part of a wider tour designed to discover if the governments of East and Central Africa were interested in participating in the

1. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1951, 9.
establishment of a central film making unit and other matters concerning cinema propaganda.¹ Franklin was interested in a regional unit but felt that:

Northern Rhodesia is being more and more drawn politically and economically southwards and eastwards to Nyasaland and that in the course of time, circumstances may suggest the formation of a separate Unit for the three territories and a break away from Nairobi.²

As Franklin had anticipated, Northern Rhodesia linked up with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland initially through the administrative body, the Central African Council, and films, like broadcasting, came under its Public Relations Committee. In 1947 the Public Relations Committee put forward a recommendation that a joint film unit should be established for the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland.³ A scheme was drawn up and submitted to the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. In the preparation of the scheme there was a conflict of interest between Southern Rhodesia and the two northern territories. The northerners felt that the south was more interested in making films in the European interest with the idea of


2. INF 1/564, Minutes of Conversation with Mr. Franklin, Inform. Officer, Northern Rhodesia, on 8 and 9 June 1944. Appendix No. 6 to Champion's report.

attracting tourists and immigrants rather than providing fundamental education by film for Africans. W. D. Gale, the Southern Rhodesian Information Officer, wanted the unit to make 35 mm rather than the cheaper 16 mm films. Gale suggested that the proposed 16 mm joint unit favoured by Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, mainly for the making of films for Africans, should be integrated with a Southern Rhodesian 35 mm unit which he proposed to establish. There was fierce opposition to this proposal in the Central African Council from Franklin who was supported by W. A. W. Clark, the Council's Chief Secretary. Clark pointed out that such a move:

would almost certainly result in the 16-mm side being adversely affected by the concentration of those in charge on the much more ambitious and arduous tasks of achieving commercial standards, conducting a large scale publicity campaign at home and abroad, for avowedly political ends, and striving for a showing of their products.²

At first the Southern Rhodesian manoeuvres failed.³ The

1. The use of film to encourage immigration dates back to 1913 when the African World newspaper sponsored a 'bioscope matinee' at the New Alhambra, Leicester Square on 20 May. Guests were specially invited by the Directors of the British South Africa Company 'to a private Exhibition of Animated Pictures taken by the African World, of Scenes in Rhodesia including the Victoria Falls, Cattle Ranching, Mining and Farm Life'. Supplement to the African World and Cape Cairo Express, 24 May 1913, 1-2.

2. ZA/S 932/34/1, meeting of the Central African Council, 21 Dec. 1946.

3. They were more successful after the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established in 1953 and the CAFU became part of the Federal Department of Information.
A proposal for an integrated unit was rejected by the north and it was decided that the joint unit should concentrate mainly on making adult education films for Africans as it was only on this condition that Colonial Development and Welfare funding would be made available. Sixty per cent of the CAFU's expenditure came from contributions from the territorial governments and forty per cent from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. The latter were contributed on behalf of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The original contribution from the funds was £59,000. This was reviewed in March 1952 and a further £84,000 was made available to the CAFU for the following four years.

The CAFU began operations in September 1948. Alan Izod, who had formerly supervised all of the colonial films at the COI, including those of the CFU, was appointed producer. He recruited in London a director-camera-man, Stephen Peet, and a script writer, Denys Brown. All filming was done on location. The CAFU started out with two field units— one located in Salisbury (where the unit had its headquarters) under the direction of Stephen Peet and the other in Lusaka under the direction of Louis Nell, formerly film officer with the Northern Rhodesian Information Office. By December 1953 when the CAFU became part of the Federal Department of Information

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2 A. Izod, 'History of the Central African Film
the newly established Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland seventy-seven films had been made and seven
were in an advanced stage of production.¹

The instructional films we are now going to consider are all 16 mm, mostly in colour and, in the beginning, silent. In the CAFU's progress report issued at the end of 1949 the Unit's production policy was outlined; it as going to specialise in six types of films:

1. The full-length film of 4 or 6 reels, which will have as its object the illustration of a general principle, such as the benefit of a certain standard of agriculture or hygiene. In all the principle of self-help will be stressed...

2. The short film intended to illustrate the benefit of one particular phase of agriculture, hygiene, etc....

3. Films to illustrate the value of government services...

4. 'Profile' films, showing the achievement of individual Africans in various fields on behalf of themselves, of their people and of their country...

5. African traditional stories, used to put over such morals as 'Honesty is the Best Policy', etc....

6. 'Crime Doesn't Pay' stories...

Producer Izod noted in conclusion that it was 'of course probable that most films will fall into two or more categories'.² The Northern News, still owned by settler

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¹ Central African Film Unit, Annual Report for 1954.
politician Roy Welensky, expressed the hope that the instructional films 'would make Africans more useful...'.

Most of the films were in story format though a few purely instructional and a few purely entertainment films were made. The story format was favoured because it was believed that the lessons would be more effective if the emotions of the audience were engaged (a conclusion that had been reached previously by the BEKE). An additional reason for the use of the story format was that there was considered to be a dearth of healthy entertainment films for Africans.

It was originally decided that the films should be silent mainly because of the variety of languages spoken in Central Africa; commentaries were provided in the main local languages and these were read out by African or coloured interpreter/cinema van operators. It was found that not all interpreters could be relied on to give a faithful rendering of the script and directors tried always to ensure that as far as possible the action should tell the story. In the interests of realism — particularly because lack of sound made the CAFU films unpopular with urban Africans used to Hollywood westerns — sound effects were later added and by 1953 about one half had recorded sound. Unlike the subtitled Hollywood silents the pace

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3 Izod, 'History of the Central African Film Unit'.

of the CAFU instructional films was very slow. Trick photography was largely avoided so as not to confuse audiences unused to the conventions of the cinema.

The Belgian anthropologist/film-maker Luc de Heusch has written that 'colonial films ingenuously reflect the image of the coloniser'. In analysing the content of these instructional films, the focus will be on the images of Empire they offer. For these basic education films, usually in a story format, do not exist in a vacuum: they are set in the society of the day - or rather how the film-makers saw that society. Writing in 1948 on the role of the instructional film, British social anthropologist, K. L. Little, saw its purpose as being 'to make African or other indigenous people socially conscious of themselves in a changing world'. Into what kind of world were these films wittingly (or unwittingly?) socialising Africans? What can we learn from these film records about the political attitudes, the fashionable stereotypes, the approved forms of behaviour in colonial Central Africa?

The type of society shown in these films is predominantly rural - an emphasis which faithfully reflects the opposition of colonial governments in this part of Africa to the stabilisation of settlements of 'semi-

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civilised' urban Africans which were seen as a 'threat to white domination'. Detribalised Africans who had broken their ties with the village would have nowhere to go in times of unemployment, sickness or retirement and would become a burden on the colonial government which would be obliged to provide expensive welfare programmes and spend more on education. Of the few instructional films that do show urban Africans, most are concerned with the don'ts of urban living - about road rules, 'crime does not pay' and juvenile delinquency. We have films about rural co-operatives but none about trade unions.

Like Mutende the CAFU instructional films were aimed at the less educated Africans; it was hoped that one effect would be that the films would lessen the influence over this group of the more educated. In the application for assistance from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote, it was stated that the films would be aimed at the 'general enlightenment of the labouring majority' to help 'even up the gap between a very small class of 'intelligentsia' and a whole people largely illiterate and ignorant of the world'.

The first film of the CAFU was a cautionary tale, Mulenga Goes To Town (CAFU No. 1), based on Franklin's Ignorance Is No Defence. It shows how a bicycle-riding country bumpkin falls foul of the law on his first visit


to Lusaka where he has been sent by his father to sell chickens. He returns home penniless and without his hat and coat after being cheated in an illegal card game. *Zimbani* (CAFU No. 3) made in Petauke district of Northern Rhodesia, contrasts two farming families. One family grows good crops, the other family head is lazy and will not let his son try out new methods. Eventually the son gets his chance and, through taking the advice of the agricultural demonstrator, makes good. As an additional reward he wins the good farmer's daughter.

The characters in these 'morality films' are stereotypes; the films are constructed around 'the parable of Mr. Wise and Mr. Foolish'.¹ 'They show and contrast', said one African familiar with the genre, 'the progressive and backward Africans - careless and careful ones in this and that manner'.²

Other agricultural films set in Northern Rhodesia included: *Magodi and the Dairy* (CAFU No. 7) filmed at the Ngoni farm and demonstrating the advantages of co-operatives; *Banda Herds His Cattle* (CAFU No. 37) illustrating that if you herd your cattle rather than keep them in a pen they will fetch a better price; and *Kilyoni - Peasant Farmer* (CAFU No. 19) which advertised a peasant farming scheme at Katete. *Muyunda and His Wife*

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(CAFU No. 42) is set in Barotseland. Muyunda's crops fail, he cannot afford food, his wife leaves him because he has no money to buy her new clothes; however, he manages to persuade her to return and they are successful when he grows rice on the edge of the Barotse plain.

Another variety of the CAFU instructional film was the 'Profile' film in the 'Africans in Action' series; real-life success stories about individual Africans - farmers, a welfare officer, a mid-wife, a home demonstrator - who had managed to bridge 'the gap between the commercial and industrial world and the primitive tribal life'.

One such story told in Africans in Action No. 2 (CAFU No. 17) was that of Theodore Kachesa, a farmer who lived near Mazabuka in Northern Rhodesia; he possessed a fine herd of cattle and more than a hundred acres of maize. He had also achieved political prominence within the system of indirect rule by which local government was conducted through traditional chiefs advised by councillors. From 1949 until his death in 1952 Kachesa was a nominated Agricultural Councillor on the Plateau Tonga Native Authority and he is shown meeting the Governor of Northern Rhodesia at an Indaba.


A series of propaganda films made to show people what a good government they had included: Nyono Gets A Letter (CAFU No. 25), Husbands and Wives (CAFU No. 23), Lusaka Calling (CAFU No. 15), The Story of Petale (CAFU No. 39) and The Five Messengers (CAFU No. 5). In Nyono Gets A Letter, Nyono's wife is about to give birth to their first child but he has to leave the village and go and earn money by doing road work. A mass literacy instructor arrives in the village and Agnes learns to read. When she is in hospital she is able to read Mutende to the other patients and to write to a worried Nyono to announce the safe arrival of their child. Apart from the main purpose of encouraging the mass literacy campaign the film is also encouraging the reading of Mutende. There is the implication, also, that 'responsible' men who cannot find employment in the village should go and work outside - in this case with the Public Works Department. The film reinforces the authority of the chief as the literacy instructor seeks his permission before he starts his campaign.

Husbands and Wives describes a community development project - the area school at Katete - where residential courses are given in carpentry, road-building and mass literacy supervision; the wives had classes in beadwork, knitting and homecraft. Lusaka Calling was a highly successful promotional film for the Lusaka broadcasting station and the cheap Saucepan Special radio. It tells the story of how the Tonga chief Shiamuundu of the
Mazabuka district is introduced to radio listening. First he watches a mobile recording unit in action in his village, then he buys a Saucepan radio. The last scenes are of the chief's visit to Lusaka where he is conducted around the Lusaka broadcasting studios and sees the actual broadcast of the recordings made in his village.

The Story of Petale (CAFU No. 39) set in Chingola on the Copperbelt, shows how a foolish youth is saved from delinquency through the good offices of the local welfare officer (European) and his African staff. Petale, the schoolboy son of a carpenter, falls in with some bad companions and begins to steal; he starts to frequent a local beer hall where we see him drunk and being lured by 'bad women'. The welfare officer steps in and we see the rehabilitation of Petale at the Welfare Centre. This is accomplished with the aid of tennis, table tennis, carpet bowls and 'afternoon tea'. The finale, worthy of Boy's Own, shows Petale leading his team to victory in a table tennis tournament. (One wonders what rural audiences especially would have made of the path to salvation by way of table tennis and carpet bowls.)

Izod considered that each film should offer some incentive for development, very often of the material kind. If you followed this particular practice you would earn more money and so be able to buy a plough, a scotch cart, a bicycle, a guitar, a Saucepan Special radio. Material prosperity and other goals like
happiness, prestige and the approval of superiors are to be achieved, so the films imply, through co-operation and conformity. The European characters who appear in these films are all authority figures and experts: government officials, agricultural advisers, doctors, welfare officers and co-operative society managers. Africans always behave deferentially in the presence of Europeans: doffing their hats and sitting in the dust before seated colonial officials. In *A Tale of Two Trucks* (CAFU No. 53) a careful African truck driver gets a pat on the back and a 'Well done, boy!' from his white boss.

The hierarchical order of colonial society in Central Africa is neatly encapsulated in *The Five Messengers* (CAFU No. 5). The messengers are shown supervising bridge building, capturing a criminal, hunting buffalo who have been raiding a garden, on guard duty and rescuing an injured man. A rigid administrative hierarchy is revealed: all the messengers salute the D.O., the junior messengers salute the senior messenger whilst the ordinary villagers who come with their petitions squat in the dust before the seated messengers.

At the pinnacle of the imperial hierarchy was the monarch - the ultimate symbol of Empire. Symbols and

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1. *Mulenga Goes To Town* almost satirises this. Mulenga is on his way to town on his bicycle to sell chickens and gets into all kinds of trouble. He tries to rescue a chicken which has flown on to the boot of a car. As Mulenga flings himself on the boot, scrambling for the chicken, the car starts to move; the driver jerks his head around as Mulenga raps on the roof - Mulenga doffs his battered straw hat.
ritual were used to foster and reinforce ideological belief, with films and film shows playing a major part. All TAFU film programmes concluded with an official national anthem trailer featuring the monarch, at first King George VI and later Queen Elizabeth II. The audience were encouraged to respond in whatever way was traditional for them to show respect - for example by sitting and clapping. In 1953 much of the money for instructional films was diverted into acquiring film of the coronation and the royal visit of the Queen Mother and Princess "Narraret in the same year. But the royal propaganda campaign was not a total success. In Northern Rhodesia the African Congress party showed its resentment about the imposition of Federation by refusing to participate in the rites of the imperial tribe.

The paternalist element in British films dealing with the colonies has caused some controversy. Jimmy Vaughn, for example, complains that British feature films about the Empire:

extol the virtues of her colonisers, police officers, District Commissioners, Civil Servants and Settlers. These heroes are portrayed as the 'embodiment of civilisation' or simply 'the friend of the black man'.

1. Interview with Louis Nell, Salisbury (Harare), Zimbabwe, 8 Jan. 1981.

2. Southern Rhodesia Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development 1953, 52.

The black man's role is to be 'patronised, uplifted and governed'. The paternalist element in the colonial instructional film was criticised at the Brussels conference on the cinema in Africa south of the Sahara in 1958. A Belgian delegate, A. Scohy, argued for the defence that it was inevitable that there should be an element of paternalism, it was inherent in the genre; the educational film inevitably played a didactic role. Any adverse effects that the paternalist element might produce would be outweighed by the improvements in standards of living and health. If one accused the instructional film of paternalism, said Scohy, then one would have to bring a similar charge against all systems of mass education. A point that Scohy did not make is that, when the pupil is of a different race and is assumed by the film-maker to belong to a more backward culture then a new dimension is added to the argument.

In 1949 when the CAFU production team took a sample of African reactions to their films at Matapos in Southern Rhodesia they found 'One critic deplored our "looking down" on Natives as dirty, lazy and foolish people - after all these qualities are not peculiar to their particular breed'. In this argument the sticking-point is the colonial context in which these films were set: the way

1. Ibid.
of the European is wise, that of the African foolish. The instructional film reflects the paternalist character of colonial rule; it reinforces the established order and presents a particular world view.

The first to point out that the colonial instructional film might have harmful side effects was an insider, a C.O. official, E. R. Edmetts who was highly critical of the patronising paternalism of colonial officialdom:

> The colonial peoples want sympathy, not films on soil erosion, humanity not lectures on how to kill bed bugs. Can we not discard this pose of instructional superiority and get down to learning from people as well as teaching them?

Something of this same attitude (to which the work of anthropologists had also contributed) informed the remarks of MP Aidan Crawley who chaired the British Film Institute Conference in 1948. In the discussions on the film in colonial development he had detected a Eurocentric note of smugness: 'over and over again the phrase has come up that we have to adjust films for primitive people...'. He agreed with John Grierson that film-makers should also be concerned about what 'other cultures can teach us'.

On a number of occasions CAFU film-makers attempted to eliminate obvious paternalism from their films by having Africans themselves doing the instruction. A good example of this type is *Africans In Action No. 5*:

1. CO 859/46/1255/1, Edmetts, minute, 26 March 1942.
Herbert Gondwe—Welfare Officer (CAFU No. 56). Gondwe was an enterprising welfare officer in the Dowa District of Nyasaland. The very model of a mobile personality, he is seen riding around on a motor cycle exhorting and organising his charges in the building of a welfare hall, the repairing of a bridge, organising the acquisition of a projector and editing a local newspaper. However this more subtle style would not silence one school of criticism which would give it a Machiavellian twist and label it 'collaborationist cinema'—for Gondwe had no part in the writing of the scenario he was acting out. S. Feldman wrote of the BEKE: 'As colonialist cinema, the Experiment, in the classic Fanonesque sense, involved the native in his own subjugation'.

The only way out of the paternalist dilemma (prior to Independence) would seem to have been for the Africans to make the films themselves and we have seen that the C.O. came to think along these lines in recommending an Africanisation policy. Unlike the CFU, however, the CAFU did not pursue an Africanisation policy. In 1952 Izod recorded that no Africans were employed in 'script-writing, direction, photography, editing and recording'. The role of the African in the CAFU was that of actor, interpreter, and cinema van operator. Although African

ideas for scripts were solicited the result was that traditional African stories were 'slightly doctored at the end, to show that crime does not pay', like The Thief (CAFU No. 10). The CAFU did have a training programme but all the young technicians who were taken on as learner-cameramen were Europeans. Izod said that he had conducted a fruitless search for Africans capable of training as technicians and blamed his lack of success on the fact that Africans who had sufficient education already had fulfilling jobs. The lack of suitable Africans available for training was at least in part a result of what Patrick Keatley has described as the 'low triangle' education policy which discriminated in favour of whites. The money that was available for African education, which was proportionally far less than that for whites, was spread broadly over the first few years of primary education with the result that in 1963 'all three territories were woefully deficient in Africans with secondary education needed for the Civil Service and senior posts in industry'. The C.O.'s development philosophy which placed so much emphasis on African initiative in community development was based on the expectation that ultimately Africans would govern themselves but from 1948, the year the CAFU was founded,

2. Izod, 'History of the Central African Film Unit'.
it was becoming apparent that the British government was going to hand over power to the white settlers. The lack of Africanisation of the CAFU reflected the prevailing power interests in Central Africa - the white settler star was in the ascendent.

Within the limits set by local politics it now remains to discover to what extent the instructional films succeeded in their primary didactic purpose of contributing to African development. First of all the films were highly regarded for their technical qualities. CAFU instructional films were bought by governments and organizations outside Central Africa for countries where similar mass education programmes were in progress. Buyers included the governments of the Belgian Congo, Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, Gold Coast, British Somaliland, Bechuanaland, British Honduras and Australia - for use in Papua and New Guinea; and by Lever Brothers, UNESCO, the South Pacific Commission and African Consolidated Films of Johannesburg. In 1950 Cape Town's Cape Times carried this comment:

One of the most interesting experiments yet seen in mass education, these films have been resoundingly received by native audiences both urban and rural.1

No systematic research was done into the impact of the films on African audiences but what evidence there is, which is mostly from government officials, suggests

that the films did have considerable success. In 1952 the Chief Secretary of the Central African Council reported:

Since it was set up only five years ago the Central African Film Unit has shown that the film is probably the most valuable means of spreading information amongst the backward peoples of Central Africa.¹

There is some evidence both from Izod himself² and from an editorial in the *African Weekly* that the films were not always so popular with more sophisticated town audiences - who were, of course, not the target audience. In 1950 the *Weekly*'s editor attended a showing of the films in Salisbury and in a rural area and reported that:

Whereas the sophisticated African might have been a little sceptical, critical and somewhat unappreciative mainly because his tastes have been developed by alien pictures, the country folks' appreciation was at once prompt and enthusiastic.³

Of the ultimate political impact of the CAFU's instructional films, one thing is certain, they did not lessen the influence of the 'intelligentsia' over the 'labouring majority'.

**Effect of the Cinema in General**

When we move away from a specific focus on the CAFU to look at what effect the cinema generally was having in the post-war period a first refinement is to divide

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1. 'Film Production in Central Africa', *Colonial Cinema*, 11, 3 (1953), 72.
2. Izod, 'History of the Central African Film Unit'.
impact into two regions - rural and urban. These were
differentiated from each other both by the size and
frequency of viewing by the audience, and by the programmes
seen. In 1950 the rural areas were being served by four
vans and two cinema barges plus twenty small static cinemas.
The result, according to Franklin, was that:

The effect of any kind of films on rural audiences is therefore bound
to be small since many villagers never see a film at all, and few
films regularly.¹

In 1952 a study was conducted on behalf of the
"northern Rhodesia Information Department by Information
Inspector, Tony Lawman, into the effects of the cinema in
a 'semi-rural' area. The investigation was carried out
amongst the 'industrious and prosperous' Lunda people of
the Luapula valley.² Lawman accompanied a cinema van on
its tours of the area and was assisted in his research by
trained African assistants. He used four methods:
(a) mass observation with assistants writing down comments
in the vernacular; (b) a running commentary on comments
which was given him by an interpreter; (c) measuring
clapping and cheering;³ (d) interviewing a cross section
of the audience after the show and questioning them on
what they had seen.


2. Lawman, 'Informational Research; An Experiment in
Northern Rhodesia', Colonial Cinema, 10, 3 (1952), 56.

3. This method was found ineffective because clapping
had a different connotation amongst the Lunda.
Lawman found that all sections of the 'intelligentsia' were against the showing of cowboy films which were seen as corrupting the morals of youth and contributing to the bad behaviour and disrespect of young people. The Luapula Lunda were not alone in their condemnation of the cowboy film as they were also condemned quite frequently in African Urban Council meetings. All groups of people resented the showing of naked African women as not only morally reprehensible but also because 'it gave the impression...that Africans in Northern Rhodesia were 'completely uncivilised'. Lawman's general conclusion confirmed the belief in the potency of the cinema as a propaganda medium particularly for illiterates:

Since they are unable to read, the local African press is of little use to them and since they lack the power of concentration, broadcast talks and news items have also little effect. The cinema, therefore, is the one existing medium which appeals to them. It is, it would seem, the most valuable of all the Information Services in the field...1

In the urban areas the cinema did not perform the same function as it did in the rural areas - it was not an auxiliary in mass education but was, on the contrary, being used as a bromide or circus. The Information Department neither ran the cinemas nor provided the programmes. In the towns the cinemas were run either by the mines or municipalities: the former wanted a

1. Lawman, 'Informational Research', 59-60.
'contented labour force' the latter 'a quiet native quarter'. Between September 1953 and June 1954 Hortense Powdermaker conducted an enquiry into African urban viewing habits in the Copperbelt town of Luanshya. Powdermaker cites an example of a typical programme which is remarkable for the absence of any CAFU or CFU material. After all the concern that had been expressed over the years about the dangers of unsuitable films on the Copperbelt it is surprising that when a trickle of more 'suitable' films did become available through the CFU and the CAFU that they were not shown in the urban cinemas. The sample programme was a commercial package which had been purchased by the Mine Welfare Department from South Africa and did not vary much in format from show to show. There was an old B grade cowboy film, an animal cartoon, newsreels - British News, Northern Spotlight and The African Mirror (from South Africa), an adventure serial like Superman, and, occasionally, a very old American slapstick comedy. Powdermaker used the mass observation method carried out with the help of African assistants at the Luanshya cinema and a sample survey conducted to find out who attended the cinema and what programmes they preferred.

The survey sample was 551. Of these 317 (58 per cent) had attended the movies at some time whilst 213 (39 per cent) were attending the movies at the time of the survey.

1. 'The Central African Screen', 86.
2. Powdermaker, Copper Town, 255; Table 4, 337.
oped the popularity poll followed by Superman, then came the various newsreels and cartoons with education films, like religious films, being preferred by only 1 per cent.\(^1\) Powdermaker puts forward the hypothesis that though the recent war-like past might help to account for the popularity of the cowboy films 'even more important is the manner in which identification with the cowboy hero fits into the present power relations between Europeans and Africans'.\(^2\) Africans could get rid of their aggressions and escape from their position of inferiority by identifying with the victories of the cowboys. But surely this explanation is inadequate: are not cowboy films universally popular in towns because they provide vicarious action-packed adventures for urban people?\(^3\)

Powdermaker is very critical of the film section of the Northern Rhodesian Information Department for lacking 'all awareness of the sociological significance of movies and of problems inherent in their introduction to Africans'. One was the problem of reality: 'What is real? What is cheating?'; and the other was that Africans could only interpret what they saw in terms of past experience and general knowledge which meant that they were getting a very distorted version of most films. She

\(^1\) Ibid., Tables 4 and 5, 337-338.
\(^2\) Ibid., 262.
\(^3\) Another more mundane reason suggested by numerous interviewees is that many Africans could not understand many feature films that relied on dialogue.
The film section of the Information Department
most unfavourably with the broadcasting station: the
former

had no people dedicated to using
the medium to help Africans make
a transition to the modern world.
Instead there were technicians
making movies of African scenes
and going on movie-truck tours in
rural areas... 1

Powdermaker appears to be oblivious of the work of the
CAFU which does not receive a mention. The film section
of the Northern Rhodesian Information Department were not
making films of 'transition' because this was the province
of the CAFU which made some films in Northern Rhodesia
and to the financing of which Northern Rhodesia contributed.
We have noted that the target audience for the CAFU was
the rural African and so we have the paradox that whilst
the majority of Northern Rhodesia's African cinema goers
were in the urban areas, particularly the Copperbelt, the
adjustment films were being made mainly for rural
audiences. Furthermore it was to help adjust these same
urban audiences on the Copperbelt to western technological
society that J. Merle Davis first recommended the use of
the film - a recommendation which sired the BEKE.

After the war a lot of concern was expressed in some
European and African quarters about the effects of gangster
and cowboy movies on the young (rumblings from some
Africans about the bad effects of cowboy movies had
surfaced during the war but the complaints had not been

1. Powdermaker, Copper Town, 254...
In 1948 concern reached a particularly high pitch; for example, a Mufulira police report said that there had been a correlation between the showing of a gangster serial and an outbreak of gangsterism amongst the town's youth and a tightening of censorship regulations was demanded.

In 1948 Vernon Brelsford who was Acting Director of Information in the absence of Franklin, analysed the censorship situation in a memo to the Secretary for Native Affairs. He explained that all films seen by Africans were first censored by a Board which included four Africans (A. Chelemu, A. Lupiya, E. M. Mlongoti and W. Ewalya). He outlined the 'guiding principles of censorship' which had been operating since the war. All scenes in films which included any of the following were banned:

(a) Women in scanty attire, including bathing costumes
(b) Undue exhibition of parts of the naked body
(c) Women of easy virtue
(d) Manhandling of women
(e) Prolonged embraces
(f) Fights between women


3. The Board convened in Lusaka since the war also included the SNA, (or nominee) as chairman, the Director of Information (or nominee) the Commissioner of Police (or nominee) the D.C. (or nominee) and five official members.
Ms illustrating crimes readily understood by Africans

(h) Films passed for showing to adults would also be considered suitable for showing to African children.

In accordance with these principles the Board had made a point of stopping the exhibition of serials featuring 'gangs of youths in cities' and 'savages manhandling the heroine'. On the subject of cowboy films Brelsford pointed out that it was 'almost the only type of entertainment film left to us' and without them they would not be able to keep the circuit going. He argued that they were pretty harmless being almost sexless and having no killing. He concluded with a touch of aspersion:

Even in European civilisation there was this early controversy about the influence of the film on crime. But it is quite obvious that if films have to show the triumph of good then the defeated evil must also be shown. It is a never ending controversy.

Missing from the list of guiding principles enumerated above is a previously mentioned principle that scenes should be banned where they were likely to cause trouble between the races; although the principle is implicit in all those guidelines designed to sanctify the image of the white woman. In 1948 the Director of Information successfully appealed against the passing of Huckleberry

The board reconvened and the film was banned because of:

- scenes of an escaped Negro slave being hounded by Europeans with dogs,
- the general attitude of Europeans towards Negroes, and a scene where the Negro is about to be lynched by an infuriated mob of Europeans.

Franklin thought that far more important than any harm the cinema might be doing was the good that it was not doing:

Here in the heart of Africa, the film had and still has a great opportunity, to work in a virgin field, to exert its most powerful influence for good in wholesome entertainment and in education in the widest sense of the word, on the simple unspoilt minds of millions of primitive people struggling towards civilization. It is tragic that this opportunity cannot apparently be taken.

He saw the only solution to the problem in a British film company being able to establish 'a large film industry in Africa to produce films with Africans, for Africans...'.

But he realised that in 1950 and for the immediate future such a step would not be possible because Africa, sparsely populated and poor, could not support such an industry.

1. NAZ/SEC 2/1121, Franklin, minute, 8 Dec. 1948.
3. Ibid. In 1951 Tanganyika started an experiment in the production of locally made entertainment films in Swahili produced by a South African firm; sponsored by the Governor, Sir Edward Twining, the experiment lasted for two and a half years. It seems that it was not considered financially viable to proceed further. COI, 'The Instructional Film in the United Kingdom Dependencies'.
... consideration just around the corner it was the end of the road for this particular pipe-dream of British colonial film policy. It had been a consistent theme. It had been the hope of the BEKE to provide such an organization. The CFU, the African Film Library and Purchasing Committee and the CAFU had all hoped to produce enough material to counteract the influence of Hollywood. In Northern Rhodesia this had proved impossible not least because of the sheer amount of material required on the Copperbelt with its regular weekly audience; an additional factor was the rural bias of the CAFU. During the war Dickson had lamented that an opportunity had been lost because the work of the BEKE had not been followed up. He thought it was too late in 1944; the Copperbelt audiences had already been spoilt. And so we find at the end of the affair that Copperbelt audiences who had played a central role in the development of colonial film policy were still seeing the same kind of Hollywood package at the time of Powdermaker's visit in 1953 as when J. Merle Davis first went to the Copperbelt in 1933 and expressed such great hopes for the constructive use of the cinema as a means of adjusting Africans to western society. The British government did not have the financial power to supply alternative media to that provided in the open market. If they could not control the media, they could not keep Africans in an information cocoon and structure...

1. Dickson, 'Tour of the East Africa Command Mobile Propaganda Unit', March 1944.
they could not remake man in Africa according to the vision of say *Education for Citizenship in Africa*.

4. Conclusion

Northern Rhodesia's administration showed considerable enterprise and initiative in its use of the mass media as a means of social control; amongst Britain's African colonies the Northern Rhodesian Information Department was in the vanguard of experimentation in the field of public relations. Northern Rhodesia's pioneering role was partly due to a special local circumstance: the phenomenon of the Copperbelt. Thousands of Africans had been uprooted from their villages and lumped together in mine compounds on the Copperbelt; a dislocation which was bound to produce immense and novel sociological problems. These were first studied in the early 1930s by J. Merle Davis and his team in their study of the effects of industrialisation on Africans on the Copperbelt; their report had suggested that the media might be used to help Africans with problems of adjustment. The 1935 strike and the importance of copper to the allied war effort ensured that the Copperbelt's social problems continued to engage government's attention and the media was co-opted to assist. Another factor which contributed to the pioneering role of the Northern Rhodesian Information Department was the special enthusiasm and talent for the new government function displayed by the first information officer Kenneth Bradley and particularly by his successor, Harry Franklin.
La gave the administration new channels for reaching out to the African population; no longer did the administration have to rely solely on primary face-to-face contacts between the D.O. at the boma and the people of the district, or the D.O.'s tour, to communicate information. Press, radio and film were used, in varying degrees, to explain and publicise government policies and both helped to create public opinion on important issues and to woo public opinion in support of government policies. The new channels of communication also provided new forms of entertainment, assisted in adult education and generally sought to adapt Africans to western technological society - with a British bias.

In coming to a final appraisal of the successes and failures of the Northern Rhodesian administration in using the media as a means of social control I will review the different types of propaganda activities of the Northern Rhodesian administration. First I will look at the major political propaganda campaigns which were embarked upon by the administration and I will then look at more long term propaganda devoted to the ends of political socialisation and mass education which fall within Sabine's definition of propaganda as 'a fusion of social information, adult education, and cultural expression...'.

The campaign to popularise indirect rule in which Mutende was chiefly concerned most certainly failed. The message was out of temper with the times. In the 1930s Northern Rhodesian society was changing rapidly; the
try was hastening the process of urbanisation which with labour migration and the spread of western education was changing the basis of leadership in African society. Mutende helped to make a contribution by giving publicity to non-traditional forms of African associations like welfare societies, and the African Provincial and Representative Councils, and helped to create public images for the new opinion leaders, the educated, who could articulate the grievances and desires of Africans thrust into a rapidly changing society.

The campaign during the war to secure African co-operation in the war effort did have more success; there is tangible evidence that Africans did respond favourably as they, for example, volunteered for the regiment and contributed to war charities. But in other ways the This War Is Your War Too campaign proved dysfunctional for the administration. Much more information was being pumped into the country than hitherto via the bookstalls, the war news in Mutende, the occasional visit of the mobile cinema van, the broadcasts to Africans (which had a very limited audience) and the tales of returning African troops: the level of information was being raised and horizons broadened much more rapidly than would have been the case without the war and the orchestrated war propaganda campaign. The impact was, of course, selective and felt most keenly amongst the intelligentsia whose perceptions of their own state of colonial servitude were sharpened by anti-Nazi propaganda.
...and was most quick to see in the Atlantic Charter principles that could be applied at the termination of colonial rule in their own country. Nkumbula, as we have seen, linked that Atlantic Charter with its principle that people should be allowed to choose the form of government under which they were to be ruled, to the amalgamation question.

Both Mutende before the war and the war propaganda campaign in which all the media assisted (though Mutende was by far the most important) had the effect of increasing political awareness among Africans. The administration had anticipated this but had hoped to control the expression of this awareness. But no amount of government manipulation of organizations or propaganda could persuade African opinion to accept the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as being in the best interests of Africans. In government's persuasion campaign the partnership theme occupied the feature position. The partnership image had been used during the war by British propagandists to justify the Empire at home and abroad to the many sceptics who saw in the Empire a British device for economic exploitation. C.O. propagandists persevered with the theme after the war both in general usage to illustrate the nature of Britain's relations with the colonies and specifically as an ennobling image, a moral justification for the Federation. Africans were the junior partners but although the partners were junior, the junior partner was supposed, at least in C.O. rhetoric, to have some voice in the firm's decisions. Jeffries had
he official history of the C.O. in 1956 that:

the partners demanded and deserved
to be taken into confidence and
given material to make up their own
minds instead of having their minds
made up for them.

But this courtesy was not extended to the projected junior
partners in the Federation. When it seemed that the British
government was moving towards a federal solution for
Central Africa during the time that Creech-Jones was
Secretary of State for Colonies Africans were given to
understand in a report in the *African Weekly* of 20 April
1949 that he had said that 'The British Government would
never surrender the rule of the majority into the hands of
a minority however good and capable that minority might
be'. But when the Tories won the election in October
1951 the new Secretary of State for Colonies, Oliver
Lyttelton, abandoned the policy of 'Federation only by
consent' and plans went ahead for the setting up of a
Federation whether Africans liked it or not.

The Northern Rhodesian administration were now obliged
by the Tory-controlled C.O. to adopt a partisan approach
and attempt to 'persuade African opinion, if this is
possible,' Lyttelton told the House of Commons in July
1952 'that this scheme is to their advantage'.

in opinion refused to be persuaded to favour a federation then Lyttelton sought to discredit that opinion. African opposition he told the House of Commons in March 1953 was not:

based on reason, fact or understanding...and is a mixture of traditional fear of the unknown and dislike of many points falsely alleged to be features of the scheme but which in fact are not. ¹

African leaders had adopted the liberal democratic principle that government should rest on the consent of the governed; no amount of government propaganda could get them to give their consent to the Federation and so, in the manner of the autocrat, the British government imposed it against the will of the African majority. The disregard by the British government of the doctrine of popular sovereignty in relation to the African population of Central Africa ultimately led to the downfall of the Federation. The failure of both the indirect rule and Federation propaganda campaigns illustrates a fundamental requirement for successful propaganda; it must correspond to the felt needs and desires of the people; indirect rule was an anachronism and the Federation a device to thwart African ambition for majority rule in Central Africa.

Another and subsidiary factor working against attempts at political persuasion on the part of the

odesian government was that it chose the wrong target audience - it by-passed the new opinion leaders in favour of the less educated. In the early years of Mutende S. R. Denny had insisted that the paper should follow a policy of aiming 'upwards rather than downwards' for the educated were the new opinion leaders but his advice was ignored and it was later confirmed officially by Denny himself that Mutende was for 'the low-grade literates, those who are not very bright'.

In choosing to aim its propaganda at the less educated the Northern Rhodesian Information Department was not only running counter to British government policy in the post war years but it was also out of step with the findings of American mass communications theorists who began publishing their results in the late 1940s and early 1950s. After the war the C.O. had insisted that the only way for mass education/community development programmes to take off was for the educated men, the new leaders, to be associated with these programmes. The Drogheda Committee which conducted an enquiry into the overseas information services and published its report in 1954, declared that information departments should aim at the influential few in order to reach the many. This was in accord with the American Two Step Flow theory which had it that communications do not act directly on people, there is not a hypodermic effect, but rather

1. See p. 280.

Influenced in their behaviour and opinions by opinion leaders who are usually more active in public affairs than the rest of the group. Early evidence from Northern Rhodesia tallies with this later American finding; it will be recalled that when Mutende editor S. R. Denny was sent to the Copperbelt in 1937 to discover the reasons for poor sales he came back convinced that the poor opinion of the paper held by many of the educated was influencing the less educated; he considered their influence 'very great'. In October 1951 a report appeared in *The Times* commenting on attempts that had been made by the Secretary of State for Colonies, the administration and other non-official bodies to sound out African opinion on the Federation issue. It was found that African opinion could be classified into three groups. The first were the 'politically conscious and vocal minority' who tended to live in the urban areas and to belong to political associations and trade unions; the second, who were to be found in both the rural and urban areas 'included the more enlightened chiefs, the teachers, traders, clerks and various Government servants'. The second group were found to be often under the influence of the first group - the opinion leaders. The third group consisting of peasants and agricultural workers, who comprised 90 per cent of

1. See p. 63.
on according to The Times report, were considered 'on the whole passive and apathetic' by the p.c.s but they felt:

that a vigorous Government campaign could have swayed them one way or the other, though conservatism and fear of the unknown biased them in the direction of the status quo.

The 'masses', the report continued, 'were readily subject to influence either by administrative officers or by a handful of vocal politicians'; the latter had an unfair advantage, however, because officials had been ordered 'to preserve neutrality on federation'. 1 This report appeared on 8 October 1951 but when the Tories were swept back into power in that same month we have seen that all official neutrality on the Federation issue was abandoned. Both Congress and the administration campaigned for the minds and hearts of the masses, Congress now spreading its organization out into the rural areas.

Congress won. James Griffiths (who had briefly succeeded Creech-Jones as the Labour Secretary of State after the latter lost his seat in a by election) commented in the House of Commons in March 1953: 'Is it not true that since the officers have commended it the opposition has increased?' 2

Information Department more successful with its long term propaganda which was contributing to the socialisation of African peoples into western technological society? The most powerful of the propaganda channels proved, after the advent of the Saucepan Special in the early 1950s, to be the radio; it had its limitations - servicing and battery replacement proved a problem in many of the rural areas; but it did reach the widest audience and by the end of the period studied radio listening was becoming a feature of life in many rural as well as urban areas. The radio audiences were treated to a mixture of western and African culture with modern and traditional music, plays sometimes written or improvised by Africans, political propaganda talks, news programmes and adult education programmes. Though in itself the film was considered the most powerful of all the propaganda weapons, its impact was severely restricted because of logistical problems associated with the mobile cinema vans; with eight vans covering the whole rural scene and subject to break downs, and bad weather and roads, cinema viewing was a rarity in the rural areas. In addition operators often gave inadequate commentaries and explanations which frequently minimised the effectiveness of films that were shown. These educational films were primarily intended for rural audiences but the target audience had insufficient exposure to the films for them

1. Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1956, 9.
e Information Department more successful with its long term propaganda which was contributing to the socialisation of African peoples into western technological society? The most powerful of the propaganda channels proved, after the advent of the Saucepan Special in the early 1950s, to be the radio; it had its limitations - servicing and battery replacement proved a problem in many of the rural areas; but it did reach the widest audience and by the end of the period studied radio listening was becoming a feature of life in many rural as well as urban areas. The radio audiences were treated to a mixture of western and African culture with modern and traditional music, plays sometimes written or improvised by Africans, political propaganda talks, news programmes and adult education programmes. Though in itself the film was considered the most powerful of all the propaganda weapons, its impact was severely restricted because of logistical problems associated with the mobile cinema vans; with eight vans covering the whole rural scene and subject to break downs, and bad weather and roads, cinema viewing was a rarity in the rural areas. In addition operators often gave inadequate commentaries and explanations which frequently minimised the effectiveness of films that were shown.¹ These educational films were primarily intended for rural audiences but the target audience had insufficient exposure to the films for them

¹ Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report, 1956, 9.
both to promote aspects of African culture and to assist cultural fusion.

This long term process of socialisation appears on the face of it to have been basically cultural and educational in contrast to the short term political propaganda campaign waged over a particular issue but in a more subtle and informal manner this cultural and educational work was having indirectly a political and economic effect. It was cementing the ties of Empire and therefore contributing to the success of the principal aim of British overseas information work: the maintenance of the British connection. The Federation was dissolved but Zambia remains within the British Commonwealth.
SELECT LIST OF SOURCES

A. PRIMARY SOURCES
   I. Unpublished Primary Sources
   II. Printed Primary Sources
   III. Interviews
   IV. Film Archives

B. SECONDARY SOURCES
   I. Published Secondary Sources
   II. Unpublished Secondary Sources

A. PRIMARY SOURCES
I. Unpublished Primary Sources
   (i) Government Archives
      (a) Great Britain
         Public Record Office, London
         CO 323 Colonies General Correspondence
         CO 537 Colonies General Supplementary Original Correspondence
         CO 795 Northern Rhodesia Original Correspondence
         CO 859 Social Service Original Correspondence
         CO 875 Public Relations and Information Original Correspondence
         INF 1 Ministry of Information Files of Correspondence
         INF 2 Guard Books and Unregistered Papers
         INF 10 British Empire Collection of Photographs
   (b) Zambia
      National Archives of Zambia (select list of files consulted)
         SEC 1/181-SEC 1/221 Central African Council
         SEC 1/455-SEC 1/462 Advisory Board on Native Education
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Recruiting of African Soldiers
East African Governors' Conference, MOI, Public Opinion Reports, Film Censorship
African Broadcasting
Watch Tower Movement
Native Development Board
Kitwe African Society
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Information Office - Kenya
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Information Office - Northern Rhodesia
Information Office - Nyasaland
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(b) Australia

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(3) Government Papers (mimeographed)


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Interview with W. Frost, formerly of the Department of Literature and Languages, the University of Zambia.

IV. Film Archives

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(a) National Film Archive, 81 Dean Street, Soho, London.

(b) The Overseas Film and Television Centre Limited, Overseas House, 19/23 Ironmonger Row, London.

(c) Imperial War Museum, London.

(ii) Zambia

Zambia Information Services Film Library, Lusaka.

(iii) Zimbabwe

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